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Foreword
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been at the heart of Vietnam’s
structural transition following the doi moi reform process in the mid-1980s. The
unprecedented economic growth and poverty reduction that quickly followed
promoted the country from a low-income to a middle-income economy over a
relatively short timeframe, which in turn resulted in an impressive lowering of
poverty levels and increased prosperity and general wellbeing of the population.
The much-improved social indicators sparked serious enquiry into the poverty-
reducing impact of Vietnam’s SMEs, which is the origins of this book. The
research looks at enterprises within the private manufacturing sector—urban
and rural, formal and informal—using rich data from surveys since 2005 and
every two years covering some 2,500 enterprises across ten provinces.
John Rand and Finn Tarp, the editors of this book, have been heavily involved
from the beginning—crafting the surveys, gathering and interpreting the wealth of
survey data. I heartily thank them for the steady direction of the research work,
their analytical skills and authorship which are brought together here for us to
read and contemplate the process of economic development and social progress at
the country level.
Danida, Denmark’s International Development Agency, provided considerable
support to the survey work. UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support
and financial contributions to its research programme by the governments of Fin-
land, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Without this vital funding our research
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complete inventory is simply not feasible for reasons of space.¹
A profound debt is owed to senior colleagues in Vietnam, including the former
Presidents of CIEM, Dr Le Dang Doanh, Dr Dinh Van An, and Associate
Professor Le Xuan Ba, as well as the current CIEM President Dr Nguyen Dinh
Cung. Together with the present and former Director General of ILSSA Dr Dao
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memory with sincere gratitude.
Ambassador John Nielsen followed up in his effective ways and supported the
research effort throughout its various stages to its end.
¹ For full details on background and contributions please see the six cross-section reports covering
each of the SME rounds available at the following website: http://web.econ.ku.dk/ftarp/publications.
html#. In each of these reports we have for the past 10–15 years carefully recorded our acknowl-
edgments to the many colleagues and friends with whom we have worked in pursuing the SME survey
in Vietnam. Reference can also be made to the detailed questionnaires and the data available on the
UNU-WIDER and DERG websites. We explicitly acknowledge that the following colleagues have in
various ways contributed as co-authors of the cross-sectional reports: Kasper Brandt, Smriti Sharma,
Neda Trifković, Marie Skibsted, Benedikte Bjerge, Nina Torm, Simon McCoy, Patricia Silva, Theo
Larsen, and Theo Talbot.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
Our work would not have been possible without continuous professional and
administrative interaction, advice and encouragement from a large number of
individuals at CIEM and ILSSA. Among many others, we would like to highlight
our gratitude to the former CIEMVice-President, Mrs Vu Xuan Nguyet Hong and
present Vice-President Dr Nguyen Thi Tue Anh as well as Dr Dang Thi Thu Hoai
who have been close collaborators from the very beginning. The same goes for
Mr Bui Van Dung and Mr Nguyen Thanh Tam, who were active members of the
research team as were in the early years Dr Tran Tien Cuong and Mr Trinh Duc
Chieu. Moreover, we are most grateful to Project Assistants Ms Do Hong Giang
and Ms Bui Phuong Lien. Without their tireless support in the organization of
numerous project activities, including the publication of countless reports and
studies during a decade of project work the present volume would have been
impossible.
Turning to the essential, highly productive, and stimulating collaboration with
the data collection and management teams from ILSSA, they were effectively
coordinated by the present Director General Dr Dao Quang Vinh, the former
Directors General Dr Nguyen Huu Dzung and Associate Professor Dr Nguyen Thi
Lan Huong, Vice Directors General, Mr Le Ngu Binh, Mr Luu Quang Tuan, and
their immediate daily colleagues including Dr Chu Thi Lan, Ms Nguyen Hai Ninh,
Ms Nguyen Phuong Tra Mi, Ms Hoang Thi Minh, Ms Le Quynh Huong, Mr Le
Hoang Dzung, Mr Nguyen Tien Quyet, Mr Nguyen Van Du, and Ms Tran Thu
Hang. The survey would not have taken off without the efforts of these and many
other ILSSA staff too numerous to name here in compiling the questionnaires,
training enumerators, implementing the survey in the field, and cleaning the data.
A particular thanks is also extended for the effective and most helpful assistance
provided by all administrative levels in Vietnam from the centre in Hanoi and all
the way out to the provincial, district and commune officials and people who
helped organizing numerous field trips and pilots over more than decade of work.
Without these crucial efforts neither we personally nor the international collab-
orators in general would have been in a position to even begin comprehending the
realities and challenges of SME development in Vietnam. We hope all we learnt
comes out clearly.
Importantly, we would like to express our deepest sense of appreciation for the
valuable time the several thousand small and medium enterprises throughout
Vietnam made available to us in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 during
the interviews carried out as part of this study. It was a humbling and thought-
provoking experience to see the openness and eagerness with which they wel-
comed and engaged with us all and the many enumerator enumerator teams. We
sincerely hope that the present volume will prove useful in the shared search for
effective policies geared towards improving their daily struggle in the market place
promoting their enterprises. This is in the final analysis the overarching goal of
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Introduction
John Rand and Finn Tarp
Over the past 30 years, Vietnam has experienced unprecedented growth and
poverty reduction, turning the country into a middle-income economy over a
relatively short time span. Most of this growth came from structural change,
where a significant proportion of the labour force moved swiftly from the agri-
cultural sector to manufacturing. During the pre-industrial transition stage in the
late 1980s, agriculture accounted for more than 40 per cent of GDP and 75 per cent
of employment (Malesky and London 2014). Three decades later the share
of workers registered within agriculture has more than halved, with labour having
shifted towards both industry and services—a process that is still ongoing
(McCaig and Pavcnik 2016; McCaig and Pavcnik 2018a; Tarp 2018). Moreover,
this change has so far happened without worrying trends as regards income
inequality, especially within urban areas, where change has gone hand-in-hand
with higher salaries in manufacturing and services and increased wage-job oppor-
tunities in those sectors (Benjamin et al. 2017).
Private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been key for the structural
transition in Vietnam that followed the initiation of the Doi Moi reform process
in 1986. A leading global expert on Vietnam uses the term ‘gradualist’ when
describing the nature of the policy-making process underlying the impressive
Vietnamese development performance (Rama 2008). By this Rama refers to the
fact that Vietnam adopted early on a dual-track approach, and that policy
makers allowed firms to expand alongside the state sector as long as they fulfilled
their quotas at state-given prices (Malesky and London 2014). Also important
for the development of a thriving private SME sector has been the innate reform
design and willingness to experiment combined with the decentralized nature
of the reform process. The government tried out larger scale reforms in selected
provinces, before deciding whether to implement a given initiative at the
national level. As such, experimentation and quality governance were crucial
for the success of nationwide reform initiatives taking place in parallel with the
policy to promote private SMEs. These initiatives included state-owned enter-
prise (SOE) reform, FDI and industrial zone policies, and business-related
administrative initiatives, such as the introduction of one-stop shops (Rama 2008;
Malesky and London 2014).
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Although Vietnam has throughout the reform process experimented with and
allowed for an increased influence of the private sector, significant state influence
remains a core feature of the Vietnamese development strategy. Large state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) continue to receive government protection and highly
favourable conditions compared to smaller domestic and foreign firms. This is
so in spite of the observation that this may be detrimental to economic growth, as
it discourages investment in skills for those without connections within the state
apparatus (Phan and Coxhead 2013). This preferential treatment of SOEs in key
industries has influenced the development of private industrial SMEs, as resource
allocation for the most productive firms has been ‘politically constrained’.
The Vietnamese government has throughout acknowledged that especially
industrial SOEs need to improve their efficiency, and though they have struggled
to do so, it remains a key policy priority of the government to ensure significant
state influence in key areas of the industrial sector. At present the SOE share in
GDP continues to be about the same as it was in 1990 (approximately 30 per cent).
In contrast, private SMEs account for around 95 per cent of all firms, about half of
the workforce and approximately 40 per cent of GDP (GSO 2018). The large
number of SMEs embodies a significant potential for dynamic and inclusive
economic growth. This is so because SMEs can be a dynamic force in generating
labour-intensive growth; in increasing competition in local markets; and in
generating much needed savings and innovation. Moreover, structural transform-
ation—the movement of workers from low-productivity to high-productivity
activities and sectors—requires SME expansion and is as already noted an essen-
tial feature of rapid and sustained growth and development.
However, SMEs also represent a series of policy challenges for future economic
development in Vietnam and elsewhere. Many small firms continue to operate as
household enterprises at the border between formality and informality. They often
remain credit rationed and/or constrained, with negative repercussions for an
optimal allocation of scarce resources, productivity and the welfare of employers
and employees. In addition, the potential and significance of SMEs normally stand
in stark contrast with the widespread lack of understanding of the characteristics,
dynamics and constraints faced by smaller firms. We conceived this volume to
help promote a better understanding of what drives SME growth and develop
insights into the underlying behaviour of SME owners, managers, and employees.
We see this as an essential task and necessary for both the development profession
and policy makers at large as they strive to address the objective of promoting
sustainable private sector development—with a view to achieving key aims among
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) launched by the UN in 2015. Import-
antly, SMEs are central—not only in promoting inclusive and sustainable eco-
nomic growth, employment, and decent work for all (SDG8); SMEs also promote
sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (Goal 9) and can help reduce
income inequalities (SDG10) if they receive support to provide good-quality jobs.
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Finally, they can support achieving gender equality (SDG5) and women’s
empowerment through female entrepreneurship.
In Vietnam, SMEs have (as already noted) been at the very core of the
government strategy for inclusive growth and economic transformation. Yet,
although Vietnam has seen a rapid increase in the number of registered enter-
prises, evidence also shows that only a small fraction of smaller household
businesses have become registered during the past three decades. This means
that the official statistics do not capture well some 30 million employees even if
they form a critically important part of the SME dynamics, both in terms of job
and income creation. It is therefore apparent that studying the dynamics and
growth process of smaller (both formal and informal) firms is key for disentan-
gling our understanding of Vietnam’s economic success story.
The roots of this volume grow from the time when the first Danida-supported
SME survey of Vietnamese non-state manufacturing enterprises covering more
than 2,500 firms in ten provinces began in 2005.¹ We focused from the start on the
private manufacturing sector, and we included rural and urban as well as formal
and informal enterprises. The success of the 2005 SME survey inspired the Central
Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) of the Ministry of Planning and
Investment (MPI) in Hanoi, the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs
(ILSSA) of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), the
Development Economics Research Group (DERG) of the University of Copen-
hagen and UNU-WIDER, together with Danida, to plan and carry out an ambi-
tious series of SME panel surveys. Since 2005, we implemented the survey of these
enterprises every two years, and it is on this extraordinary foundation that the
present volume builds.
Importantly, since the survey tracked the same SMEs over time, the SME
database is by now a very strong tool for gaining detailed and policy-relevant
information about private sector firm dynamics and enterprise development in
Vietnam from 2005–15. During this decade, the number of registered non-state
SME manufacturing firms more than tripled and so did their labour force. The
overall performance of the smaller firms shows a clear and promising trend of
consistent growth, but the process is taking place in what remains a constrained
environment that often results in a non-optimal allocation of resources. For
example, while some companies face credit constraints, other challenges are the
rigidities of the regulatory environment or institutional weaknesses. Understand-
ing the circumstances under which both formal and informal SMEs operate and
the constraints and opportunities they face is a key input into evidence-based
¹ We acknowledge inspiration from the 1991 survey by Ronnås (1992), and note that the ten
provinces include Ha Noi, Ha Tay (now part of Ha Noi), Hai Phong, Ho Chi Min City, Phu Tho,
Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, and Long An. Further details on the data are available
in Chapter 2.
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policy-making for the future of businesses, the overall economy, and the welfare of
the Vietnamese people in both urban and rural areas.
While six detailed descriptive cross-section reports for each of the SME survey
years are available,² capturing change from one survey to the next, the present
volume presents for the first time a comprehensive set of detailed analytical
studies, which rely throughout on the complete and coherent data from more
than 2,500 SMEs in ten provinces. Attention is on the time dimension rather than
on individual cross-section information and descriptions. We carefully selected
these papers from a UNU-WIDER call for research proposals, and we reviewed
and discussed all papers in a joint workshop in November 2017 in Hanoi. Thus, all
chapters in the volume—including this framework-setting introduction and the
concluding chapter by the editors—rely extensively on the SME panel; owners,
managers, and employees in the firms included in this panel have all lived through
and experienced a critical period in Vietnam’s economic development process
while managing their daily private and productive lives. How the firms coped and
ended up performing in a highly dynamic macroeconomic environment under a
complex set of constraints is key in what the research work tries to uncover.
ILSSA carried out the wide range of tasks related to the planning and imple-
mentation of the SME survey in the field and UNU-WIDER and DERG collab-
orated with CIEM in all aspects of survey design and data analysis. A full package
of capacity-building activities by DERG—and later on UNU-WIDER staff—
including both formal courses, on-the-job training and a wealth of seminars,
were conducted in Vietnam and elsewhere throughout this process under ongoing
institutional twinning arrangements. The shared scholarly aim was to ensure that
the SME project developed both the data required to deliver policy-relevant
research to decision makers and the research capacity within Vietnamese institu-
tions to take advantage of that data.
We did not foresee in 2005—when we launched the SME panel survey—that
the report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel of Eminent persons on
the Post-2015 Development Agenda (HLP), would call—more than ten years
later—for a data revolution for sustainable development post-2015 as follows:³
We also call for a data revolution for sustainable development, with a new
international initiative to improve the quality of statistics and information
available to citizens. We should actively take advantage of new technology,
crowd sourcing, and improved connectivity to empower people with information
on the progress towards the targets.
(Chapter 4, Implementation, Accountability and Building Consensus, p. 21.)
² See http://web.econ.ku.dk/ftarp/publications.html#++++.
³ See https://www.un.org/sg/en/management/beyond2015.shtml.
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The HLP call for a data revolution is most pertinent, and it forms the rationale for
the UNU-WIDER project on structural transformation and inclusive growth in
Vietnam under which we pursued the SME panel surveys over the years.⁴ While
substantial improvements in statistical systems took place in many developing
countries over the past decades, performance remains poor in far too many sectors
and countries. The call for ‘increased support for strengthening data collection
and capacity-building in Member States’ was rightly reiterated in the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). It is this background—and recalling UNU-WIDER’s
long-standing expertise in innovation in data collection and analysis—that leads
us to believe that data will be at the epicentre of development action in the coming
decades. At the same time, while the logic of a concerted push towards a data
revolution is compelling, these calls are often somewhat ‘fluffy’—and it is not
entirely clear from ongoing debates that it is widely understood what such a
revolution actually demands and means in concrete practice.
We developed the aims of this volume with these concerns in mind using
Vietnam as a fascinating case due to the concrete and unique, and coincidental,
availability of the SME experience and panel dataset. Furthermore, Vietnam’s
contemporary similarities to a large number of developing economies, including
its strong private sector performance after the Doi Moi reforms, make its experi-
ence and policy recommendations, based on analysis of microeconomic data,
highly relevant for many regional and extra-regional stakeholders. In fact, Vietnam
provides an exceptionally informative environment in which to observe and con-
sider the importance of key factors and mechanisms influencing SME performance
and development, including:
• credit access and management practices;
• political connections, institutional quality, and innovation; and
• certification, working conditions, and union membership.
These dimensions therefore make up the three core-components of this vol-
ume, and the associated Chapters 3–11 identify throughout the policy challenges
in each area. They follow this scene-setting introduction and a detailed description
of the data in Chapter 2; and we conclude by drawing up a series of policy
implications in Chapter 12.
In sum, the aims of this volume are to:
• Provide an in-depth evaluation of the development of private sector formal
and informal manufacturing SMEs in a developing country—Vietnam in this
case—over the past decade, combining a unique primary source of panel data
with the best analytical tools available.
⁴ See https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/structural-transformation-and-inclusive-growth-viet-nam.
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• Generate a comprehensive understanding of the impact of business risks,
credit access, and institutional characteristics, on the one hand, and govern-
ment policies on SME growth performance at the enterprise level, on the
other, including the importance of working conditions, informality, and
union membership.
• Serve as a lens through which other countries, and the international devel-
opment community at large, may wish to approach the massive task of
pursuing a meaningful data revolution as an integral element of the SDG
development agenda.
• Make available a comprehensive set of materials and studies of use to
academics, students, and development practitioners interested in an inte-
grated approach to the study of growth, private sector development, and the
microeconomic analysis of SME development in a fascinating developing
country.
Finally, we hope that the volume can provide a comprehensive analytic con-
tribution to a crucial topic within the discipline of development economics based
on some fifteen years of continued efforts. In addition, we wish to help persuade
national and international policy makers (including donors) of the need to take
the call for a data revolution seriously, not only in rhetoric, but also in concrete
plans and budget allocations, and in the necessary sustained action at country
level. This is where inclusive socioeconomic development takes place and benefit
poor and discriminated people who are struggling to make ends meet; and private
sector progress is fundamental in this effort.
Focusing next on the specific context of the individual chapters, and relating to
selected literature in the field rather than going in chronological order, one of the
most significant challenges encountered by private industrial SMEs in Vietnam in
developing their potential is restricted access to credit. This topic is of particular
importance, and has led to a variety of papers on the topic over the years using
different data sources. As an example, Rand (2007) used the pilot data of the data
utilized in this book volume to analyse the extent to which borrowing constraints
restrict firm access to credit. Based on information from 1,106 Vietnamese
manufacturing SMEs, his paper suggested that approximately 25 per cent of
enterprises are credit constrained, and that these small firms would increase
their debt demand by 115 per cent if borrowing constraints were relaxed. His
analysis also suggested that informal credit markets in Vietnam play an important
role especially for fast growing firms, as successful entrepreneurs do not have the
time to go through the administrative difficulties faced in the formal credit system.
Another contribution by Malesky and Taussig (2009a) analyses the dynamics of
relationship-based lending in the country’s financial system. Using data from the
Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) initiative, covering around
6,400 firms in all provinces in Vietnam, they assess the extent to which firm
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owners’ political connections are determinants of bank loans. The results show
that these connections increase the likelihood of accessing loans by 4 per cent.
Their paper moreover finds that political connections have a distortive impact
on capital allocation mechanisms and that the most profitable private firms
actually opt out of the formal financial system, and choose to use informal
means to access credit.⁵
Three chapters in this book volume extend and deepen this literature. First,
Christina Kinghan, Carol Newman, and Conor O’Toole look in Chapter 3 at
capital allocation and credit access for SME growth, and find that capital alloca-
tion in Vietnam is sub-optimal. Firms with higher returns to capital are less likely
to access formal finance, confirming on a much stronger data set the results in
Rand (2007). Enrico Santarelli and Hien Thu Tran address in turn in Chapter 4
the interaction between human capital and institutional quality in determining the
dynamics of capital structure. The authors find that it is very hard for non-state
firms to access formal financing, and the ones capable of doing so rely on their
influence, using tax benefits against financial distress. At the same time, whilst
human capital encourages more loans, its interaction with institutional quality
favours other financial resources over debt financing, again consistent with the
early results in Rand (2007). Chapter 6 by John Rand links to the issue of credit
allocation by studying the effect of political connectedness on credit constraints.
Controlling for unobserved time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity, as well as
self-selection and access to alternative credit markets, his chapter shows that
political connections decrease the likelihood of SMEs being credit constrained
by 4 per centage points, basically confirming the findings in Malesky and Taussig
(2009a) using different analytical approaches.
While work on assessing the relevance of political and economic institutions in
influencing a sound and stable business and investment environment has been a
core research topic for decades, the direction of causality has remained a chal-
lenge, and this is also so in the context of Vietnam (Malesky 2010). Yet, since the
early 1990s, business/government relations in Vietnam have been highly decen-
tralized towards the province level. Exploiting this variation across different
provinces Malesky et al. (2015a) utilize the Annual Enterprise Survey published
by the General Statistical Office (GSO) in combination with data from the
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) to determine the extent to which local
institutions affect the environment for firm investment. They identify transparency—
i.e., making available provincial planning documents—as the most robust predictor
⁵ This is in line with the analysis by Steer and Sen (2010), who find that informal institutions in
Vietnam have contributed to expanding the private sector, in particular given the absence in this
process of complete and trustworthy formal institutions. Using primary data from 305 firms collected
in 2004, the authors show how informal institutions such as social networks, friends and families have
helped Vietnamese firms gather information on their trading partners in the absence of formal means
to access this information.
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of private firm investment in Vietnam, and more relevant than property rights,
contracting institutions, and corruption. This effect is particularly significant for
small domestic private firms (SMEs). Another element affecting the quality of the
investment environment is corruption. Rand and Tarp (2012) used two rounds of
the data underpinning this book volume to develop a better understanding of the
nature, evolution, and potential impact of bribe-paying behaviour. Based on data for
1,659 manufacturing SMEs in the ten provinces they show that bribe incidence is
highly associatedwith firm-level differences in visibility, sunk costs, and ability to pay.
Formality correlates positively with bribe incidence, so ‘visibility’ in this sense seems
to dominate the ‘bribes-to-hide’ effect in determining corruption.
Chapter 6 as well as Chapter 8 in this volume follow directly in the footsteps of
the work about institutional quality and investment behaviour. We already com-
mented on Chapter 6, and Tam Thanh Nguyen and Chieu Duc Trinh look in
Chapter 8 at how slack resources affect investments in innovation for Vietnamese
SMEs, and find that whilst financial slack hinders innovation, human capital slack
stimulates innovation in the direction of new business processes or products.
Moreover, firms located in more favourable business environments experience
less positive effects from human capital slack, and lesser negative effects of
financial capital slack. Chapter 9 by Neda Trifković links indirectly to the discus-
sion of institutional quality and corruption by looking at the role of international
private standards in reducing business risks, defined as financial loss or physical
damage related to business activities. As the chapter shows, international stand-
ards have the potential to increase productivity for Vietnamese SMEs, as inter-
national certification correlates with lower risk of temporary closure, informal
payments, and customer risk.
The institutional context not only matters for firm access to credit and invest-
ments. Institutions play a key role in a firm’s decision to formally register and pay
taxes. In the case of Vietnam, Malesky and Taussig (2009b) argue that improve-
ments in institutions have a strong impact on the likelihood of SMEs registering
formally from the very commencement of their activities. At the same time, they
reduce the amount of time informal firms choose to remain informal. Informality
affects state-revenue. It also affects the health and safety of firm employees, as they
lack access to a number of non-wage benefits, such as contributions for pension,
paid holidays, right to minimum wages and to a maximum number of weekly
working hours. Many do not have access to a written contract. This weakens the
conditions of the institutional structure, which in turn encourages more infor-
mality. To address the problem of endogeneity in the relation between formality
and quality of institutions, Malesky and Taussig (2009b) rely on a two-stage
instrumental variable approach, using the experience of the Vietnam War as an
exogenous determinant of today’s institutions. The results support a causal rela-
tion going from institutions to formalization. Moreover, in a disaggregated ana-
lysis it emerges that property rights are the most relevant institution in Vietnam
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when it comes to drivers of formalization, more important than regulatory
frameworks and contract enforcement work.
Rand and Torm (2012a) also offer evidence on the benefits of formality. They
found that being formal increases profits for Vietnamese SMEs by about 10 per cent,
once they control for firm size, firm location, workforce and owners character-
istics. These results also hold for informal firms in 2007 that formalized by 2009,
and which saw their profits increase by 16 per cent. The Rand and Torm study
finds evidence as well for formalization leading to higher capital stocks, and a
more empowered workforce, where workers’ rights and duties are set out in
formal contracts. Combining qualitative with quantitative evidence, the authors
show as well that informality is often the result of lack of awareness of the
benefits of formality. Most informal SMEs are only aware of the financial costs
of formalization. Furthermore, Rand and Torm (2012b) find that formalization
brings forward salaries that are between 10 and 20 per cent higher for formal
workers compared to informal firms, a result driven mostly by observed character-
istics, such as firm size, workforce characteristics, and location of the firms.⁶
McCaig and Pavcnik (2018b) is another study of the financial benefits of
formalization, and they use data from three rounds of the Vietnam Household
Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). They show that registration does not bring
about particular benefits for Vietnamese SMEs, which is contrary to the findings
in Rand and Torm (2012a). McCaig and Pavcnik (2018b) utilize data that enables
them to observe whether firms that choose to formalize are significantly different
in terms of growth rates prior to formalization compared to firms that choose not
to formalize. Moreover, they document that very few firms formalize to hire more
paid employees. They rather choose to employ unpaid family-members. These
results are partly in line with those of Cling et al. (2017), who find that many
household businesses do not perceive any growth benefits of formalization. They
state that procedures are complicated, and they are unable to determine how taxes
are calculated, reinforcing the perception of taxation as an arbitrary process.
Finally, some scholars argue that informality is the consequence of lack of
information on behalf of SMEs and blurry regulations in place in relation to
registration. In fact, as Cling et al. (2017) argue, informality is the result of
complex and unclear registration procedures, rather than an intention to evade
taxation. To support their argument, the authors use first-hand data from a survey
implemented in Ho Chi Min City and Hanoi, combined with qualitative inter-
views from a sub-sample of the survey. The evidence shows that almost all
informal SMEs are generally unaware of regulations, though they appear to be
aware of the fact that they would be less subject to corruption if they registered.
In addition, the Cling et al. paper finds that the incentives beyond the setting up of
⁶ For a detailed discussion of Vietnamese formal/informal wage gaps at worker-level, see Nguyen
et al. (2013).
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the business are quite important when it comes to formalization: if the business
has been set up because of an independent choice and not in response to the lack
of any other viable alternative, the likelihood is higher that is it registered. The
location of business premises also matters, as businesses with fixed premises are
more likely to be registered. Whether institutions, information or trade affect
informality in Vietnam, the accumulated evidence seems to point to the notion
that the benefits of formality have to be more clearly communicated and under-
stood by SMEs.
Informality can also exist at the employee level (within a formal firm). This is so
even if registration should be compulsory for all formal workers. Accordingly, not
many employees enjoy social insurance as present, as a vast majority of them
tends to collect their benefits upon termination of employment. This means that
very few meet the requirement of twenty or more years of contributions necessary
for claiming a pension at a later stage. Salaries for employees also tend to be
underreported to reduce contributions from employers, and employees often
agree to receive slightly higher salaries on the condition of remaining unregistered
(Castel and Pick 2018). This is problematic as formality and employee registration
bring forward a number of other benefits for both firms and employees, including
stable wages, decrease in casual labour, better access to less expensive credit,
higher profits, and increase in customer demand. Formal firms are much more
productive than informal firms partly due to higher levels of education recorded
amongst formal firm owners (La Porta and Shleifer 2014).
Three chapters are directly relevant to these reflections about firm informality
and labour conditions. In Chapter 7, Thi Bich Tran and Hai Anh La address the
reasons that push household businesses to remain informal. They find that
informality amongst top-tier firms results from household businesses perceiving
the tax cost of formalization to be larger than the benefits of formalization. As
government officials do not promote formalization amongst this category of firms,
the authors hypothesize that corruptive behaviour between top tier firms and
government officials may perpetuate the former’s condition of informality. Turn-
ing to Christophe J. Nordman and Smriti Sharma in Chapter 10, they look at
economic returns derived from working conditions and shows that no mechanism
is in place in Vietnam to compensate labourers working in unfavourable condi-
tions and lacking a formal contract. In addition, employees hired through formal
procedures, and lacking a formal contract, earn less than similar employees hired
relying on social network channels. Finally, Nina Torm deals in Chapter 11 with the
benefits of trade union membership. She finds that, controlling for firm and worker
characteristics, the wages of unionized workers are between 9 and 22 per cent higher
than wages of non-unionized workers, with gains increasing progressively towards
the upper end of the distribution. Axel Demenet and Quynh Hoang in Chapter 5
also touch upon informality, though indirectly. They study the degree of informal-
ity and firm performance looking at the importance of management practices for
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SMEs productivity; and they show a positive and significant association between
managerial capital and firm productivity, particularly relevant formicro (informal)
and small enterprises, as opposed to more formal firms of medium size.
In sum, we reiterate that the Vietnamese economy has undergone dramatic
changes in the last thirty years or so since Doi Moi began in 1986. Whilst the
country has on the one hand opened up to the global economy, a number of wide
ranging domestic changes have also taken place, which have contributed to
increasing the general wellbeing of the population. Structural reallocations of the
labour force from agriculture to manufacturing has increased the number of
domestic firms; combined with an increase in the number of foreign firms and
foreign direct investment. The introduction of the Enterprise Law in 2000 played a
key role in this, in particular for small and micro-enterprises, easing the procedures
for firm registration. Nonetheless, these procedures remain rather complex and
ambiguous, especially when it comes to smaller firms, which do not need to register
fully, depending on the size of their turnover and the location of their premises.
Arguably, the blurred lines between formality and informality have negative
consequences for the future of the Vietnamese economy, especially as evidence
demonstrates that small informal firms have lower levels of total factor product-
ivity, are more credit constrained, and the wages of their employees are signifi-
cantly lower than the wages of their formal counterparts. However, formalization
encounters a number of obstacles. Going forward it seems policy makers will have
to promote SME-formalization, whilst at the same time improving the institu-
tional environment for formalization. In the meantime, SMEs must adapt to the
changing character of the Vietnamese economy. Highly relevant success stories
from the early stages of privatization and transition show that those Vietnamese
SMEs that were capable of adapting their strategy to the needs of the export-
oriented and labour-intensive manufacturing sector are those that managed to
achieve sustainable growth (Taussig 2013). Yet, as seen above, the process of
adaptation, renewal and growth remains paved with challenges. We try in this
book to shed further light on the nature of these challenges and suggest new
perspectives on how to tackle them.
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2
The Vietnam SME Data, 2005–15
Hanna Berkel, John Rand, Finn Tarp,
and Neda Trifković
2.1 Delving into the Vietnam SME Data
This chapter sheds light on the Vietnam SME database. It covers six survey rounds
during the period 2005–15 and represents the basis for the analytical work in all
subsequent chapters. We start by outlining the overall purpose behind collecting
the SME data and continue to describe the data, including sample design, firm and
owner characteristics and attrition. Section 2.2 compares the SME data with the
characteristics of Vietnam’s overall enterprise population as provided by the
General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) to evaluate the representativeness of
the former.
2.1.1 Purpose
Since the initiation of the Doi Moi reforms in 1986, it is widely believed that SMEs
have critical characteristics that contribute to Vietnam’s economic and social
development. Specifically, SMEs represent a source of growth, savings, employ-
ment creation, and increased competition. Despite their vast potential, general
knowledge on their characteristics, as well as the opportunities and constraints
they were facing was lacking at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Accordingly,
it was difficult for researchers to formulate evidence-based policy recommenda-
tions and for the government to assist this sector. This led the Institute of Labour
Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social
Affairs (MOLISA) jointly with the Central Institute of Economic Management
(CIEM) to implement a representative survey of non-state manufacturing enter-
prises in 2005. Technical collaboration came forward from the Development Eco-
nomics Research Group (DERG) at the Department of Economics at the University
of Copenhagen and funding was provided by Danida (CIEM 2007). The chosen
firms were located in ten different provinces,¹ as shown in Figure 2.1: Ha Noi, Phu
¹ In 2009, Ha Tay province became part of Ha Noi such that Ha Tay does not appear as a separate
province in Figure 2.1. In our dataset, we maintain Ha Tay as a separate province because it facilitates
the comparability with previous years.
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Tho, Ha Tay, Hai Phong, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, Ho Chi
Minh City, and Long An. Subsequently, five more survey rounds took place bian-
nually until 2015, supported from 2011 by UNU-WIDER. The overall aim was to
follow the same enterprises over time to understand their long-term development
and to analyse the business environment in which they operate (Brandt et al. 2016;
Rand et al. 2014, 2008; Rand and Tarp 2012, 2010).
2.1.2 Sample Design
In Vietnam, non-state manufacturing enterprises register as private, collective,
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Figure 2.1 Location of the sampled provinces and map of Vietnam
Source: igismap.com for Vietnam shapefile used for the left-hand map created in Stata by the authors,
and Tarp (2017: 28) for the right-hand map.
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Accordingly, the sampling frame we aimed for does not include state-owned or
FDI enterprises. The population frame of non-state manufacturing enterprises
originated from two datasets from GSO and additional on-site screening of firms
by the enumerators. First, the 2002 Establishment Census (GSO 2004), from
which the number of non-state registered household business establishments
that do not satisfy the conditions stated in the Enterprise Law was taken. Second,
the Industrial Survey (GSO 2007), from which the number of enterprises formally
registered under the Enterprise Law, was obtained. Our ten provinces jointly
covered 30 per cent of the country’s overall non-state manufacturing population
in 2005. As we wanted to ensure representativeness at the province level for
formal/registered non-state manufacturing firms, we aimed at estimating the
sample size for the smallest group (in this case Lam Dong) and subsequently
determine the sample sizes for the remaining provinces. For reasons of imple-
mentation, the survey had to be limited to a select number of districts within each
province. Thus, firm selection took place in a two-step sampling procedure. In the
first step, districts within each province were selected using probability propor-
tional to size (PPS) sampling. The number of selected districts in each province is
proportional to the number of districts in each province. In the second step, firms
within a selected district were randomly selected from the population list of
formal/registered non-state and household manufacturing firms (including
164,468 firms), as shown in Table 2.1.
During the pilot surveys, it became clear that we could only collect information
on informal manufacturing firms through snowballing techniques. Accordingly,
Table 2.1 Vietnam’s non-state and household manufacturing: population by province
in 2005
Province Householdenterprises Non-stateenterprises Total
Ha Noi 16,588 2,429 19,017
Phu Tho 17,042 127 17,169
Ha Tay* 23,890 201 24,091
Hai Phong 12,811 363 13,174
Nghe An 22,695 237 22,932
Quang Nam 10,509 111 10,620
Khanh Hoa* 5,603 256 5,859
Lam Dong 5,268 160 5,428
HCMC 34,241 3,682 37,923
Long An 8,050 205 8,255
Total 156,697 7,771 164,468
Notes: Includes only non-state manufacturing enterprises. Figures for Ha Tay have been downward
adjusted and Khanh Hoa upwards adjusted after a series of consultations with both central and local
government officials.
Source: The Real Situation of Enterprises (GSO 2005) and Results of Establishment Census of Vietnam
(GSO 2004).
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within each district, we selected firms not represented in the ‘formal’ sampling
frame, yet visually present for interview (on-site identification). Within each
district, we asked the enumerators to find as many additional informal firms as
possible within each chosen site (block enumeration). The results of this stratified
2-step sampling approach and resulting number of informal firms are in Table 2.2,
where we for each survey year have reported data by province and by legal status.²
Analysts can calculate the corresponding sampling weights for formal/registered
firms based on the information provided in Table 2.1.
Over the years, the survey team re-interviewed surviving firms in a tracer
survey. Questionnaires are comparable across all survey rounds, and we randomly
replaced exit firms using two criteria. First, holding a constant level of household
enterprises from the 2002 Establishment Census (GSO, 2004). Second, the
updated population of firms registered under the Enterprises Law in the years in
which the surveys took place. We note that our data do not necessarily correspond
exactly with what was happening in Vietnam’s overall SME population during
2005–15 (for more details see Section 2.2.2). However, our data is unique in the
sense that it follows the same SMEs (both formal and informal) and their
employees over time.
2.1.3 Characteristics of the Sample
The core variables used in subsequent chapters are firm size (number of employ-
ees), location, sector, ownership, and formality status. Appendix Tables A2.1 and
A2.2 provide additional details on the characteristics of the firms followed over a
decade. We measure firm size based on the number of employees and classify
firms in three size categories following World Bank suggestions: Micro enterprises
are composed of fewer than ten employees, while small-sized firms have between
10 and 49 workers and medium companies from 50 up to 300 employees.³ Due to
our focus on SMEs, we exclude large enterprises with more than 300 workers. In
our sample, the average number of workers per firm decreased from 19 in 2005 to
16 in 2015. In 2005, 63 per cent of the sample’s enterprises were micro sized,
29 per cent small and 8 per cent medium sized. These shares changed to 70, 23,
and 7 per cent in 2015, respectively. Figure 2.2 breaks these numbers down by legal
status. In 2005, the share of firms that were of micro size and informal (36 per cent)
was higher than the share of formal micro enterprises (27 per cent). In 2015, many
informal firms had formalized such that more micro enterprises were formal
(60 per cent) than informal (10 per cent) in our sample.
More than half of the sampled firms are household enterprises. This implies
that the 2000 Vietnam enterprise law does not recognize them. The share of
² An enterprise is legally formal when it has a tax code.
³ There were no large firms in the initial sample, but some have become large over time.
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Table 2.2 Number of interviewed enterprises by year: province and formality status
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
F Inf F Inf F Inf F Inf F Inf F Inf
Ha Noi 222 75 226 54 236 48 239 36 228 55 275 18
Phu Tho 32 245 49 194 74 185 79 174 76 180 197 55
Ha Tay* 114 281 99 283 106 271 139 206 174 171 305 62
Hai Phong 137 64 121 74 148 62 175 29 156 26 195 23
Nghe An 109 279 99 250 145 209 166 181 162 173 272 66
Quang Nam 81 91 79 76 101 57 107 54 112 55 156 10
Khanh Hoa 98 4 84 2 92 3 96 1 89 1 90 7
Lam Dong 68 21 75 7 57 13 70 11 74 14 86 4
HCMC 652 43 589 20 599 19 566 8 600 12 642 9
Long An 82 47 90 36 100 27 106 18 108 27 122 9
Sample size 1,595 1,151 1,511 996 1,658 894 1,743 718 1,799 714 2,340 263
Note: *In 2009, Ha Tay province became part of Ha Noi. However, in this dataset Ha Tay is maintained as a separate province because it facilitates the comparability with
previous years.

























limited liability companies in the sample increased from 16 to 24 per cent and the
percentage of joint stock companies without state capital grew from 2 to 4 per cent
during the 2005–15 period. During the same period, sole proprietorships
decreased from 10 to 6 per cent, while partnerships, collectives and cooperatives
jointly shrank from 4 to 2 per cent. As can be seen from Figure 2.2, the formality
rate increased sharply from 57 per cent in 2005 to almost 90 per cent in 2015; and
around 40 per cent of the sampled businesses maintained written accounts over
the whole period.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the composition of the sample’s manufacturing industries
based on standard ISIC-codes in 2005 and 2015, respectively. Food and beverages
represent the biggest industry, as 30 per cent of the firms belong to it. Fabricated
metal products (17 per cent), wood (11 per cent), furniture (8 per cent), rubber
(5 per cent), and non-metallic mineral products (5 per cent) follow suit. Each of
the remaining industries includes less than 5 per cent of the enterprises. The
composition of industries has changed over time in that there are relatively more
enterprises in the food and beverages, fabricated metal, wood and apparel indus-
tries, and fewer in furniture, non-metallic mineral products, textiles, and electronic
machinery.
2.1.4 Sample Attrition
Attrition related to firms closing operations, refusing to participate in the survey,
















Figure 2.2 SME sample by firm size and formality status
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SME data.
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concerns. However, as the survey design allowed us to follow exiting firms (or the
previous owners of closed down firms) we can for most years conclude that the
majority of firms not found were in deed ‘real’ closures and not attrition due to
refusal to participate or mobility related reasons. As presented in Table 2.3, we
interviewed 2,746 enterprises in 2005. In 2015, only 982 of these same enterprises
remained active. The recoded attrition rate varies by survey year and lies between
15 to 21 per cent, whereas the ten-year attrition rate is 64 per cent. This gives an
annual ‘death’ rate between 9 and 10 per cent.
Table 2.3 compares the characteristics of the attrited enterprises with the non-
attrited firms to establishwhether any particular features supported the non-attrited
ones in keeping their business running for such a long period. The table first
examines whether there exists a difference in firm size between attrited and
non-attrited businesses. It appears that attrited firms were significantly larger
than non-attrited ones in the three survey rounds: 2007, 2009, and 2013. It
therefore seems, at least in some years, that larger SMEs may have faced more
challenges to survive than smaller ones. Regarding the location of the attrited and
non-attrited enterprises, we look at the share of firms that operated in the two
biggest cities, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh. The firms that did not survive in the first
three survey rounds were significantly more likely to be located in these two cities
than the firms that kept operating. This could be due to more competition in the
country’s largest cities such that it is more difficult for businesses to survive
there than in other parts/cities of the country.





















Figure 2.3 SME sample by manufacturing industries
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SME data.
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Concerning household enterprises, the samples were statistically different in
2005, 2007, 2013 and 2015. Specifically, the share of household firms was higher in
the non-attrited than in the attrited sample. This is consistent with the trends
observed for firm size: attrited enterprises were generally larger than non-attrited
enterprises and larger firms are less likely to be household enterprises. However,















2005–7 panel 2,182 564 25 18 ***
2005–7–9 panel 1,787 395 29 15 ***
2005–7–9–11 panel 1,415 372 17 15
2005–7–9–11–13 panel 1,159 256 18 14 *
2005–7–9–11–13–15 panel 982 177 13 14
Firms in Ha Noi and HCMC (%)
2005 2,746
2005–7 panel 2,182 564 46 34 ***
2005–7–9 panel 1,787 395 44 31 ***
2005–7–9–11 panel 1,415 372 43 28 ***
2005–7–9–11–13 panel 1,159 256 30 28
2005–7–9–11–13–15 panel 982 177 30 27
Firms in five biggest industries (%)
2005 2,746
2005–7 panel 2,182 564 66 72 ***
2005–7–9 panel 1,787 395 64 73 ***
2005–7–9–11 panel 1,415 372 67 75 ***
2005–7–9–11–13 panel 1,159 256 69 76 ***
2005–7–9–11–13–15 panel 982 177 75 76
HH enterprises share (%)
2005 2,746
2005–7 panel 2,182 564 62 69 ***
2005–7–9 panel 1,787 395 62 71 ***
2005–7–9–11 panel 1,415 372 69 71
2005–7–9–11–13 panel 1,159 256 64 73 ***
2005–7–9–11–13–15 panel 982 177 67 74 *
Informal firms (no tax cod, %e)
2005 2,746
2005–7 panel 2,182 564 34 35
2005–7–9 panel 1,787 395 34 35
2005–7–9–11 panel 1,415 372 38 34
2005–7–9–11–13 panel 1,159 256 34 35
2005–7–9–11–13–15 panel 982 177 41 33 *
Note: ¹Food and beverages, fabricated metal products, wood, furniture, rubber.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SME data.
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Table 2.4 Comparison of balanced and unbalanced panel by firm size, location, sector, and ownership type
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Frequencies
Full sample 2,746 2,507 2,552 2,461 2,493 2,603
New entrants 1,764 325 521 451 464 502
Incumbent firms not new entrants 0 1,200 1,049 1,028 1,047 1,119
Balanced panel 982 982 982 982 982 982
Firm Size Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Full sample 19.19 53.74 19.19 49.97 18.77 62.55 15.97 32.65 15.19 44.58 15.61 37.09
New entrants 21.70 64.06 18.58 35.69 19.37 32.59 16.52 34.57 16.69 33.91 17.04 40.13
Incumbent firms not new entrants – – 21.87 63.86 17.60 39.64 16.21 29.79 16.15 58.90 16.80 41.65
Balanced panel 14.66 25.93 16.11 30.88 19.71 89.05 15.47 34.57 13.46 28.34 13.52 29.03
Share of firms in Hanoi and HCMC Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Full sample 36.13 35.46 35.34 34.50 35.90 36.27
New entrants 40.99 48.92 45.11 45.23 43.75 42.03
Incumbent firms not new entrants – 38.42 37.94 36.58 40.40 41.47
Balanced panel 27.39 27.39 27.39 27.39 27.39 27.39
Share of firms in five biggest sectors¹
Full sample 70.76 69.57 70.45 71.11 72.08 72.88
New entrants 67.12 64.62 65.64 64.52 67.46 71.31
Incumbent firms not new entrants – 66.42 68.26 69.55 69.72 70.33
Balanced panel 77.29 75.05 75.35 75.76 76.78 76.57
Share of household firms
Full sample 68.90 69.17 66.42 65.01 63.62 63.35
New entrants 65.36 63.69 48.37 61.20 55.60 57.17
Incumbent firms not new entrants – 66.00 67.49 58.95 60.27 59.25
Balanced panel 75.25 74.85 74.85 73.12 70.98 71.18
Share of informal firms (no tax code)
Full sample 41.92 39.73 35.03 29.18 28.64 10.10
New entrants 38.95 32.92 27.83 26.39 31.68 40.24
Incumbent firms not new entrants – 38.67 35.37 27.14 25.98 2.41
Balanced panel 47.25 43.28 38.49 32.59 30.04 3.46
Note: ¹Food and beverages, fabricated metal products, wood, furniture, rubber.

























attrited firms are no more likely to be formal, i.e. to have a tax code, than
businesses that survived in all survey rounds except for the last one in 2015.
Here 61 per cent of the enterprises that did not survive were formal compared to
77 per cent in the non-attrited sample. In 2015, the share of informal firms was
higher among the attrited than the non-attrited businesses, signalling that it may
be more challenging now to operate an informal firm due to different initiatives of
the government to formalize the Vietnamese economy. In sum, attrited SMEs in
Vietnam are more likely to be larger, located in Ha Noi or Ho Chi Minh City, and
to operate a household enterprise in ‘smaller’/less concentrated industries.
Table 2.4 compares the firms in the full sample, new entrants, incumbent firms,
and those in the balanced panel by year. The 982 firms that survived the whole
period of 2005–15 were, on average, smaller than new entrants and incumbent
firms except for in 2009. Moreover, a smaller share of the balanced panel was
located in the two biggest cities, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh, than new entrants and
incumbent firms. Regarding the different manufacturing industries, the balanced
panel had a higher share of enterprises operating in the five biggest industries
than the other two groups, except for 2013 and 2015. This fits well the previous
observations that enterprises that survived were, on average, smaller, less likely to
be located in the two largest cities, and more likely to operate in one of the five
largest industries. Further, the 982 survivors included a higher share of firms that
were household enterprises and were more likely to be informal in most years.
However, in 2015, almost none of the firms in the balanced panel were informal
anymore, perhaps because the government succeeded in its formalization efforts.
As we wanted to continue examining informal enterprises, the share of informal
firms among the new entrants remained around 40 per cent, which is quite high.
2.1.5 SCOLI
Costs of living are likely to change at varying pace across both space and time.
Thus, it is crucial to take into account spatial price variations. Therefore, the
studies in this volume rely on a spatial cost of living index (SCOLI) which is
interpreted as the minimum cost of buying a given level of utility at given prices in
each of Vietnam’s provinces (Kakwani and Hill 2002).
2.2 Considering the Representativeness
of the Vietnam SME Data
Tables A2.3 to A2.8 show that Vietnam’s enterprise population has been increas-
ing at a steady pace over the ten years in focus here. It is therefore of interest to
evaluate the representativeness of the SME data by comparing it to the country’s
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total enterprise population as given by GSO.⁴ While the GSO data contain
information on all types of legal ownership, i.e. state-owned (SOE), non-state
(NSOE), FDI and household (HH) enterprises,⁵ as well as on all sectors, we focus
in this volume on NSOE and HH enterprises from the manufacturing sector.
Table A2.3 shows that in Vietnam, the overall enterprise population (SOE, NSOE,
FDI, HH) increased from 2.7 million in 2005 to 5.1 million in 2015 (row 1),
whereas the manufacturing enterprise population grew from around 680,000 to
almost 900,000 in these ten years (row 5). Manufacturing NSOEs and manufac-
turing HHs increased from 17,000 and 660,000, respectively, to 56,000 and
800,000 in the same period (rows 6 and 7). The SME sample analysed in this
book consisted of 0.4 per cent of Vietnam’s total manufacturing enterprise popu-
lation (SOE, NSOE, FDI, HH) in 2005 and 0.3 per cent in the subsequent years.
Our SME data stem as noted from 10 of Vietnam’s 63 provinces, and they host
approximately 55 per cent of the country’s manufacturing NSOEs and around
25 per cent of its manufacturing households. In 2005, the SME sample covered
around 10 per cent of the manufacturing NSOEs located in the selected provinces
and 1 per cent of their manufacturing household firms. Due to the large growth-
rate of the manufacturing sector, these shares decreased to 3 per cent for manu-
facturing NSOEs and 0.8 per cent for manufacturing households in 2015.
Tables A2.4 and A2.5 compare the GSO and SME firms by province, ownership
type, and manufacturing sector. Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi are the two cities
with the biggest populations of manufacturing NSOEs and HHs. In 2005, Ho Chi
Minh City had 4,600 manufacturing NSOEs and 34,000 manufacturing house-
holds, which changed to 18,000 and 29,000 in 2015, respectively. In the same
period, Ha Noi’s non-state manufacturing enterprises grew from 2,400 to 11,000,
while its manufacturing households grew strongly from 17,000 to 85,000. These
two cities were also the ones with the highest numbers of firms interviewed in the
SME survey rounds. Overall, the manufacturing enterprises in the SME data
represented, depending on the year, between 7 and 2 per cent of Ho Chi Minh’s
manufacturing NSOEs, while the SME data on households covered around 1 per
cent of the manufacturing households in this city. Lam Dong is one of the ten
provinces where the enterprise population is smallest and increased most slowly
over time. In 2015, the SME sample captured 7 per cent of Lam Dong’s manu-
facturing NSOEs and 1 per cent of its manufacturing households.
GSO data show that 97 per cent of firms in Vietnam are household enterprises
and their number almost doubled from 2.7 to 4.7 million in 2005–15 (row 4 in
Table A2.3). In the SME data, more than 60 per cent of the interviewed firms are
⁴ GSO provided the original dataset on enterprises, which we compared to our sample’s enterprises,
while the numbers for households are taken from GSO reports on non-farm individual establishments
(GSO, 2015, 2014, 2010a, 2004).
⁵ GSO uses the term ‘non-farm individual business establishments’, which is equivalent to ‘house-
hold enterprises’ in this book
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household enterprises and these were about 0.3 per cent of all of Vietnam’s
manufacturing households in 2005 (see Table A2.6). Overall, the SME data
captured 5 per cent of Vietnam’s manufacturing non-state enterprises in 2005
and 2 per cent in 2015. These shares became smaller over time because the
country’s manufacturing enterprise population grew, while the sample size only
changed slightly every year. Limited liability companies form the biggest sub-
group of non-state manufacturing enterprises in Vietnam, followed by private
enterprises in 2005 (6,000) and by joint stock companies without state capital in
2015 (9,000). In 2005, the country had almost 9,000 limited liability companies in
the manufacturing sector, which increased to 30,000 in 2011 and 39,000 in 2015.
In 2005, the SME data included 5 per cent of Vietnam’s manufacturing limited
liability companies and 2 per cent of the same in 2015. Vietnamese manufacturing
cooperatives and partnerships increased only slightly from 1,000 to 1,500 in the
ten-year period. In our SME sample, between 3 and 9 per cent of the interviewed
firms are cooperatives or partnerships (see Table A2.6).
In terms of the manufacturing industries, Table A2.7 shows that in 2005, one-
fifth of Vietnam’s manufacturing NSOEs were in the food and beverages industry,
followed by fabricated metal products (11 per cent), non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts (8 per cent), wood (8 per cent), and furniture (8 per cent). The first two also
represented the two largest industries in the SME survey.⁶ The third largest
industry in the SME data, rubber and plastics, was overrepresented, as it ranks
seventh in the population. In 2005, the share of interviewed SMEs in Vietnam’s
manufacturing NSOEs was 5 per cent. The SME sample held 14 per cent of
Vietnam’s NSOEs in the coke and refined petroleum industry, 9 per cent of the
rubber industry, and 8 per cent of firms in the paper industry. These shares are
relatively large due to, among other factors, the small size of these industries: only
14 NSOEs existed in the coke and refined petroleum industry.
In 2015, fabricated metal products (17 per cent in NSOE population), and food
and beverages (14 per cent in NSOE population) remained the largest industries in
both the manufacturing NSOE population and SME data (excluding households).
Yet, they had swapped places. Wearing apparel was Vietnam’s third biggest
manufacturing industry (9 per cent) and followed suit as number four in the
SME data. As in 2005, the rubber and plastic industry was overrepresented as
number three in the SME data, while it was only the sixth largest among the
manufacturingNSOEs (6 per cent) in Vietnam. Publishing and printing (8 per cent)
rose to fourth place in the manufacturing NSOE population, while it was the sixth
biggest in the SME survey. The fifth largest industry was the wood industry in both
the population (8 per cent) and the SME survey (see Table A2.7).
⁶ We do not have any information on household enterprises by manufacturing industry. Therefore,
Table A2.7 only compares NSOE with SME-data, excluding households.
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Table A2.8 compares Vietnam’s HH enterprises and SME HHs by year. We do
not have sufficient information on the manufacturing industries of Vietnam’s HH
enterprises such that we cannot compare Vietnam’s HH population with SME
HHs by manufacturing industry.
2.3 Conclusion
Our SME data represent both the dynamics and evolution of registered formal
non-state manufacturing firms in the ten selected provinces in Vietnam over the
period 2005 to 2015. However, as reliable information on the characteristics of the
enterprise population of the informal manufacturing does not exist, we cannot
establish appropriate weights for this group of firms. Moreover, given that our
sample of informal household businesses was identified at locations where several
registered entities operate means that our sample of informal household busi-
nesses is unlikely to be strictly representative of informal SMEs in Vietnam. The
informal firms we capture are in all likelihood more established and productive
informal entities. Being able to follow firms over a ten-year period offers many
advantages of analytical nature. At the same time, when referring to the informal
firms, the reader must keep the above characteristic of the data in mind through-
out the following chapters.
Appendix
Table A2.1 Firm, owner, and worker characteristics by year
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Firm characteristics
Firm size (number of
employees)
19.19 19.19 18.77 15.97 15.19 15.61
Firm age 11.53 13.53 14.63 13.45 15.53 16.54
Household 68.90 69.17 66.42 65.01 63.62 63.35
Private/sole proprietorship 10.16 7.70 7.84 7.92 8.10 6.34
Partnership/Collective/
Cooperative
3.50 3.99 2.86 2.72 2.17 2.04
Limited liability company 15.70 17.35 19.51 20.52 21.86 23.86
Joint stock company (without
state capital)
1.75 1.79 3.37 3.82 4.25 4.42
Food and beverages 27.93 27.72 29.19 30.39 31.09 32.12
Tobacco 0.00 0.32 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.04
Textiles 3.61 4.59 4.94 4.39 4.01 3.30
Apparel 3.64 4.19 4.23 4.96 4.89 5.42
Leather 2.00 2.07 1.88 1.99 2.13 2.34
Wood 8.27 11.89 12.03 10.28 10.19 11.18
Paper 2.73 2.75 2.74 2.72 2.97 2.23
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Publishing and printing 2.18 2.35 2.94 2.44 2.61 3.30
Refined petroleum 0.40 0.00 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.35
Chemical products 1.40 1.83 1.57 1.58 2.09 1.92
Rubber 5.28 5.31 5.56 4.71 5.54 6.07
Non-metallic mineral products 7.10 6.02 5.29 4.79 4.13 3.76
Basic metals 0.62 1.12 1.37 1.46 1.08 1.08
Fabricated metal products 16.79 16.83 16.93 17.76 17.17 17.25
Electronic machinery 3.93 3.31 2.74 3.01 2.61 2.27
Motor vehicles 0.73 1.20 0.94 0.69 0.48 0.46
Other transport equipment 0.66 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.27
Furniture 12.49 7.82 6.74 7.96 8.10 6.26
Recycling 0.18 0.40 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.38
High-tech firms 17.81 12.60 10.70 11.99 11.55 9.26
Export firms 6.37 5.66 5.84 6.04 6.30 6.95
Internat. certification (Yes=1) 3.53 4.27 5.68 6.70 7.34 4.19
Urban 64.64 64.62 63.99 62.62 63.18 63.35
Formal credit access (Yes=1) 22.72 35.14 36.79 27.55 23.79 23.67
Credit constrained 25.27 24.05 26.61 28.02 30.84 20.73
Bookkeeping 36.53 35.54 40.60 38.60 38.79 38.99
Technology innovation (Yes=1
if introduction of new
product or improvement of
product or new process/
technology or all)
66.72 48.15 45.02 44.09 19.66 33.88
Formal (=have a BRC) 57.03 58.05 62.88 68.25 68.56 88.98
Observations 2,746 2,507 2,552 2,461 2,493 2,603
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SME data.
Table A2.2 Firm, owner, and worker characteristics by year
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Financial
information
Real revenue (VND) 6,271,785 5,020,016 5,048,084 9,892,408 4,429,981 8,217,846
Profit/revenue share 20.00 21.40 21.60 19.50 22.40 23.60
Assets/revenue share 1535.73 309.34 239.63 306.42 238.23 185.29
Debt/revenue share 12.60 12.60 12.70 10.40 9.70 9.30
Have debt (Yes=1) 57.48 53.06 58.05 48.72 49.22 35.51
Owner characteristics
Age 44.67 45.31 45.71 45.76 46.18 46.44
Female owners 0.3063 0.3303 0.3413 0.3690 0.3995 0.4072
Primary or below 10.52 13.12 13.01 10.00 5.98 6.57
Lower secondary 32.08 31.95 28.72 28.40 24.59 20.94
Upper secondary
or above
57.39 54.93 58.27 61.60 69.43 72.49
Member of
Communist Party
8.85 7.38 7.09 9.43 9.23 7.26
Workforce Characteristics
Manager NA 25.69 26.82 29.20 31.96 35.04
Professional NA 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Production worker NA 65.95 65.07 62.01 59.64 57.34
Female workers 35.63 36.99 37.62 36.98 38.54 38.16
Trade union in firm 9.25 9.65 8.54 8.37 9.55 12.45
Observations 2,746 2,507 2,552 2,461 2,493 2,603
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SME data.
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Table A2.3 Overview: Vietnam’s enterprise population
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Vietnam’s enterprise population
1 OVERALL ENTERPRISE POPULATION (=Enterprises
(SOE, NSOE, FDI) & household (HH) enterprises) (2+4)
2,711,096 3,429,084 4,074,429 4,464,197 4,984,751 5,085,525
2 Enterprises (SOE, NSOE, FDI) 91,755 129,379 205,689 339,217 359,866 414,186
3 Non-state enterprises (NSOE) 84,003 120,380 196,776 325,771 347,795 401,186
4 Household (HH) enterprises 2,619,341 3,299,705 3,868,740 4,124,980 4,624,885 4,671,339
Vietnam’s manufacturing enterprise population
5 OVERALL MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE POPULATION
(SOE, NSOE, FDI, HH)
678,499 836,154 869,379 888,340 912,873 894,552
6 Non-state manufacturing enterprises 16,958 22,342 33,893 47,027 50,322 55,966
7 Manufacturing households 657,968 809,948 830,576 835,469 856,634 832,290
Manufacturing enterprise population in the 10 provinces of SME data
8 OVERALL MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE POPULATION
(SOE, NSOE, FDI, HH)
167,332 NA 245,496 252,301 250,408 249,111
9 Non-state manufacturing enterprises 8,971 11,813 19,030 26,932 29,177 33,644
10 Manufacturing households 156,697 NA 224,548 223,180 219,060 213,183
Note: Since the SME data was collected in the year before the publishing year, we compare the SME data with the enterprise population of the previous year as well, e.g. the
2007 survey round is compared to Vietnam’s enterprise population in 2006 because the SME data was collected in 2006; the 2015 survey round is compared to Vietnam’s
2014 enterprise population because the SME data was collected in 2014.











































Ha Noi 2,373 173 0.0729 2,966 161 0.0543 5,273 176 0.0334
Phu Tho 128 29 0.2266 174 21 0.1207 239 35 0.1464
Ha Tay 415 61 0.1470 NA 70 0.0000 NA 68 NA
Hai Phong 540 93 0.1722 670 103 0.1537 811 92 0.1134
Nghe An 148 90 0.6081 185 61 0.3297 381 75 0.1969
Quang Nam 101 21 0.2079 166 24 0.1446 272 36 0.1324
Khan Hoa 256 36 0.1406 363 30 0.0826 517 36 0.0696
Lam Dong 107 18 0.1682 164 17 0.1037 247 16 0.0648
HCMC 4,637 309 0.0666 6,721 257 0.0382 10,660 295 0.0277
Long An 266 24 0.0902 404 29 0.0718 630 28 0.0444
Total 10 provinces 8,971 854 0.0952 11,813 773 0.0654 19,030 857 0.0450
Other 53 provinces 7,987 0 0.0000 10,529 0 0.0000 14,863 0 0.000


















Ha Noi 8,452 181 0.0214 9,501 163 0.0172 10,825 173 0.0160
Phu Tho 393 34 0.0865 450 33 0.0733 444 31 0.0698
Ha Tay NA 61 0.0000 NA 71 0.0000 NA 64 NA












































Nghe An 543 74 0.1363 571 85 0.1489 613 71 0.1158
Quang Nam 463 32 0.0000 482 42 0.0871 556 38 0.0683
Khan Hoa 521 35 0.0672 605 35 0.0579 588 40 0.0680
Lam Dong 284 20 0.0704 336 24 0.0714 386 28 0.0725
HCMC 14,288 289 0.0000 16,218 323 0.0199 17,988 364 0.0202
Long An 893 35 0.0392 1,117 31 0.0278 1,097 34 0.0310
Total 10 provinces 26,932 861 0.0320 30,456 907 0.0298 33,644 954 0.0284
Other 53 provinces 20,095 0 0.0000 23,891 0 0.0000 22,322 0 0.0000
Total 47,027 861 0.0183 53,867 907 0.0168 55,966 954 0.0170
Note: Since the SME data was collected in the year before the publishing year, we compare the SME data with the enterprise population of the previous year as well, e.g. the
2007 survey round is compared to Vietnam’s enterprise population in 2006 because the SME data was collected in 2006; the 2015 survey round is compared to Vietnam’s
2014 enterprise population because the SME data was collected in 2014.











































Ha Noi 16,588 124 0.0075 NA 119 NA 92,566 108 0.0012
Phu Tho 17,042 248 0.0146 NA 222 NA 20,238 224 0.0111
Ha Tay 23,890 334 0.0140 NA 312 NA NA 309 NA
Hai Phong 12,811 108 0.0084 NA 92 NA 10,832 118 0.0109
Nghe An 22,695 298 0.0131 NA 288 NA 29,938 279 0.0093
Quang Nam 20,509 141 0.0069 NA 131 NA 14,124 122 0.0086
Khan Hoa 5,603 66 0.0118 NA 56 NA 6,408 59 0.0092
Lam Dong 5,268 71 0.0135 NA 65 NA 7,797 54 0.0069
HCMC 34,241 386 0.0112 NA 352 NA 32,285 323 0.0100
Long An 8,050 105 0.0130 NA 97 NA 10,370 99 0.0095
Total 10 provinces 156,697 1,892 0.0121 NA 1,734 NA 224,549 1,695 0.0075
Other 53 provinces 543,612 0 0 NA 0 0 606,028 0 0


















Ha Noi 91,110 94 0.0010 90,262 120 0.0013 85,213 120 0.0014
Phu Tho 19,063 219 0.0115 20,071 223 0.0111 18,074 221 0.0122
Ha Tay 0 284 NA 0 274 NA 0 303 NA












































Nghe An 29,966 273 0.0091 31,944 150 0.0047 31,626 267 0.0084
Quang Nam 14,846 129 0.0087 15,733 125 0.0079 15,955 128 0.0080
Khan Hoa 6,042 62 0.0103 5,895 55 0.0093 5,591 57 0.0102
Lam Dong 7,389 61 0.0083 7,563 64 0.0085 8,013 62 0.0077
HCMC 33,000 285 0.0086 28,905 289 0.0099 29,400 287 0.0098
Long An 10,353 89 0.0086 7,579 104 0.0137 7,711 97 0.0126
Total 10 provinces 223,180 1,600 0.0072 219,060 1,586 0.0072 213,183 1,649 0.0077
Other 53 provinces 612,289 0 0 637,574 0 0 619,107 0 0
Total 835,469 1,600 0.0019 856,634 1,586 0.0019 832,290 1,649 0.0198











































State-owned enterprises 1,247 0 0.0000 859 0 0.0000 948 0 0.0000
FDI enterprises 2,326 0 0.0000 3,005 0 0.0000 3,962 0 0.0000
Non-state enterprises 16,958 854 0.0504 22,342 773 0.0346 33,893 857 0.0253
Private 5,838 279 0.0478 6,770 193 0.0285 8,450 200 0.0237
Collectives & Cooperatives
& Partnership
1,117 96 0.0859 981 100 0.1019 1,223 73 0.0597
Limited Liability 8,621 431 0.0500 12,059 435 0.0360 19,354 498 0.0257
Joint stock without state capital 1,094 49 0.0448 2,102 45 0.0214 4,290 86 0.0200
Joint stock with state capital 815 0 0.0000 1,337 0 0.0000 576 0 0.0000
Total 20,531 854 0.0416 22,342 773 0.0346 33,893 857 0.0253
Household enterprises 657,968 1,892 0.0029 809,948 1,734 0.0021 830,576 1,695 0.0000


















State-owned enterprises 653 0 0.0000 202 0 0.0000 190 0 0.0000
FDI enterprises 5,191 0 0.0000 5,715 0 0.0000 6,470 0 0.0000
Non-state enterprises 47,027 861 0.0183 50,322 907 0.0180 55,966 954 0.0170
Private 7,628 195 0.0256 7,395 202 0.0273 6,574 165 0,0251












































Limited Liability 29,997 505 0.0168 33,008 545 0.0165 38,518 621 0.0161
Joint stock without state capital 7,570 94 0.0124 8,223 106 0.0129 9,290 115 0.0124
Joint stock with state capital 545 0 0.0000 NA 0 0.0000 NA 0 0.0000
Total 47,027 861 0.0183 56,239 907 0.0161 62,626 954 0.0152
Household enterprises 835,469 1,600 0.0019 856,634 1,586 0.0019 832,290 1,649 0.0020
Total 882,496 2,461 0.0028 912,873 2,493 0.0027 894,916 2,603 0.0029
Note: Since the SME data was collected in the year before the publishing year, we compare the SME data with the enterprise population of the previous year as well, e.g. the
2007 survey round is compared to Vietnam’s enterprise population in 2006 because the SME data was collected in 2006; the 2015 survey round is compared to Vietnam’s
2014 enterprise population because the SME data was collected in 2014.





















































Manufacturing Total 16,958 854 0.0504 22,342 773 0.0346 33,893 857 0.0253
Food and beverages 4,018 138 0.0343 4,916 125 0.0254 6,529 131 0.0201
Tobacco 6 0 0.0000 4 2 0.5000 6 2 0.3333
Textiles 646 33 0.0511 914 46 0.0503 1,259 53 0.0421
Wearing apparel 1,156 53 0.0458 1,544 58 0.0376 2,668 62 0.0232
Leather 315 10 0.0317 398 13 0.0327 611 14 0.0229
Wood 1,356 64 0.0472 1,747 66 0.0378 2,984 71 0.0238
Paper and paper products 726 57 0.0785 976 48 0.0492 1,532 57 0.0372
Publishing, printing etc. 882 34 0.0385 1,547 38 0.0246 2,192 53 0.0242
Coke and refined petroleum 14 2 0.1429 26 0 0.0000 52 3 0.0577
Chemicals and chemical
products
665 27 0.0406 934 23 0.0246 1,387 28 0.0201
Rubber and plastic 946 88 0.0930 1,307 82 0.0627 1,908 96 0.0503
Non-metallic mineral
products
1,366 42 0.0307 1,644 34 0.0207 2,330 43 0.0185
Basic metals 278 11 0.0396 402 15 0.0373 663 16 0.0241
Fabricated metal products 1,869 129 0.0690 2,665 106 0.0398 4,397 121 0.0275
Machinery and equipment 860 54 0.0628 1,094 45 0.0411 1,641 41 0.0250
Motor vehicles and trailers 217 13 0.0599 152 11 0.0724 258 16 0.0620
Other transport equipment 320 11 0.0344 401 6 0.0150 575 4 0.0070
Furniture 1,284 87 0.0678 1,608 54 0.0336 2,803 45 0.0161
Recycling 34 1 0.0294 63 1 0.0159 98 1 0.0102


















































Manufacturing Total 47,027 861 0.0183 53,867 907 0.0168 55,966 954 0.0170
Food and beverages 7,115 138 0.0194 7,570 144 0.0190 8,033 138 0.0172
Tobacco 6 0 0.0000 9 0 0.0000 7 0 0.0000
Textiles 1,872 43 0.0230 2,181 35 0.0160 2,259 36 0.0159
Wearing apparel 4,023 66 0.0164 4,879 71 0.0146 4,970 81 0.0163
Leather 991 16 0.0000 1,299 18 0.0000 1,185 23 0.0194
Wood 4,082 54 0.0132 3,965 70 0,0177 4,346 76 0.0175
Paper and paper products 1,756 56 0.0319 1,947 62 0.0318 1,988 48 0.0241
Publishing, printing etc. 3,392 40 0.0000 4,097 47 0.0000 4,747 70 0.0147
Coke and refined petroleum 79 2 0.0253 91 2 0.0220 91 3 0.0330
Chemicals and chemical
products
2,014 30 0.0149 2,586 37 0.0143 2,777 36 0.0130
Rubber and plastic 2,908 76 0.0000 3,545 94 0.0000 3,560 100 0.0281
Non-metallic mineral
products
3,454 51 0.0148 3,567 46 0.0129 3,685 45 0.0122
Basic metals 861 20 0.0232 985 15 0.0152 922 13 0.0141
Fabricated metal products 7,741 139 0.0180 8,876 145 0.0163 9,488 167 0.0176
Machinery and equipment 2,261 50 0.0000 3,024 48 0.0000 2,715 45 0.0166
Motor vehicles and trailers 178 13 0.0730 349 8 0.0229 206 7 0.0340
Other transport equipment 424 5 0.0118 520 5 0.0096 420 4 0.0095
Furniture 2,942 61 0.0207 3,199 59 0.0184 3,220 47 0.0146
Recycling NA 1 0.0000 0 1 0.0000 0 5 0.0000
Other manufacturing 927 0 0.0000 1,178 0 0.0000 1,347 0 0.0000
Note: Since the SME data was collected in the year before the publishing year, we compare the SME data with the enterprise population of the previous year as well, e.g. the 2007
survey round is compared to Vietnam’s enterprise population in 2006 because the SME data was collected in 2006; the 2015 survey round is compared to Vietnam’s 2014
enterprise population because the SME data was collected in 2014.








































700,309 1,892 0.0027 NA 1,734 NA 830,576 2,552 0.0031














835,469 1,600 0.0019 856,634 1,586 0.0019 832,290 1,649 0.0020
Total HHs 4,124,980 1,600 0.0004 4,624,885 1,586 0.0003 4,671,339 1,649 0.0004
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Capital Allocation, Credit Access,
and Firm Growth
Christina Kinghan, Carol Newman,
and Conor O’Toole
3.1 Introduction
Since the originalDoiMoi economic reforms, Vietnam has undergone considerable
economic transformation. Living standards have risen and the economy has been
reoriented away from central planning towards a more market-based economic
structure. The development of private sector businesses, as well as foreign direct
investment, have played an important role in this transformation. Understanding
the catalysts for such rapid economic development can shed important light for
policy makers and academics looking to decompose the sources of growth in a
developing country context.
One sector of the Vietnamese economy that has experienced rapid reform is the
financial sector. While initially Vietnam was slow to embrace capital and banking
market liberalization, a series of policy initiatives throughout the 1990s and into
the 2000s laid the foundations for rapid change in financial markets. Kovsted et al.
(2003) note that financial reform initially took place in two phases: (1) initial
banking reforms between 1988 and 1997 which split the commercial state lending
from the Central Bank, State Bank of Vietnam, as well as allowing joint stock
commercial banks and foreign branches; (2) the banking law of 1998 which
removed administrative control over interest rates and strengthened the inde-
pendence of the Central Bank. These changes—along with a multitude of other
reforms—led to a rapid financial deepening of the economy and high levels of
credit growth. Private sector credit to GDP increased considerably between 1995
and 2015. Recent research has found that this process of financial development
has led to a reduction in credit constraints and fostered higher investment
amongst Vietnamese companies (O’Toole and Newman 2017).
However, much of the existing research has focused on large companies or has
been aggregate in nature. Fewer research papers have considered the role that
financial reform has played in the development of small and medium sized
companies, Rand (2007) being a notable exception. Indeed, where these issues
have been considered, the efficiency of capital allocation has not been factored
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into the discussion. In an economy with perfect credit markets, we expect funds to
flow to firms with the highest marginal revenue product of capital until marginal
revenue equals the marginal cost on average. However, as many imperfections
exist in credit markets, exploring their allocative efficiency in relation to their
impact on firm growth is an important research area. A focus on the financing of
SMEs is of particular importance given the extensive international evidence that
these companies are most likely to suffer credit access difficulties due to informa-
tional asymmetries, a lack of collateral or other financial market failures (Berger
and Udell 2006.
To address this gap in the literature, we use a detailed panel dataset on a cohort
of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises operating in Vietnam to explore the
relationship between capital allocation efficiency, credit access and firm growth.
We approach our analysis in two steps. In the first step, using data on approxi-
mately 2,600 firms over the period 2005–15, we explore the relationship between
credit access and capital efficiency for Vietnamese SMEs. More specifically, we
examine the extent to which financing is allocative efficient by considering
the relationship between credit constraints, credit demand and the marginal
value of additional capital for firms. This sheds important light on whether the
financial system is functioning in an efficient manner by allocating finance to
those with the highest marginal returns. If credit is demanded by lower-prod-
uctivity firms, this may suggest a selection effect which leads to an inefficient
credit structure. If credit constraints are higher for more efficient firms, this may
suggest that the financial system is not channelling funds to their most efficient
use. As such, we also directly examine whether higher-efficiency firms have
access to formal financing.
In the second step, we explore the impacts of misallocation on firm growth. If
higher efficiency firms have restricted access to finance, we should find their
investment and employment reduced to a greater extent by credit constraints.
To explore this issue, we estimate investment and employment equations and
explore whether these sources of firm growth are affected by credit constraints, a
key channel through which financing impacts the real economy. We then identify
the relationship between firm growth and the efficiency of capital allocation by
considering whether credit constraints are limiting investment for those firms
with the highest marginal returns. If we find evidence that high-return investors
(with a high marginal revenue product of capital) are more likely to have their
investment and employment impacted by credit constraints, then we can conclude
that finance is not being allocated to its most beneficial use in the Vietnamese
economy.
Our contributions to the literature are as follows. First, we extend the existing
literature to explore how access to finance is linked to capital efficiency. By
separately considering credit demand and credit supply indicators, we provide
new insights into these channels. Second, we are the first study to our knowledge
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to link credit constraints to investment and employment controlling for the
efficiency of capital. Third, we provide new empirical evidence on the link between
credit constraints and capital misallocation for a unique panel of micro, small, and
medium-size firms and in a developing country context, distinguishing between
formal and informal credit channels. Finally, our chapter provides new insights
for Vietnam on the potential role that easing credit access could have on firm
growth through a discussion of capital allocation efficiency and its links to
investment and employment.
A number of findings emerge from our analysis. First, we find that high-return
investors, with the greatest marginal return on capital, have a lower likelihood of
having formal finance (loans outstanding with formal credit institutions). In
contrast, we find that informal finance is not related to returns to capital. We
consider two possible underlying mechanisms. First, it could be that formal credit
markets are not allocating finance to the highest-return firms and that informal
credit markets are filling this gap. Second, it could also be the case that firms with
formal credit have already successfully invested these funds reducing the marginal
benefit of an additional unit of capital. The former is suggestive of inefficiencies in
the financial market while the latter may simply reflect a dynamic adjustment
process. Understanding which channel is in operation is important.
Decomposing credit access into the demand for credit and the supply of credit,
we find that firms with the highest return on capital are associated with lower
demand for credit. We also find some evidence that efficient firms are more likely
to be discouraged borrowers and are less likely to be credit-rationed, suggesting
that credit supply constraints are affecting the choices of efficient enterprises in
relation to accessing formal finance. In relation to firm growth, we find evidence
that rejected credit applications are limiting investment activity, particularly for
high-return firms, i.e. the firms with higher investment efficiency are more
affected by credit constraints.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses related
literature. Section 3.3 describes the data and the empirical approach. Section 3.4
documents the empirical findings and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Our research is related to four broad strands of existing empirical literature. First,
this work is linked to the general literature on access to credit and firm perform-
ance. Second, our research is related to the broader literature on investment,
employment, and credit access in the context of financial sector development.
Third, our chapter speaks to the recent literature that attempts to identify distor-
tions in the economy that prevent the efficient allocation of resources across firms.
Fourth, our chapter is closely linked to studies focusing on credit access, financial
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markets, and Vietnamese small firms. Understanding the specificities of the
Vietnamese case is important to identify the role that changes to financial markets
can play in the development of the SME sector in emerging economies.
The first strand of literature that we speak to explores the determinants and
impacts of credit constraints in developed and developing economies. This is a
vast literature and so here we provide a short description of the studies that are
most closely related to ours to demonstrate the channels through which credit
constraints can impact the real economy as a means of guiding our empirical
analysis.
Financial market imperfections, which distort the efficient allocation of capital,
arise for a number of reasons. In their seminal work, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
define credit rationing as cases where either: (a) identical firms receive different
credit outcomes; or (b) some firms cannot access financing at any interest rate.
This can be due to a number of potential market imperfections such as: (a) moral
hazard and principal agency problems; (b) adverse credit selection; (c) monitoring
difficulties; (d) informational asymmetries; (e) and legal enforcement (Lawless
et al. 2017). A large number of papers have documented that small and young
firms are more likely to be affected by such difficulties (Berger and Udell 2006;
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006 and as such credit market policies have been
devised globally to address credit constraints particularly for small and
medium-sized firms.
A large number of studies have focused on credit market constraints in
developing country contexts and in particular the characteristics associated with
constrained firms. Byiers et al. (2010) find that firm size, ownership, andmanagerial
capacity affect credit access using a manufacturing survey for Mozambique.
Hansen and Rand (2014) explore differences in access to credit across gender
for a sample of 16 sub-Saharan African economies. Beck et al. (2008) find that
institutional and financial development alleviates SME access to finance con-
straints and supports their contribution to economic growth. While these
studies address a range of factors that influence SME access to finance, to our
knowledge, ours is the first study that addresses the relationship between credit
access and the efficiency of capital for the SME sector (formal and informal) in a
developing country context.
The second strand of relevant literature links investment financing, employ-
ment growth, and access to credit. This literature generally finds that financing
constraints lower investment activity for enterprises thus preventing firms from
growing (Chirinko 1993 Bond and Söderbom 2013; Fazzari et al. 1988; Campello
et al. 2010). Such financing constraints—which come about due to market imper-
fections—therefore lead to a lower rate of economic growth as the capital stock is
less than the optimal level.
A key focus of our chapter is the relationship between credit access and firm
growth. Two measures of firm growth often used in the literature are investment
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and employment. The relationship between investment and access to credit has
been found to vary, depending on the degree of development of the financial
system as well as the banking market structure and institutional set-up. This is an
important consideration in the Vietnamese context, given how the economy has
developed financially in terms of credit deepening in recent years. Ryan et al.
(2014) find that banking competition increases SME financing constraints and the
effects are greatest in countries with bank-dependent financial systems. Love
(2003) and O’Toole and Newman (2017) find that credit constraints are lower
where credit markets are deeper and more market-oriented. Beck et al. (2006b)
note that institutional set-up and legal protections also matter for access to
finance. In terms of employment growth, a number of studies has also been
found to reduce firm employment growth (Gerlach-Kristen et al. 2015; Spaliara
2009). Chodorow-Reich (2014) also finds that credit market disruptions had a
large impact on employment after the recent financial crisis in the US. However,
these papers do not consider whether the effects of constraints differ depend-
ing on the efficiency of capital of the firm, which is what we explore directly in
this chapter.
Third, this chapter examines credit constraints as a source of capital market
inefficiency and so contributes to the emerging literature examining the link
between credit market distortions and resource misallocation pioneered by
Hsieh and Klenow (2009.¹ Examples in an Asian context include Brandt et al.
(2013) who explore the extent to which TFP losses in China’s non-agricultural
sectors between 1985 and 2007 were associated with factor market distortions.
They find evidence that the reversal in TFP growth can be attributed for the most
part to capital misallocation due to capital market distortions that favoured
investment in the state sector rather than more productive sectors of the economy.
In the case of Japan, Caballero et al. (2008) find evidence for inefficient resource
allocations resulting from the extension of credit to insolvent borrowers. Indus-
tries with greater numbers of insolvent borrowers had lower levels of job creation
and lower levels of productivity.² There is a notable dearth in the literature of
papers which examine the role of financial frictions and capital market misallo-
cation in other developing country contexts such as Vietnam. Moreover, to our
knowledge there is no empirical evidence specifically focusing on micro, small,
and medium-sized firms which examines the interplay between formal and
informal credit.
The final literature that complements our research addresses credit access and
firms in Vietnam. There are a number of papers of particular relevance. Rand
¹ See Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) for an overview of the recent literature on this topic.
² See also Caggese and Cuñat (2013) for evidence from Italy that links credit constraints to
misallocation through an exporting channel and Gopinath et al. (2015) for evidence of the link between
size-dependent financial frictions and capital misallocation in an EU context.
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(2007) uses a survey of SMEs in the manufacturing industry to explore the
determinants of credit constraints, credit demand and the cost of capital for
small firms in Vietnam. Drawing on a cross-sectional study covering approxi-
mately 1,000 SMEs across four provinces (Ha Tay, Long An, Quang Nam, Phu
Tho) and three of the largest cities (Ho Chi Minh, Ha Noi, and Hai Phong), the
study used direct indicators of credit rejections to explore which firms were
constrained. The results indicate that between 14 and 25 per cent of SMEs were
constrained and that these companies would increase their debt by between 40
and 115 per cent if constraints were loosened. The research also finds an import-
ant role for informal financing for those firms who are fast growing. Rand et al.
(2009) also explore survey data on SME access to financing in Vietnam. They find
that the formal financial sector is just about keeping up with growth.
There has been a notable increase in the degree of financial development in
Vietnam since the mid-1990s as private sector credit has soared and reforms have
been implemented in financial markets. To explore how this has impacted com-
panies on the ground, O’Toole and Newman (2017) use the Vietnamese national
enterprise survey to test the impact of financial development in Vietnam on
investment credit constraints for both large firms and SMEs. Using a standard
Tobin’s Q investment model, they separate financial development into three
specific aspects: overall financial depth, the state-owned enterprise use of finance,
and the degree of market-oriented bank lending. They develop indicators of
financial development along these channels at the province level in Vietnam.
A number of findings emerge from their research. They find that financial
development reduces external financing constraints for firms, thus facilitating
higher investment activity. Financing constraints are decreasing in credit to the
private sector, increasing in the use of finance by SOEs and decreasing in the
degree to which finance is allocated on market-terms by commercial banks.
CAO Thi Khanh (2016) explores the factors that determine access to formal
credit in Vietnam as well as considering whether firms are satisfied with the
financing process. Using a survey of Vietnamese SMEs conducted over 2005–13,
the findings indicate that banking relationships and the business environment
were important factors when applying for formal credit as well as in credit
obtainment. However, positive measures of firms’ performance, such as high
return on assets scores and sales growth, did not have a significant influence on
whether firms obtained credit. Furthermore, Vietnamese formal financial institu-
tions were found to depend too much on collateral assets in assessing whether to
supply credit.
A final study that provides important context for this chapter is Kovsted et al.
(2003) who document the financial development process in Vietnam up to 2003.
Their research provides insight into the overall process of financial reform that
occurred in Vietnam, the changing structure of the financial sector and its lending
agents, an overview of the regulatory and central banking operations, and the
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many policy initiatives that were undertaken in the phase of reform up to 2003.
Our study is complementary in that we review access to finance issues and
developments in lending in the period following the initial reforms.
3.3 Data and Empirical Approach
3.3.1 Data Overview
This chapter uses a firm-level panel dataset, gathered using the Survey of Small
and Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam. The SME
survey is conducted every two years on over 2,500 enterprises across ten provinces
with a large proportion of the firms surveyed across all years of the survey. The
population of non-state manufacturing enterprises in the ten selected provinces is
based on two data sources from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. These are
the Establishment Census and the Industrial Survey. This panel is compiled from
surveys conducted in Vietnam in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. The
provinces surveyed included the cities, Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and
Hai Phong, and the provinces of Ha Tay, Long An, Phu Tho, Quang Nam, Nghe
An, Khanh Hoa, and Lam Dong.
For the purposes of our analysis, the survey captures a range of questions on
applications for finance, the types of credit the firms apply for as well as the
success of credit applications. Importantly, the data also captures the range of
other balance-sheet and profit and loss controls that are needed to undertake
standard assessment of investment as well as accurately control for credit risk and
firm quality.
3.3.2 Empirical Approach
Understanding the relationship between access to finance
and capital efficiency
The first part of our empirical assessment links the marginal revenue product of
capital (our proxy for firm capital efficiency) to broadly defined indicators of
access to finance. We then separately focus on considering the association between
credit demand and credit supply and capital allocation. It is important to split out
supply and demand effects to understand whether capital efficiency in the econ-
omy is affected by the credit markets provision of financing or to selection effects
due to the type of enterprise that is seeking credit. Table 3.1 presents the main
indicators that we use in our empirical methodology.
We use the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) as our measure of
capital efficiency and our measure is based on the underlying model of Hsieh and
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Klenow (2009) whose focus was on the extent of resource misallocation in both
labour and capital markets. Our firm-specific measure of MRPK is given by:




where αS is the sector level (2-digit) elasticity of capital with respect to output and
is computed as one minus the share of labour costs in total value added of the
sector, sigma is the elasticity of substitution and is set conservatively at a value of
3, PsiYsi is nominal value added of the firm, and Ksi is the capital stock of the firm
measured as total assets.
If all resources are allocated efficiently then the MRPK will be equalized across
firms. Firms with higher than average MRPK face disincentives (such as credit
constraints) for investing in capital, while those with below-average MRPK benefit
from more favourable investment conditions (such as access to credit).
To measure formal credit access, we use an indicator which captures whether or
not the firm has a formal loan or line of credit with a financial institution. This
should give a broad indication of access to finance in the formal financial system.
To measure informal access to credit, we use an indicator which captures whether
the firm has an informal loan outstanding.
The above indicators measure usage of credit and do not disentangle credit
demand and supply factors. To identify these two channels separately, we use two
indicators for credit demand and two for credit supply. On the demand side, the
indicators capture: (a) whether the firm applied for formal credit; and (b) whether
Table 3.1 Indicators of access to finance, credit demand, and credit supply
Indicator Definition
Formal credit access Variable = 1 if firm has a formal loan or line of credit and
0 otherwise




Variable = 1 if firm applied for a loan to a formal financial
institution and 0 otherwise
Credit demand: requires
loan
Variable = 1 if the firm indicated it needs a loan to undertake
its activities and 0 otherwise
Credit supply: credit
rationed




Variable = 1 if firm did not apply for a loan due to (a) possible
rejection, (b) the process was too difficult, or (c) theinterest
rates were too high and 0 otherwise
Credit supply: credit
constrained
This variable is a composite of credit rationed and
discouraged borrowers
Source: Authors’ esimates.
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the firm reports that it needs a loan. On the supply side, we use two traditional
indicators of credit constraints to capture: (a) rejection rates for loan applications
(credit rationing); and (b) discouraged borrowers. These are standard measures in
the literature (see Casey and O’Toole (2014 for a discussion).
Our main research objective is to empirically test for a relationship between
credit access (as defined above) and capital efficiency. We therefore estimate the
following equation which links each of the indicators above to a proxy for the
firm’s marginal revenue product of capital, controlling for firm profitability, size,
age, and a range of fixed effects. Controlling for both firm profitability and
marginal returns should ensure that credit market selection effects due to profit-
ability are absorbed in the profit variable and that the capital efficiency measure
captures allocation effects.
PrðI ¼ 1Þit ¼ β0 þ β1lnMRPKit þ β2ln profitit þ β3ageit þ β4ln empit
þαi þ τt þ ss þ πp þ eit ð3:2Þ
I represents, in turn, each of the binary indicator variables noted above, ln MRPK
is the log of the marginal revenue product of capital, ln profit is the log of the
profits of the firm, age is the age of the firm and ln emp is the number of
employees, used to capture firm size. We saturate the model with fixed effects
for sector, time, and province to ensure that time-invariant confounding factors
are removed at these levels of variation. The model is estimated using a linear
probability approach with and without a within-group transformation to remove
firm-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sectoral level. Subscript i
refers to firm i in the panel, αi are firm-specific, time-invariant effects, πp are
province dummies, τt are year dummies, ss are sector dummies, and eit is an i.i.d.
error term. These notations are carried through Equations (3.3) and (3.4).
Exploring the impacts on firm growth
First, we consider the association between access to finance and firm capital
efficiency focusing on both credit supply and credit demand. This provides us
with some tentative conclusions as to how high investment-return firms interact
with the Vietnamese credit market.
Second, we focus on the credit supply side and test whether there is any
evidence that credit supply constraints are limiting firm growth for high-return
investors. If this is the case, it would provide evidence that capital allocation is not
efficient and the policy conclusions can be directly linked to potential supply-side
distortions. To measure firm growth, we focus on investment and employment
which are two channels used extensively in the literature.
For many small firms, investment is often lumpy and infrequent. They may
make a large investment in a specific year and then not invest again for a period of
time. To capture these dynamics, we focus on both the extensive and the intensive
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
. , . ,  . ’ 49
margin of investment. We define a variable for whether or not firms invest in
capital (measured as fixed or intangible assets) which is binary. To capture the
intensive margin, we take the log of total expenditure on investment for investors
only. To measure employment growth, we take the log of the total number of
employees in the enterprise. To test for the impact of credit constraints, and their
interaction with capital efficiency, we estimate the following investment equation:
ln Invit ¼ β0 þ β1rev grit1 þ β2ln profitit1 þ β3ageit1 þ β4age2it1
þβ5ln empit1 þ θ1CCit1 þ θ2lnMRPKit1 þ θ3CCit1  lnMRPKit1
þαi þ τt þ ss þ πp þ eit ð3:3Þ
The key variables of interest are CC which measures credit constraints and ln
MRPK. As control variables, we include rev gr, which is the growth in revenue
between period t–1 and period t, and lagged profitability to capture firm funda-
mentals. We control for the age of the firm and its square. We also include the
lagged number of employees as a control for firm size. Lags are included to avoid
simultaneity problems. As above, we saturate the model with fixed effects for
sector, time, and province to ensure that time-invariant confounding factors are
removed at these levels of variation. The model is estimated using a within-group
transformation to remove firm-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
sectoral level.
If credit constraints are limiting investment, then we expect θ₁ < 0. If the credit
market is not efficiently allocating capital, then we would expect θ₃ < 0 indicating
that the effect of credit constraints is greater for more efficient firms. For the
extensive margin binary model, we estimate a linear probability model with
the same set of covariates. For employment, we use a similar specification with the
addition of a control to proxy for the marginal revenue product of labour.
3.3.3 Summary Statistics
To motivate our empirical analysis, we present a number of summary charts
which contextualize our research. Figure 3.1 presents trends in the credit supply
and demand variables to gain insight into how firms’ access to finance has evolved
over the survey period. Both indicators of credit demand suggest that it has been
in decline since 2007 suggesting firms are lowering their requirements for new
credit over time in Vietnam. In terms of credit supply, the share of discouraged
borrowers appears to have risen over the period 2007–13 but has fallen back in
2015. The loan rejection rate (Credit Rationing) appears relatively steady over the
period but has fallen somewhat between 2011 and 2015.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how firms in our sample grow in terms of employment and
investment over time. Employment growth has generally been falling over the
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sample period suggesting SME firms in Vietnam are getting smaller. In more
recent years, however, the rate of decline in employment has moderated some-
what. In terms of investment activity, also illustrated in Figure 3.2, we see that the
proportion of firms investing every year has also fallen over the sample period,
from over 60 per cent in 2005 to around 48 per cent in 2015. The biggest fall in
investment rates was between 2005 and 2007 but it increased again between 2007
and 2009. A further decline in the number of firms investing occurred between
2009 and 2013, which is not surprising given the financial crisis, recovering





















Figure 3.1 Access to credit indicators








Employment Growth Investment (Intensive Margin)





Figure 3.2 Illustrative measures of firm growth
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam SME survey.
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The average marginal revenue product of capital is presented in Figure 3.3. The
figure is an average across all firms in each survey wave. The data suggest that
marginal returns increased during the early period, fell back coinciding with the
global financial crisis, but rebounded in more recent times. Given that the
Vietnamese economy has undergone a considerable transformation, including a
broadening of the financial sector, it is surprising that the marginal product of
capital has been very volatile. In an economy which is transitioning to a market-
orientation, it is not unsurprising that during this transition, more efficient firms
could be replaced by inefficient firms which raises overall marginal products.
Indeed, O’Toole and Newman (2017) show that this market re-alignment coin-
cided with a re-orientation of the financial sector away from the state-owned
enterprises and towards an improved allocation of finance. This would suggest
that the firms with higher levels of efficiency are not those to whom the credit
market is channelling funds. Furthermore, it may be that lending institutions are
focusing on informal signals for the allocation of formal finance rather than key
firm performance indicators. Indeed, Malesky and Taussig (2008) found that
banks in Vietnam placed a greater emphasis on connections rather than perform-
ance indicators in the allocation of credit.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics on the key indicators of access to finance,
credit demand and credit supply for each year of our analysis. Approximately
25 per cent of firms were constrained in each year of the survey; however, this
figure declined to 16 per cent in 2015. Between 25 per cent and 40 per cent of firms








Figure 3.3 Marginal revenue product of capital
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam SME survey.
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finance. Less than 10 per cent of firms in each survey year are considered to be
credit rationed.
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics on the main continuous variables of
interest in our analysis. The average age of firms in the dataset was 14 years and
the average number of employees was 18. The average investment made by firms
was approximately 820 Million VND and the average profit was 479 Million
VND.
3.4 Results
In this section, we present the main results of our empirical estimations. We first
document the findings in relation to access to finance and capital efficiency,
separating out supply and demand side factors. Second, we explore the relation-
ship between capital efficiency, credit constraints and investment. Finally, we
examine the relationship between credit constraints, efficiency and employment.
Table 3.2 Summary statistics on access to finance, credit demand, and credit supply
Year 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Sample size 2,823 2,635 2,657 2,537 2,575 2,648
Credit constrained 25 22 23 26 26 16
Formal credit access 37 36 37 28 24 24
Informal credit access 71 61 70 64 63 65
Requires loan 25 34 23 16 14 22
Discouraged borrower 17 15 15 18 20 12
Credit rationed 8 8 8 8 6 4
Applied loan 39 37 38 29 26 25
Source: Authors’ calculation using Vietnam SME Survey.
Table 3.3 Summary statistics on main continuous variables (millions VND)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total investment 8,230 820 2,045 0 19,103
Revenue 15,494 3,534 8,174 27 75,179
Gross profit 15,493 498 1,086 14 10,500
Firm age 15,775 14 10 2 77
Total labour 15,811 18 50 1 2,561
Total assets 15,494 3,920 7,533 24 68,244
Note: Outliers removed at 1st and 99th percentile.
Source: Authors’ calculation using Vietnam SME Survey.
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3.4.1 Financing and Capital Efficiency
The use of financing and capital efficiency
Our empirical exploration begins by testing the relationship between access to
formal and informal finance and capital efficiency. The regression results from
the estimation of Equation (3.2) using a linear probability models are presented
in Table 3.4. We estimate each specification using both simple OLS techniques
and a linear fixed-effects estimator (FE). As the fixed effects transformations
remove firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity that could bias the estimates,
our preferred specification is the FE. If there is a discrepancy between OLS and
FE findings, the FE should take priority. Province, sector, and time-fixed effects
are included in all specifications and standard errors are clustered at the
sector level.
As illustrated in columns (1) and (2), we find a negative correlation between the
MRPK and the likelihood of having a formal loan. This suggests that firms with a
higher marginal revenue product of capital have a lower likelihood of having
formal finance. On face value, this result suggests that capital allocation is not
efficient as the firms with higher returns on capital are not the ones to which the
credit market is channelling funds. However, it could also be the case that the
Table 3.4 Relationship between capital efficiency, formal, and informal credit









Ln MRPK 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.006 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Constant 0.390*** 0.214 0.650*** 1.943***
(0.049) (0.132) (0.027) (0.123)
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Other controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 15,062 15,062 15,072 15,072
R-squared 0.188 0.042 0.031 0.014
Number of firm ID 5,012 5,014
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at sector level are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Note (1): OLS regression refers to pooled cross sectional estimation of the data. Fixed effect (FE)
estimation uses a simple within-group mean removal technique.
Note (2): As specified in Equation (3.2) other controls included are firm profitability, firm age, and firm
size. Results are not presented here but are available on request.
Source: Authors’ estimates using WIDER Vietnam SME survey data.
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firms that have access to formal finance have already undertaken productive
investments lowering their MRPK in which case the negative correlation here is
simply picking up a dynamic adjustment process. We will explore this possibility
when we consider the impact of access to credit on firm growth below.
In contrast to the results for formal financing, we find a positive correlation
between MRPK and informal financing, in columns (3) and (4), although the
magnitude is small and is not well-determined. This suggests that the efficiency of
capital is not an important consideration in the allocation of informal financing.
Identifying credit demand and supply effects
In the section above, we found some tentative evidence that the formal financing
market is not allocating financing efficiently. We delve deeper into this issue by
trying to understand whether this is coming through demand or supply effects in
these markets. In this section, we test the relationship between formal credit
demand, formal credit supply, and capital efficiency.
The regressions exploring the relationship between credit demand and effi-
ciency, estimated using a linear probability model and the same specification as
for the regressions presented in Table 3.4, are presented in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Relationship between capital efficiency and credit demand









Ln MRPK 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.379*** 0.302** 0.213*** 0.614***
(0.052) (0.125) (0.022) (0.143)
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Other controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 15,071 15,071 15,075 15,075
R-squared 0.183 0.041 0.133 0.046
Number of firm ID 5,013 5,014
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at sector level are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Note (1): OLS regression refers to pooled cross sectional estimation of the data. Fixed effect (FE)
estimation uses a simple within-group mean removal technique.
Note (2): As specified in Equation (3.2) other controls included are firm profitability, firm age, and firm
size. Results are not presented here but are available on request.
Source: Authors’ estimates using WIDER Vietnam SME Survey data.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
. , . ,  . ’ 55
A number of findings emerge. Across all specifications, it appears that credit
demand is negatively associated with the marginal revenue product of capital. As
firms have a higher level of capital efficiency, their demand for credit falls. This is a
surprising result as these firms are potentially the ones to gain most from taking
on credit and increasing investment.
We also explore the relationship between credit supply and capital efficiency
using the same specification. The results are presented in Table 3.6. We find that
marginal returns to capital are negatively correlated with the probability of
being credit-rationed and positively correlated with the probability of being a
discouraged borrower, although in both cases the results are not well deter-
mined. It does provide, however, some suggestive evidence that being turned
down for a loan (credit rationing) may well be justified on efficiency grounds as
these firms have indeed lower returns to capital. On the other hand, firms who
choose not to apply for a loan for fear of being rejected—the process being too
difficult or the rate of interest being too high—are likely to be the ones that
would yield high returns on that investment. Caution, however, should be
exercised in this interpretation given that the results are not statistically well-
determined.
Table 3.6 Relationship between capital efficiency and credit supply









Ln MRPK 0.002 0.004* 0.024*** 0.009
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 0.029* 0.052 0.405*** 0.693***
(0.014) (0.113) (0.051) (0.072)
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Other controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 15,075 15,075 15,075 15,075
R-squared 0.034 0.011 0.036 0.014
Number of firm ID 5,014 5,014
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at sector level are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Note (1): OLS regression refers to pooled cross sectional estimation of the data. Fixed effect (FE)
estimation uses a simple within-group mean removal technique.
Note (2): As specified in Equation (3.2) other controls included are firm profitability, firm age, and firm
size. Results are not presented here but are available on request.
Source: Authors’ estimates using WIDER Vietnam SME Survey data.
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3.4.2 Do Financing Constraints Affect Firm Growth
for Efficient Firms?
Financing and investment
To this point, we have explored the relationship between capital efficiency and
access to finance. We find some tentative evidence that capital allocation may not
be optimal as firms with higher marginal returns are less likely to have formal
finance. In this section, we undertake a more direct test, which asks whether firm
growth has been limited by credit allocation problems. To test this hypothesis, we
explore whether credit constraints impact investment and employment and if the
effect is larger for higher return firms. This is a more direct test of whether credit
supply is limiting the efficient allocation of capital.
Table 3.7 presents the results for the specification exploring the relationship
between credit constraints, the efficiency of capital, and investment as given in
Equation (3.3). We present the results for both the intensive and extensive margin.
All independent variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity issues and in each case
the model is estimated including firm-fixed effects. We separately test the effects
on all constrained firms and on credit-rationed firms and discouraged borrowers.
In each case we interact MRPK and credit constraints to examine whether there is
an impact on investment.
On the intensive margin, we find a negative interaction between the marginal
product of capital and credit rejections (column 4). This suggests that as
efficiency increases (higher marginal product firms), credit constraints lower
the level of investment that firms undertake. That we find this channel specific-
ally for the intensive margin and not the extensive margin, may reflect the fact
that those firms with high marginal products may have internal resources that
they will use to undertake at least some investment even if they are credit-
constrained. They will not invest the optimal level but they will appear in the
measure for the extensive margin as having some positive level of investment.
More generally, this finding suggests that credit allocation may be the allocation
of investment in the Vietnamese economy.
Financing and employment
The second measure of firm growth that we consider is employment. We test the
relationship between employment, credit constraints, and capital efficiency using
the same specification as above. The channel through which access to finance
impacts employment is not as direct as investment, as the latter requires poten-
tially larger amounts of funds at a particular point in time while expanding the
work force could be done incrementally. It may be the case, however, that
employment growth is slowed if firms cannot access sufficient working capital
to manage wage bills or—if firms forego investments—they may operate at a lower
than optimal capital output ratio thus lowering employment growth.
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Table 3.7 Testing the effect of credit constraints and capital efficiency on investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
Lag Ln MRPK* Lag Credit Constraints 0.010 0.086
(0.011) (0.061)
Lag Ln MRPK 0.004 0.093* 0.006 0.077* 0.004 0.080*
(0.007) (0.047) (0.005) (0.038) (0.006) (0.044)
Lag credit constraints 0.027 0.230
(0.038) (0.153)
Lag Ln MRPK* Lag credit rationed 0.004 0.093*
(0.019) (0.050)
Lag credit rationed 0.031 0.328***
(0.054) (0.104)
Lag Ln MRPK* Lag discouraged Borrower 0.014 0.063
(0.010) (0.075)
Lag discouraged borrower 0.019 0.114
(0.031) (0.192)
Constant 0.742*** 2.923*** 0.381** 3.225*** 0.745*** 3.245***
(0.137) (0.490) (0.136) (0.446) (0.138) (0.479)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 10,040 5,022 10,040 5,022 10,040 5,022
R-squared 0.037 0.061 0.037 0.061 0.037 0.061
Number of firm ID 3,621 2,522 3,621 2,522 3,621 2,522
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at sector level are included in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note (1): As specified in Equation (3.3) other controls include revenue growth, firm age and age squared, lagged profitability in logs, and lagged number of employees in
logs.

























The results using the same specification as for Table 3.7, with the addition of a
control for the marginal revenue product of labour, are presented in Table 3.8. We
do not find any statistically significant interactions between the marginal products
and credit constraints in the employment specifications. This suggests that the
negative effect of credit on capital efficiency and firm growth is running through
the investment channel and not the employment channel.
3.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This chapter explores the impact of credit access on firm growth by examining
whether credit is flowing to firms with the highest return on capital. Standard
Table 3.8 Testing the effect of credit constraints, credit allocation and employment
(1) (2) (3)
Lag Ln MRPK* Lag Credit Constraints 0.005
(0.015)
Lag credit constraints 0.018
(0.040)
Lag Ln MRPK 0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Lag Ln MRPL 0.065** 0.065** 0.065**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Lag Ln MRPK* Lag credit rationed 0.030
(0.037)
Lag credit rationed 0.078
(0.087)
Lag Ln MRPK * Lag discouraged borrower 0.008
(0.014)
Lag discouraged borrower 0.015
(0.043)
Constant 1.383*** 1.379*** 1.391***
(0.284) (0.280) (0.285)
Controls Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Observations 8,145 8,145 8,145
R-squared 0.072 0.073 0.072
Number of firm ID 3,152 3,152 3,152
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note (1): Controls include: revenue growth, firm age and age squared, lagged profitability in logs, lagged
number of employees in logs, and the lag of the log of the firm’s marginal revenue product of labour.
Source: Authors’ estimates using WIDER Vietnam SME Survey data.
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neoclassical economic models would suggest that an efficient capital market
should intermediate financing to firms with the highest returns on investment
allowing them to invest and grow. For the case of Vietnam—a country that is
transitioning to a more market-oriented economy—we find evidence that finan-
cial markets are not necessarily intermediating finance to its highest return in the
case of SMEs, and this is limiting investment at the firm level.
More specifically, we find that high-return investors, with the greatest mar-
ginal return on capital, have a lower likelihood of having formal finance (loans
outstanding with formal credit institutions). Marginal returns on capital do not
seem to impact on informal financing. This could be suggestive evidence that
formal credit markets are not allocating finance to the highest return and that
informal credit markets are filling a void to address this gap.
Directly testing whether credit supply is the limiting channel, we find evidence
that rejected credit applications are limiting investment activity but not employ-
ment, particularly for firms with higher investment efficiency. The effects are
found to be running through the credit-rationing channel on the intensive margin
of investment.
Our results provide a number of insights for policy. Having formal credit in
Vietnam is associated with lower marginal returns on capital. While this might
be suggestive of good credit allocation (as firms with formal credit have been
able to make investments), the fact that credit constraints are found to limit
investment for high marginal return firms would indicate otherwise. We find
suggestive evidence that borrower discouragement may be an important credit
constraint in Vietnam. More efficient firms appear to be more discouraged.
Since these borrowers often do not interface with a formal financial institution
(as compared with rejected borrowers who make an application), targeted credit
policies, such as guarantee schemes, for example, are less likely to be effective in
addressing this market failure. Improving awareness amongst firms, and
increasing information about the formal credit process, might prove to be the
more effective policy response.
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4
The Interaction of Institutional Quality
and Human Capital in Shaping the
Dynamics of Capital Structure
Enrico Santarelli and Hien Thu Tran
4.1 Introduction
Firms are financed through various means: internal capital, debt, equity, or any
hybrid forms. The combination of different sources of finance is often referred to
as the ‘capital structure puzzle’ initially proposed by Myers (1984). The choice of
capital structure is one of the most important strategic decisions that managers
face in today’s increasingly volatile and hypercompetitive market. But what do we
know about the capital structure of small businesses in a transition economic
setting? The answer is ‘not much’ as almost all the existing empirical literature on
capital structure has so far mostly focused on established firms, especially market-
listed companies in advanced countries. Ignoring the peculiarities of small enter-
prises, which represent the majority of the firm population and account for a
remarkable part of gross domestic product (GDP) and employment in most
countries, especially in transition and developing countries, extant studies tend
therefore to underestimate an important aspect of the capital structure puzzle.
In Vietnam, for example, there are only around 1,000 firms that issue publicly
traded securities, yet according to the General Statistics Office (GSO 2016) they
contribute up to 65 per cent of GDP and hold 23 per cent of the whole national
capital investment. However, there are around 56,000 small firms with total
assets of less than 10 billion Vietnam Dong (VND), accounting for 93.8 per cent
of the whole firm population, and contributing to nearly 30 per cent of GDP. The
latter create more than half a million new jobs and employ more than 51 per cent of
the labour force.
So far, the three most influential theories of capital structure—trade-off theory,
pecking order theory, and market-timing theory—offer several predictions
regarding firm-specific factors affecting firm capital structure. Under trade-off
theory, the firm seeks to balance the tax benefits from using debt against the costs
of financial distress that rise at an increasing rate with the use of leverage. Hence,
this theory predicts an ‘optimal’ ratio of debt to equity, where the tax benefits of
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deductible interest are just offset by the costs of financial distress (Miller 1977).
The theory predicts that larger firms, in general, and firms with more tangible
assets and characterized by higher profitability could enjoy greater tax benefits of
debt and hence should have higher leverage. The pecking order theory (Myers
1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) relies upon the concept of asymmetric information
between managers and investors that guides managers in their preference for
raising funds. According to this theory, firms stick to a ‘pecking order’ in their
search for funding, first using internally generated funds (primarily retained
earnings) with the lowest degrees of asymmetric information, then tapping private
debt (primarily in the form of loans from financial institutions), and seeking
equity from outside sources as a last resort. Based on this, the theory predicts
that more profitable firms can rely on internal funds and hence have lower
leverage. As a consequence, there is no ‘optimal’ ratio of debt to equity. Finally,
the market-timing theory of capital structure is the most recent addition to the
theories of capital structure, emerging from a study by Baker and Wurgler (2002)
that considers how the efforts of management to ‘time’ the issuance of equity
relate to the firm’s capital structure. Of these three major competing theories
explaining capital structure decisions, only the first two are relevant for small
firms that do not issue publicly traded securities. There has been no consensus about
which theory best explains small firms’ capital structure decisions (Serrasqueiro
and Caetano 2015).
Further, while developed countries tend to have an advanced institutional
environment and a developed capital market such that capital-constrained firms
can easily access different sources of finance to optimize their capital structure
(Rajan and Zingales 1995; Wald 1999), very little is known about how firms in
transition countries determine their capital structure and how this decision is
influenced by the local institutional quality, which is normally characterized by
distinctive characteristics such as inefficient markets, active government involve-
ment, weak financial market, and high uncertainty (Booth et al. 2001; Chang
et al. 2014). These transition settings challenge the efficacy of existing business
models and theories, and thus provide a useful context to explore how firms
facing radical external institutional and market changes of the transition develop
a relevant capital structure to bring about required organizational changes. As a
transition country, Vietnam presents an interesting and highly relevant context
to explore the wider applicability of the capital structure literature. With the
implementation of the doimoi policy over the past 30 years driving the centrally
planned economy towards moremarket-driven arrangements, Vietnam has experi-
enced substantial changes in virtually every aspect of its society and economy
(Tran and Santarelli 2017).
Our chapter contributes to the literature as follows. First, we explore what
determines the evolution of capital structure over time. In this connection, we
address the question of ‘which capital structure theory—trade-off or pecking
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order—best explains the capital structure decisions of non-state firms during the
post-transition process in Vietnam?’. We classify the determinants into three
categories—individual-level, firm-level, and regional-level categories—in order
to provide a comprehensive insight into firms’ capital structure black boxes.
Second, since the financial market is relatively underdeveloped in Vietnam, and
non-state firms are constrained by a complex credit-rationing process, the use of
formal external financing directly from the market is very limited, and hence we
predict that informal sources of debt will be more important than formal ones.
Thus, we study how informality in the financing market is associated with firms’
leverage decisions. Finally, we identify that an optimal capital structure or a
beneficial leverage level in small firms will depend significantly on their entrepre-
neurs’ human capital and the local institutional environment. In particular, the
extent to which firms can access formal loans or may need to exploit informal
loans instead is contingent on the combination of their owners’ education,
experience and transparent and fair credit rationing rules in a high-quality
institution. We look into the dynamic relationship between environmental insti-
tutional quality and firms’ changing leveraging decisions, taking into account the
interaction effect of entrepreneurs’ human capital and local institutions.
For empirical evidence, we use a unique database provided by the CIEM-
DANIDA (Central Institute for Economic Management and Danish International
Development Agency) project covering around 2,000 micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises in Vietnam for each year from 2003–14. We estimate our
empirical models by employing the System Generalized Method of Moments
estimator (GMM-Sys) (Blundell and Bond 1998). The structure of the chapter is
as follows. We review the related literature on capital structure theories, deter-
minants of capital structure, and how capital structure influences firm survival,
and develop our hypothesis in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses our data, their
descriptive statistics, and pair-wise correlation. Section 4.4 presents variable
construction and estimation models. Section 4.5 discusses the main results and
provides interpretation. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Discussion
4.2.1 Trade-off Theory versus Pecking Order Theory
In theory, firm capital structure is optimal in efficient markets (Rubinstein 2003).
However, in practice, the financial market is never efficient. Subsequent theoret-
ical work has taken into account the imperfections of financial markets and has
shown that firms establish their capital structure depending on firm-specific
attributes and macroeconomic factors that determine the various costs and
benefits associated with debt and equity financing (Frank and Goyal 2009).
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Our empirical analysis is motivated by two strands of the capital structure
literature which are directly relevant to non-state small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs).
The trade-off strand states that optimal capital structure is determined by firms
balancing tax savings from debt against deadweight bankruptcy costs. Classic
arguments for this trade-off theory are based on bankruptcy costs in a situation
of excessive debt, tax deductibility of interest expenses, and agency costs of equity
derived from excess free cash flows (Jensen and Meckling 1976). It is therefore
suggested that there is an optimal level of debt where the marginal benefit equals
the marginal cost of an additional unit of debt (Bradley et al. 1984). The pecking
order theory argues that a pecking order in financing exists if there is information
asymmetry in companies between the insiders, either shareholders or managers,
and outsiders, mainly investors. There is thus a preference hierarchy of financing
sources: firms prefer to use retained earnings as their first financing source,
followed by debt and, lastly, by equity. Equity is less attractive to firms given
that it entails larger information asymmetry costs (Baskin 1989), or managerial
optimism (Heaton 2002), making its issuance more expensive relative to other
funding sources.
Empirically, these two theories have often been placed in opposition when
seeking to identify which offers the best explanation regarding capital structure
decisions. In the empirical studies, some of the findings are consistent with the
trade-off theory while others are consistent with the pecking order theory.¹ A large
number of these empirical studies have focused on the debt determinants of large
and listed companies, whereas capital structure decisions of SMEs have only
recently gained interest (Sogorb-Mira 2005; Serrasqueiro and Caetano 2015).
The serious lack of capital and existence of information asymmetry prevent
SMEs from accessing external financing sources and thus being able to peg with
a hierarchical order of selection. However, to balance debt tax shield benefits and
deadweight bankruptcy costs associated with debt financing, they need a high level
of financial literacy around debt and tax systems, which appears to be far beyond
their ability. While various empirical studies support a particular theory in
explaining SMEs’ capital structure decisions (for instance, the pecking order
theory in Ou and Haynes 2006; Ramalho and Silva 2009), Serrasqueiro and
Caetano (2015) conclude that the pecking order theory and trade-off theory are
not mutually exclusive, i.e. when SMEs adopt a financing behaviour, following one
theory does not imply a distance from the other theory. In what follows, we will
review the (contradictory) predictions of the two theories regarding the key
determinants of capital structure such as profitability, growth opportunities,
asset tangibility, income volatility, firm size, and tax shield benefits.
¹ For a review, see Köksal and Orman (2014).
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According to trade-off theory, profitability is positively associated with leverage
for three reasons (Bonfim and Antão 2012). First, as profitability increases,
bankruptcy costs decrease, pushing firms to higher levels of leverage. Second,
facing higher expected tax rates than less or non-profitable firms, more profitable
firms should borrow to shield income from taxation. This asymmetric taxation of
profits and losses drives profitable firms to higher levels of debt as they benefit
more from the resulting tax benefits of debt (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). Third,
in the agency theoretical framework, profitable firms tend to have severe free cash-
flow problems, that is, more excess earnings over profitable investments, thus also
requiring higher leverage to restrain management discretion. However, the peck-
ing order theory suggests a negative relationship between profitability and lever-
age level since profitable firms have internal funds (retained earnings) to support
investments and are less likely to seek debt financing.
The two theories also disagree with respect to the relationship between leverage
and growth opportunities. While trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship
between leverage and firm growth, the pecking order theory predicts a positive
relationship. Supporting the agency theoretical framework, trade-off proponents
suggest that firms with high-growth opportunities tend to have few free cash-flow
problems but high financial distress costs of debt due to significant conflicts of
interest between shareholders and debt holders. Thus, high-growth firms should
use less debt. However, pecking-order theorists claim that high growth is likely to
put a strain on retained earnings since internal funds are unlikely to be sufficient
to support emerging investment opportunities, and it therefore pushes capital-
constrained firms into debt financing. This supports a positive relationship
between debt and growth opportunities once internal retained earnings have
been fully exhausted.
Asset tangibility is normally a proxy for the availability of collateral, and thus
firms with considerable tangible assets tend to have low expected distress costs
and few debt-related agency problems. Trade-off theory asserts that firm leverage
increases with tangibility of assets (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Frank and Goyal
2009). This is because tangible assets are easier to collateralize and they suffer a
smaller loss in value when firms go into distress. In addition, since firms tend to
match the maturity of assets with that of liabilities, tangibility should be positively
correlated with long-term leverage. However, according to pecking order theory,
firms with high tangibility can have low leverage because they tend to have low
information asymmetry, making the issuance of equity less costly (Harris and
Raviv 1991).
According to trade-off theory, the value of interest tax shields incentivizes firms
to hold high levels of debt when facing high tax rates. The effect of taxes on debt
ratios, however, has been difficult to clearly identify in the data, and the available
evidence is rather mixed and weak (see, for example, Antoniou et al. 2008; Frank
and Goyal 2009). This may be because non-state firms face severe constraints in
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accessing external financing, there is uncertainty about what would constitute a
good proxy for tax effects, and transaction costs make it difficult to identify tax
effects even when they are an element of a firm’s problems. Thus, in practice,
researchers normally analyse non-debt tax shields, such as depreciation deduc-
tions, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits, which can be a substitute
for the interest expenses and consequently can reduce the need to carry debt
(DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). These shields can be considered as substitutes for
the corporate tax benefits of debt financing. Therefore, while tax shields make it
attractive to secure additional financing using debt, trade-off theory predicts a
negative relationship between leverage and non-debt tax shields. More often than
not, empirical studies produce results that are supportive of this trade-off theory
prediction (Köksal and Orman 2014). Nevertheless, the pecking order theory, with
the underpinning principle that a company follows a certain ‘pecking order’ in its
capital structure choices (internal funds first, then debt, and equity) does not,
however, provide an explicit explanation for the relationship between non-debt
tax shields and leverage.
Large firms tend to be diversified and have stable cash flow, so their probability
of bankruptcy is smaller than that of SMEs. Trade-off theory asserts that large
firms have higher leverage compared with small firms. However, since large firms
also tend to have less asymmetric information and lower adverse selection,
pecking order theory suggests that large firms can more easily issue equity
compared to small firms, and thus prefer equity to debt, resulting in lower
leverage.
Although the two theories are in contradiction as far as the prediction of the
impact of profitability, growth opportunities, and firm size on leverage are con-
cerned, they agree on the impact of volatility (or firm risk) on leverage ratios.
Risky firms tend to have volatile cash flows and high costs of financial distress.
Under trade-off theory, the impact of volatility on debt financing is negative as
debt increases bankruptcy costs. In addition, the probability of wasting interest tax
shields increases when earnings are less than tax shields (Frank and Goyal 2009).
Bankruptcy risks and tax shields both work to reduce leverage. Under pecking
order theory, business risk exacerbates the adverse selection between firms and
creditors. Thus, firms with more volatile cash flows are less likely to be indebted to
lower the possibility that they will have to issue new risky securities or forego
future profitable investments when cash flows are low.
4.2.2 Institutional Effects in Transition Countries
Institutions are recognized as being fundamental to economic growth and devel-
opment because they provide the basic rules of human interaction for people in
their use of scarce resources. More recent international studies pay particular
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attention to how institutional differences across countries shape capital structure
decisions (Öztekin 2015). Institutional characteristics affect not only the costs and
benefits of operating at various leverage ratios, but also the speed at which a firm
converges to its long-term capital structure. If a province’s institutional charac-
teristics make debt and equity financing more costly, firms in that province will
exhibit slower adjustment speeds.
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s, firms in post-socialist
countries had to readjust their working principles to be competitive in the open
market. This also created a wave of new-born enterprises. These countries under-
went severe economic reforms during the 1990s to produce significant changes to
their institutional settings as well as their macroeconomic indicators. All these
major changes were expected to have an impact on the capital structure of firms
from transition countries (De Haas and Peeters 2006; Decoure 2007). Cross-
country studies have shown that firms in these countries tend to use short-term
debt rather than long-term debt (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999).
Since at least the mid-1990s, there have been a growing number of studies that
explore the determinants of capital structure in individual transition countries,²
including Vietnam.³ The ideologies of the centrally planned mechanism prioritize
state ownership in controlling the capital market. By introducing a monobank
system—a system consisting of the central bank and various specialized state-
owned banks (an investment bank, a foreign trade bank, an agricultural bank,
etc.), which are regulated directly by instructions from the central bank—the
central planning board can control all funds and cash flows. A large proportion
of these funds is for state investment in state-owned enterprises and public
services. However, the newly developed market institutions have not been sup-
ported by an effective system of legalization and legal practices in which private
transactions are enforced, fair competition, free entry and orderly ways of exit are
maintained, and the rights of debtors and creditors are secured. As a result, this
substantially limits firms’ financing choices, especially those of private firms.
Evidence suggests that private firms in China are denied access to bank loans
and often must resort to expensive trade credits (Brandt and Li 2003; Cull et al.
2009), while informal and short-term loans are preferred by new business found-
ers in Vietnam (Rand 2007). Many private entrepreneurs in Vietnam with experi-
ence of doing business in informal markets in the past mainly use their savings
rather than bank credits to finance their businesses (Tran and Santarelli 2014).
² See, for example, Wiwattanakantang (1999), Deesomsak et al. (2004) for Thailand; Pandey (2004)
for Malaysia; Huang and Song (2006), Qian et al. (2009), Chang et al. (2014) for China; Correa et al.
(2007) for Brazil; Qureshi (2009) for Pakistan; Espinosa et al. (2012) for Chile; and Sbeti and Moosa
(2012) for Kuwait.
³ Almost all the studies of the capital structure in Vietnam (for instance Nguyen 2010; Nguyen et al.
2012; Vo 2017) focus solely on listed firms and limit exploring whether determinants of capital
structure of the country are comparable to those of advanced countries.
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4.2.3 Hypothesis
Vietnam is currently one of the fastest emerging markets undergoing transition to
a market economy. Its rapidly expanding capital market is gradually opening up to
global investors and international firms. This suggests that some of the trade-off
theory’s predictions are more appropriate for the case of Vietnam than those of
the pecking order theory. First, there are so many profit opportunities in the
country that entrepreneurs are always in need of loans to finance their start-ups
and operations. The underdevelopment of the Vietnamese financial market,
however, limits their access to formal loans and prioritizes loans from informal
sources. Second, large size, profitability, and high growth are key indicators in the
credit-rationing criteria of formal creditors. Thus, large, profitable, and high-
growth firms will attempt to obtain more loans, especially from formal sources
to finance their activities. Third, since SMEs find it difficult to obtain formal
financing due to difficulties in proving their creditworthiness, small cash flows,
inadequate credit history, high risk premiums, underdeveloped bank–borrower
relationships, and high transaction costs (Tran and Santarelli 2014), collateral is
essential for them to obtain loans. Thus asset tangibility, a good proxy for
collateral availability, stimulates firms to adopt more debt financing. Finally,
income volatility indicates high firm risk and instable cash flows. As a conse-
quence, firms with volatile income will be less likely to obtain loans since debt
financing may exacerbate their bankruptcy risks. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The leverage decisions of firms in Vietnam follow trade-off theory
predictions, rather than those of pecking order theory.
Nevertheless, modern Vietnam, during the transition to a market economy, still
suffers many institutional constraints with complex administrative regulation,
excessive bureaucracy, and frequent changes in ‘red tape’ increasing the risk and
cost of doing business for private entrepreneurs (Glewwe and Dang 2011; de Jong
et al. 2012). As a consequence, although the government has recognized entre-
preneurial activities as an essential driver of economic growth, there is a lack of an
established system of entrepreneurial finance. Since the early 1990s, shortage of
capital was at the top of the list of constraints identified by Vietnamese entrepre-
neurs in almost every survey of private small firms in the country (Tran and
Santarelli 2014). Until recently, state-owned commercial banks still relied on
political connections to determine loan access as a credit source for private
enterprises regardless of their profitability or growth (Malesky and Taussig
2009). In fact, recent research indicates that SMEs in transition economies may
experience highly constrained pecking orders, given the significant institutional
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biases they face in accessing debt from the formal financial sector (Newman et al.
2012). Rand (2007) suggests that formal loans are relatively unimportant for new
business founders compared to informal loans and personal savings due to
collateral requirements from the formal financial system. Thus, we realize that
SMEs in Vietnam may passively follow a pecking-order strategy in financing their
businesses.
On one hand, social capital from membership of business networks plays an
important role in gaining support and accessing external resources, including
financial capital (Santarelli and Tran 2013). However, our data show that only 7.5
per cent of firms were members of business associations in 2015. On the other
hand, human capital helps entrepreneurs to acquire financial resources, as it is one
of the factors that investors and banks rely on to evaluate credit applications. Tran
and Santarelli (2014) suggest that human capital helps family firms to relax their
capital constraints since they have a greater knowledge of financing alternatives.
However, we observe from our data that around 80 per cent of respondents have
low levels of educations (unskilled/technical training with no certificate/vocational
education). This once again supports the passively adopted pecking-order strategy
of relying mainly on internal funding, since even when SMEs try to apply for
loans, they are unlikely to obtain them.
4.3 Data Description
The dataset used in our empirical investigation is a 12-year panel of Vietnamese
small and medium private manufacturing enterprises covering the period from
2003 to 2014. The dataset is extracted from five waves of the Danish International
Development Agency (DANIDA) surveys (carried out in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011,
2013, and 2015), providing highly detailed information on various aspects of
entrepreneurs and their firms. These SME surveys stemmed from the collabor-
ation of the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) in Hanoi,
Vietnam and the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs of Vietnam, the
Department of Economics of the University of Copenhagen, and the Royal
Embassy of Denmark in Vietnam. The surveys are designed with the objective
of collecting and analysing data representative of the private sector as a whole in
Vietnam. This means that, as well as interviewing large or formally registered
enterprises, a substantial number of non-registered businesses are also studied in
order to gain a comprehensive understanding of SME dynamics in Vietnam.
The sample we use for our analysis was extracted from the master dataset based
on the following criteria: (i) firms’ sales, total assets and/or labour force are non-
zero; (ii) state-owned firms and joint ventures are excluded; and (iii) unregistered
(informal) businesses who do not pay tax are excluded. The final sample consists
of 24,640 observations covering 4,458 firms, of which up to 73 per cent (3,273)
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obtained some type of loan. Among these indebted firms, nearly 52 per cent
(1,698) applied for loans from formal sources, 72 per cent (2,360) applied for
loans from informal sources, and 36 per cent (1,181) applied for loans from both
sources. The average leverage ratio (debt to total asset) of our sampled firms is
comparatively low and stable, varying between 9 per cent and 14 per cent from
2003 to 2008, and then reducing to less than 9 per cent from 2009 onwards
when transitional measures brought positive changes to the macro institutional
environment.
The tabulation of legal ownership types by provinces shows that only 55 per cent
of the sampled firms are household enterprises compared to around 90 per cent in
the firm population (CIEM et al. 2011). Many households operate informally
(unregistered) and thus are excluded from the analysis. The location–sector split
of our sample suggests that the three largest sectors in terms of number of
enterprises are food and beverages, fabricated metal products, and manufacturing
of wood products. Finally, some 67 per cent of small and medium firms are
registered as limited liability companies, compared to 33 per cent of micro firms.
Moreover, up to 90 per cent of all micro firms are household establishments. Only
26 per cent of the joint stock firms are found in the medium firm category, and
almost 21 per cent with this legal structure are found in the micro category; see
Santarelli and Tran (2018: tables 1–3).
The second dataset that we use for our analysis is the provincial competitive-
ness index (PCI) data, which was first created for a sample of regions in 2005 and
then for all 63 provinces and municipal cities from 2006 onwards. The survey is a
product of the collaboration between the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (VCCI) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).
PCI is a provincial institutional index, a weighted average of the nine sub-indices,




There are several different leverage measures used in capital structure studies.
Following Köksal and Orman (2014), we consider three different measures of
leverage: formal, informal, and total debt over total assets.⁵ It is important to
⁴ For the data and information about the methodology of the PCI index, see PCI (n.d.).
⁵ Formal loans come from weak relationships: banks, venture capital funds, social funds, etc., while
informal loans are from strong networks such as families, relatives, friends, private creditors, etc. They
are specified from the most important (in value terms) current formal and informal loan respectively.
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distinguish between formal and informal leverage since formal debt and informal
debt inherently carry different implications for the outcome of the business. As
mentioned earlier, firms in transition countries tend to employ more informal
forms of financing, reflecting the greater dependence of these firms on families
and friends. While these informal sources enable firms to have less pressure from
interest rates, they can, however, erode the necessary entrepreneurial efforts to
maintain firm survival and growth.
Independent variables
(i) Profitability is the ratio of before-tax profit to total assets (return on assets
(ROA)). While trade-off theory expects a positive impact of profitability on
leverage, pecking order theory suggests a negative impact.
(ii) Growth opportunities are reflected by the growth of sales as in Schoubben
and Van Hulle (2004), Frank and Goyal (2009), and Köksal and Orman (2014).
While trade-off theory predicts a negative impact of firm growth on leverage
ratios, pecking order theory predicts a positive impact.
(iii) Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999), we define asset tangibility as the ratio of tangible fixed assets
to total assets. Trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage
and tangibility, while pecking order theory generally predicts a negative relation-
ship between leverage and tangibility.
(iv) Following Titman andWessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), firm
size consists of labour size (natural logarithm of total number of employees) and
economic size (natural logarithm of total assets). Trade-off theory asserts that
large firms have higher leverage compared with small firms but, according to
pecking order theory, large firms prefer equity to debt, and thus have lower
leverage.
(v) While tax shields make it more attractive to secure additional financing
using debt, trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage
and non-debt tax shields. Nevertheless, pecking order theory does not provide
an explicit explanation of the impact of tax on leverage. Rather than including
corporate taxes and non-debt tax shields separately in our analyses following
Köksal and Orman (2014), we use a single indicator called the ‘potential debt
tax shield’ (PDTS) proposed by Shuetrim et al. (1993), which simultaneously
takes account of the presence of both effects. Whether a firm actually enjoys a
positive tax advantage for debt financing depends on the trade-off between
these two effects.
PDTS ¼ Iit þ
Tit
τt
if Tit > 0
0 if Tit ¼ 0
;
(
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where Iit and Tit denote, respectively, interest payments and tax payments by firm
i at time t, and τt denotes the statutory corporate tax rate at time t.⁶
(vi) Firm risk or volatility is measured by the standard deviation of operating
income over total assets as in de Jong et al. (2008). Both the trade-off and the
pecking order theories predict a negative relationship between leverage and
business risk.
(vii) Institutional barriers are measured by the PCI, which is designed to assess
the ease of doing business, economic governance, and administrative reform
efforts by Vietnam’s provincial and city governments in order to promote private
sector development. The overall PCI index score comprises ten sub-indices
reflecting economic governance areas that affect private sector development.
The higher a province’s PCI index, the higher the quality of the institutions in
that province. In particular, that province is considered to perform well if it has:
(1) low entry costs for business start-up; (2) easy access to land and security of
business premises; (3) a transparent business environment and equitable business
information; (4) minimal informal charges; (5) limited time requirements for
bureaucratic procedures and inspections; (6) minimal crowding out of private
activity from policy bias toward state, foreign, or connected firms; (7) proactive
and creative provincial leadership in solving problems for enterprises; (8) devel-
oped and high-quality business support services; (9) sound labour training pol-
icies; and (10) fair and effective legal procedures for dispute resolution.⁷
Control variables
(i) Education and experience of firm owners; (ii) firm ownership types: house-
holds, private firms, cooperatives, limited liability firms, and joint-stock compan-
ies; (iii) firm age; (iv) export firms; and (v) regional dummies. Table 4.1 presents
the measurement of all adopted variables.
Table 4.2 provides basic summary statistics. Although up to 70 per cent of our
sampled firms obtained some type of loans, loans make up just under 10 per cent
of the firm’s total assets, of which 7 per cent are from formal sources and 3 per
cent from informal sources. Exploring this further, around 60 per cent to 70 per
cent of formal loans are from state-owned commercial banks, and the same
proportion applies to informal loans obtained from family and friends. When
comparing the debt ratios to statistics reported in other studies (such as Gannetti
2003; Li et al. 2009), it is clear that Vietnamese firms have much lower levels of
leverage in their capital structures than firms in other countries. Given the fact
that a significant number of firms report ‘lack of capital’ as one of their three
⁶ Shuetrim et al. (1993, in Köksal and Orman, 2014) show that it is equal to the sum of interest paid
and taxable income after all non-debt tax deductions have been made.
⁷ For the methodology, sampling method, questionnaire, and annual report on PCI, see PCI (n.d.).
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Table 4.1 Measurement of variables
Variables Proxies Measures
Dependent variables Total debt ratio The ratio of total debt over total assets
Total formal debt ratio The ratio of debt from formal sources over total assetsa
Total informal debt ratio The ratio of debt from informal sources over total assetsa
Independent variables Firm profitability Return on assets (ROA): the ratio of before-tax profit to total assets
Growth opportunities Growth of sales: ðSalest−Salest−1ÞSalest−1
Asset tangibility The ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets
Firm size Labour size: natural logarithm of total number of employees of the firm
Economic size: natural logarithm of total assets of the firm
Tax shields Potential debt tax shield (PDTS), Iit and Tit denote, respectively, interest payments and tax payments by firm i
at time t, and τt denotes the statutory corporate tax rate at time t.




0 if Tit ¼ 0
(
Firm risk/volatility The standard deviation of operating income over total assets
Institutional barriers The provincial competitiveness index (PCI) comprises ten sub-indices reflecting economic governance areas that
affect private sector development. For the methodology, see PCI (n.d.).
Individual-level
control variables
Education A dummy attains 1 if the firm owner has high level of education (college and university degrees), and zero otherwise
Experience The sum of three types of experience: self-employment experience (the likelihood of previously being self-employed),
industry experience (the likelihood of previously working in the same line of business), and management experience
(the likelihood of previously working as a manager)
Firm-level control
variables
Firm age Number of years that a firm is in operation
Export firms A dummy attains 1 if the firm produces products/services for exporting
Ownership types 1. Household; 2. Collective/cooperative/partnership; 3. Private firms; 4. Limited liability; 5. Joint stock
Province-level control
variables
Regional dummies 1. Ha Noi; 2. Phu Tho; 3. Ha Tay; 4. Hai Phong; 5. Nghe An; 6. Quang Nam; 7. Khanh Hoa; 8. Lam Dong; 9. Ho Chi
Minh city; 10. Long An
a Formal loans come from weak relationships: banks, venture capital funds, social funds, etc., while informal loans are from strong networks such as families, relatives, friends, private


























biggest challenges in firms’ establishment and operations (Tran and Santarelli
2014), the actual low (formal/informal) leverage ratios reflect the underdeveloped
and weak financial market in Vietnam, which fails to address capital constraint
issues. There is significant variation in age across our sampled firms. The average
firm age is 12 years, and the standard deviation of firm age is 9.73. On average,
almost 75 per cent of firms’ assets are tangible assets. Only 7 per cent of the
sampled firms are involved in export activities.
The correlation matrix in Table 4.2 indicates that there are high correlations of
0.71 and 0.52 between the overall leverage level and the formal/informal debt
ratios respectively, reflecting the fact that formal and informal loans are equally
important to Vietnamese firms in financing their investments. There is a trivial
correlation of 0.04 between formal debt ratio and informal debt ratio, which
indicates that firms mainly rely on one loan source at a particular point of time,
rather than using both at the same time. Firm size is significantly and negatively
correlated with firms’ ROA: smaller firms are more profitable. Profitability is
positively associated with all measures of leverage, whereas asset tangibility is
negatively associated with these measures. Export firms appear to be more lever-
aged than their counterparts. We also find a significantly positive correlation
between the entrepreneur’s human capital variables and leverage ratios. Finally,
PCI index is negatively associated with all measures of human capital and leverage
ratios. This indicates that firms are less financially constrained in provinces with
high-quality institutions. However, these provinces are also attractive repositories
of highly educated and richly experienced entrepreneurs, suggesting some possible
interactions between institutional quality and the entrepreneur’s human capital.
4.4.2 Methodology
We estimate a dynamic panel model that estimates the unobserved leverage ratio,
t, from the past leverage ratio, t−1 and other explanatory variables.
LEVi;t ¼ αLEVi;t−1 þ βXi;t þ γPCIi;t þ δi;t; ð4:1Þ
where LEVi;t is firm i’s debt ratio in year t, LEVi;t−1 is firm i’s debt ratio in year
t−1, α is the adjustment parameter, β and γ are the coefficients to be estimated.
Xi;t are observable firm and province characteristics, and PCIi;t is institutional
quality index of the province where firm i is located.
Equation (4.1) contains the endogenous lagged dependent variable and the
short panel bias (Blundell and Bond 1998; Huang and Ritter 2009). We therefore
use the system GMM technique to estimate Equation (4.1), and we control for the
potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables, including the lagged dependent
variable, by using lags of the same variables as instruments. According to Wintoki
et al. (2012), the system GMM procedure can both take advantage of the panel
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation matrix
Var Mean Std Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) 0.099 0.29 0 13.3 1.00
(2) 0.07 0.24 0 12.5 0.71* 1.00
(3) 0.03 0.15 0 9.8 0.52* 0.04* 1.00
(4) 11.82 9.73 0 76 −.06* −.05* −.05* 1.00
(5) 14.09 1.72 4.59 20.8 0.02* 0.03* −.04* −.04* 1.00
(6) 2.07 1.14 0 7.56 0.16* 0.15* 0.09* −.13* 0.64* 1.00
(7) 0.35 3.35 −1.3 406 0.03* 0.03* 0.02* −.02* −.08* −.00 1.00
(8) 18.2 1,496 −1 196,001 0.00 0.01 0.00 −.00 0.01 0.01 −0.00 1.00
(9) 0.22 0.91 0 60.1 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* −.03* −.09* 0.01 0.71* −0.00 1.00
(10) 0.75 0.30 0 1 −.07* −.12* −.14* 0.04* 0.07* −.01 −.02* 0.00 −.01 1.00
(11) 817,525 149*10⁵ 0 178*10⁷ 0.03* 0.03* 0.00 −0.00 0.09* 0.10* 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −.03* 1.00
(12) 0.074 0.26 0 1 0.09* 0.08* 0.05* −.04* 0.25* 0.38* 0.00 −0.00 0.01 −.04* 0.05* 1.00
(13) 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.11* 0.09* 0.08* −.14* 0.36* 0.43* −0.01 −0.00 0.01 −.05* 0.06* 0.20* 1.00
(14) 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.01 0.00 −.01 .01 −.02* −.06* 0.01 −0.01 −.00 0.03* −0.01 −.04* −.15* 1.00
(15) 0.062 0.24 0 1 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* −.06* 0.09* 0.16* −0.01 −0.00 −.00 0.03* −0.00 0.09* −.16* −0.01 1.00
(16) 0.114 0.32 0 1 0.05* 0.03* 0.03* −.09* −.14* −0.01 0.00 0.00 −.01 −0.01 −.06* −.01 −.02* −.05* 0.04* 1.00
(17) 57.9 4.09 47.7 67.1 −.04* −.03* −.04* −.06* 0.15* 0.05* −0.00 0.04* −.00 0.03* −.15* 0.02* 0.05* 0.05* −.01 0.01 1.00
Note: * significant at 1 per cent level. (1) debt ratio; (2) formal debt ratio; (3) informal debt ratio; (4) firm age; (5) economic size; (6) labour size; (7) return on assets (ROA); (8) growth of sales; (9) firm
volatility; (10) firm tangibility; (11) potential debt tax shield (PDTS); (12) export firm; (13) education; (14) self-employment experience; (15) management experience; (16) industry experience (17)


























structure of our dataset and account for the frequently ignored methodological
concerns that are common to corporate finance studies, such as dynamic
endogeneity.
4.5 Estimation Results
We estimate three equations in which the overall debt ratio, the formal debt ratio,
and the informal debt ratio take turns to be the dependent variable. The results are
presented in Table 4.3. For each equation, we provide three treatments: columns
(1), (4), and (7) examine the relationship between capital structure determinants
and the three leverage ratios; columns (2), (5), and (8) add provincial institutional
quality index into the estimation; and columns (3), (6), and (9) look into the
interaction between institutional quality and the entrepreneur’s human capital
variables. We will now look at the effect of individual capital structure determin-
ants to explore if our hypothesis is supported.
The results show that firm size is a reliable factor for all sources of leverage. This
seems to be driven more by countries with weak institutional settings, in which the
liability of newness and smallness represents a key challenge to start-up firms.
While labour size has a significant and positive relationship with leverage ratios,
which supports the trade-off theory’s assertion that large firms have higher
leverage compared with small firms, economic size is negatively associated with
debt financing. Firms with large asset pools are able to leverage their assets to
various means to create stable cash in-flows without debt obligations.
Profitability has a significantly positive impact on overall and formal leverage.
As profitability increases, the higher are the expected tax rates and the lower the
bankruptcy risk, which pushes firms to obtain more (formal) loans to capitalize
abundant growth opportunities in a transitional economic setting, as well as to
shield their income from taxation. This again supports the trade-off theory.
Furthermore, high profitability also improves firms’ credit ratings to obtain formal
loans, so they rely less on informal loan sources when it comes to further
investments. However, sales growth does not exert a significant impact on lever-
age, which fails to support either the trade-off theory or pecking order theory.
We also find that asset tangibility reflects the availability of collateral for
acquiring loans. Nevertheless, we find a significant and negative relationship
between firms’ asset tangibility and leverage ratios, which supports the pecking
order theory. Given the underdevelopment of the financial market and the
importance of informal loans in Vietnam, access to formal loans is challenging,
and thus rather than obtaining credits, firms will try to bootstrap by all means
such as by leasing or renting their land or factories, to create stable income from
their large fixed assets. However, we do support both the trade-off theory and
pecking order theory in finding a significant and negative relationship between
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Table 4.3 Determinants of total leverage, formal leverage, and informal leverage
Variable Total leverage Formal leverage Informal leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Debt ratio, t−1 0.391**(0.008) 0.136**(0.009) 0.129**(0.008) 0.516**(0.009) 0.202**(0.007) 0.191**(0.007) 0.496**(0.008) 0.128**(0.006) 0.128**(0.006)
Firm age 0.001*(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) −0.001*(0.000) −0.001*(0.000) 0.000(0.000) −0.000*(0.000) −0.000*(0.000)
Labour size 0.007(0.007) 0.014*(0.006) 0.014*(0.005) 0.011*(0.005) 0.015**(0.004) 0.016**(0.004) 0.001(0.003) 0.003(0.002) 0.003(0.002)
Economic size −0.026**(0.004) −0.017**(0.004) −0.019**(0.003) −0.021**(0.003) −0.016**(0.002) −0.016**(0.002) −0.010**(0.002) −0.013**(0.001) −0.013**(0.001)
Profitability 0.007*(0.003) 0.008*(0.004) 0.005(0.004) 0.006**(0.002) 0.008**(0.003) 0.008**(0.003) 0.001(0.002) 0.000(0.001) 0.000(0.001)
Growth opportunities −0.000(0.000) −0.000(0.000) −0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) −0.000(0.000) −0.000(0.000)
Income volatility −0.577**(0.162) −1.308**(0.151) −1.252**(0.141) −11.162**(0.596) 2.404**(0.154) 2.250**(0.154) −0.897**(0.062) −0.216**(0.021) −0.217**(0.021)
Asset tangibility −0.149**(0.022) −0.154**(0.021) −0.140**(0.019) −0.086**(0.016) −0.122**(0.013) −0.119**(0.013) −0.074**(0.010) −0.062**(0.007) −0.062**(0.007)
Debt tax shield (PDTS) 0.000**(0.000) 0.000**(0.000) 0.000**(0.000) 0.000**(0.000) 0.000*(0.000) 0.000*(0.000*) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000)
Export firm 0.010(0.020) 0.011(0.019) 0.005(0.018) 0.004(0.014) 0.002(0.012) 0.000(0.012) 0.013(0.009) 0.019**(0.006) 0.019**(0.007)
Professional education 0.062**(0.011) 0.038**(0.009) 0.229**(0.072) 0.037**(0.007) 0.016**(0.006) 0.047(0.048) 0.009*(0.004) 0.002(0.003) 0.000(0.027)
Self-employment experience 0.041**(0.008) 0.038**(0.007) 1.345**(0.039) 0.016**(0.005) 0.011*(0.005) 0.224**(0.026) 0.006(0.004) 0.001(0.002) 0.027*(0.015)
Management experience −0.032*(0.014) 0.005(0.016) 1.332**(0.041) −0.023*(0.010) 0.017*(0.009) 0.233**(0.028) −0.003(0.007) 0.004(0.005) 0.031(0.016)
Industry experience 0.073**(0.011) 0.159**(0.016) 1.352**(0.039) 0.000(0.008) 0.015(0.011) 0.214**(0.026) 0.010*(0.005) 0.004(0.006) 0.027*(0.015)
PCI index −0.002**(0.000) −0.006**(0.001) 0.000(0.000) 0.001**(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000)
PCI * education −0.004**(0.001) −0.001(0.001) −0.000(0.000)
PCI * experience −0.022**(0.001) −0.004**(0.000) −0.000*(0.000)
Private firm −0.025(0.021) −0.023(0.022) −0.031(0.021) −0.022(0.015) −0.016(0.014) −0.017(0.014) −0.012(0.009) −0.037**(0.008) −0.036**(0.008)
Cooperative/partnership firm 0.029(0.044) 0.029(0.044) 0.023(0.041) 0.018(0.031) −0.017(0.028) −0.016(0.027) 0.015(0.020) 0.028*(0.016) 0.029*(0.016)
Limited liability firm 0.021(0.025) 0.032(0.024) 0.029(0.023) 0.011(0.018) −0.022(0.015) −0.023(0.015) 0.008(0.011) 0.007(0.008) 0.007(0.008)
Joint stock firm −0.039(0.043) −0.064(0.039) −0.045(0.036) −0.006(0.031) −0.042*(0.024) −0.041*(0.024) −0.018(0.019) −0.032*(0.014) −0.033*(0.014)
Provincial dummies χ2ð8Þ=230** χ2ð8Þ=513** χ2ð8Þ=513** χ2ð8Þ=228** χ2ð8Þ=698** χ2ð8Þ=699** χ2ð8Þ=584** χ2ð8Þ=1337** χ2ð8Þ=1332**
Intercept 1.129**(0.165) 0.027(0.139) 0.672**(0.132) 18.404**(1.156) 9.183**(0.310) 8.909**(0.311) −2.868**(0.233) −0.886**(0.067) −0.889**(0.068)
Wald χ2 test 3244** 1751** 3028** 6957** 9007** 9170** 6722** 7039** 7045**


























firm risk (volatility) and leverage. The volatility of firms’ incomes indicates the
instability of returns to entrepreneurs and a higher risk of bankruptcy, but also a
large potential magnitude of profit. Thus, although a higher risk of returns is
correlated with lower debt ratios, the magnitude of the correlation is weaker with
informal debt ratios. Given its open policy for the last three decades, Vietnam is
characterized by a generation of young, ambitious, and dynamic entrepreneurs
who are willing to take advantage of every opportunity that comes their way.
Unable to obtain loans from formal sources due to volatile cash flows, they
renegotiate terms with family and friends to obtain informal financial support.
Finally, potential debt tax shields are significantly and positively associated with
leverage. These tax shields act as powerful substitutes for corporate tax benefits of
debt financing, and thus firms with higher amounts of debt tax shields should
choose to have lower levels of debt according to the trade-off theory. However, we
fail to support this theory for the case of Vietnam. We claim that these tax shield
benefits, such as depreciation deductions, depletion allowances, and investment
tax credits, make it more attractive to secure additional financing. Nevertheless,
these tax shield benefits are strongly available when we consider the overall and
formal leverage ratios of firms. They gradually lose their significance, and become
insignificant and irrelevant for informal leverage sources. Obviously, loans
acquired from informal sources, such as families and friends, are considered as
internal/own capital, and thus are not applicable for any tax exemption or shield
benefits.
Overall, our findings support the trade-off theory with respect to the effects of
profitability, volatility, and firm size, while supporting the pecking order theory
with respect to asset tangibility. Therefore, overall, we cannot strongly support our
hypothesis, and contend that the leverage decisions of firms in Vietnam follow the
explanations of both the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. They work
in a complementary rather than mutually exclusive manner in explaining the
capital structure decisions of firms in a transition economic setting.
With regard to the effects of control variables, firm and individual character-
istics that explain total debt decisions appear to play a similar role in formal and
informal debt decisions, although the statistical significance may differ. Export
firms in particular are slightly more indebted, but their loans are mainly from
informal sources. As expected, the entrepreneur’s human capital is a crucial
determinant of a firm’s capital structure. We find a consistent positive impact of
professional education on the overall and the formal leverage ratios. Keeping other
factors constant, entrepreneurs with high education levels (college and university
degrees) are more likely to have 6.2 per cent higher financial leverage. Since
education level is always one of the most important screening criteria for banks
and venture capital funds to make investment decisions, it is plausible that highly
educated entrepreneurs find it easier to obtain formal loans. Surprisingly, while
self-employment and industry experience are important for obtaining loans,
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especially formal ones, management experience plays the exact opposite role. An
entrepreneur who has owned/started up a firm previously or has worked in the
same line of business gives a positive signal to formal creditors when they evaluate
the risks and returns of investments into a firm. This valuable entrepreneurial
experience is also found to exert a significantly positive effect on various measures
of entrepreneurial performance in Vietnam (Santarelli and Tran 2013). However,
management experience is more meaningful to wage employment opportunities
(Carbonara et al. 2019). As expected, we consistently find an insignificant effect of
human capital variables on the informal debt ratio.
Importantly, disparities in regional institutional development matter for firms’
leverage decisions. Our variable of interest, provincial institutional quality, is
negatively associated with the overall leverage ratio. Firms residing in provinces
with high-quality institutions are found to have lower leverage levels than their
counterparts in low-quality institutions. Advanced market institutions require
banks to apply strict screening criteria to monitor loan financing, and, thus,
firms with bad credit in well-developed provinces cannot obtain loans or cannot
borrow as much as they want. However, a developed institutional environment
also favours the emergence and development of alternative financing instruments
such as equity and, as a result, local firms reduce their reliance on debt financing
(Li et al. 2009). The significant and positive effect of PCI on the formal debt ratio
indicates that better legal rules and better protection of creditors in high-quality
institutions also encourage more formal debt financing (supporting Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). But it is worth noting that our measure of institu-
tional development across regions (PCI) in Vietnam is much broader than the
creditor protection measure typically used in prior work.
While higher professional education is positively associated with leverage
ratios, institutional quality has a negative impact on debt financing. Further,
better developed provinces are attractive destinations for highly educated entre-
preneurs and workers in general. These inconclusive pair-wise correlations sug-
gest the need to study the interaction effects of human capital and institutional
quality on capital structure decisions. We present the estimation results of these
interactions in columns (3), (6), and (9) for the overall debt ratio, formal debt
ratio, and informal debt ratio respectively. Interestingly, although human capital
motivates and enables entrepreneurs to adopt debt financing, highly educated and
experienced entrepreneurs residing in high-quality institutions do not find loans
attractive as other sources of finance. Being exposed to various sources of finance
in a well-developed province with an advanced financial market, they acquire
fewer loans and move toward more sophisticated financial sources (such as
venture capital). The single effect of education becomes insignificant when we
add its interaction term with PCI in the estimation. This again affirms the crucial
role of the institutional environment in obtaining loans in particular and capital
structure decisions in general. No matter how well educated entrepreneurs are,
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they fail to access debt financing if they are located in a province with low-quality
institutions. In summary, we show that human capital and institutional develop-
ment interact in important ways to affect capital structure decisions: the role of
human capital in firms’ capital structure decisions is strengthened in more
developed provinces. As suggested by Carbonara et al. (2016), advanced institu-
tional quality not only facilitates the development of an efficient financial market
that eases access to formal loans and other more attractive sources of finance, but
it also promotes entrepreneurial start-up activities in different economic settings.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Employing a unique database on Vietnamese firms, this chapter addresses the
questions: ‘Which capital structure theory—trade-off or pecking-order—best
explains the capital structure decisions of non-state and non-listed firms during
the post-transition process in Vietnam?’ and ‘How do human capital and provin-
cial institutional quality as well as their interaction influence these decisions?’We
classify the determinants into three categories: individual-level, firm-level, and
regional-level categories and find that the leverage decisions of Vietnamese firms
generally follow the explanation of both the trade-off theory with respect to the
effects of profitability, volatility, and firm size, and pecking order theory with
respect to the effect of asset tangibility. Although many studies favour either the
trade-off theory or pecking order theory over the other to describe the capital
structures of firms (Köksal and Orman 2014), we claim that this is not necessarily
the case for young and dynamic entrepreneurs in a transition country. Both
theories work in a complementary manner to explain the financing choices of
private firms in Vietnam. Since the financial market is underdeveloped and state-
controlled in Vietnam and non-state firms are constrained by a complex credit-
rationing process, accessing formal sources of loans is extremely tough for young
and non-state firms. However, Vietnam is a land full of opportunity where
entrepreneurs always have new opportunities to begin again after failed business
attempts, with the support of their family and friends (Carbonara et al. 2019).
Thus, given their liability of newness and smallness, bootstrapping skills and
informal sources of finance are far more essential to their financial decisions. It
is therefore not possible to explain this informality characteristic of firms’ capital
structure in transition countries in general, and Vietnam in particular, by relying
on only one particular standard capital structure theory.
Given the widespread prevalence of informal loans, we study how informality
in the financing market is associated with the leverage decisions of firms. We find
a rather consistent pattern of estimation results in terms of effect direction across
all sources of loans. Nevertheless, profitability and debt tax shields are no longer
significantly important when entrepreneurs adopt informal debt financing.
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Finally, identifying an optimal capital structure or a beneficial leverage level
depends significantly on the local institutional environment. We study the effect
of provincial institutions on firms’ leverage levels and find that high-quality
institutions with transparent and fair credit rationing rules, legal protection of
creditors, and efficient government involvement enables firms to reduce their
reliance on debt financing and to adopt other more appropriate sources of
financing.
Inspection of individual characteristics reveals that the human capital of entre-
preneurs is an important factor in determining their capital structure. Generally,
educated and experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to take loans to finance
their investments. However, when entrepreneurs reside in a high-quality institu-
tional province, education and experience may respond adversely to leveraging
decisions. They all use fewer loans and switch to other more attractive financial
sources that become available and accessible when institutional quality is
improved.
Our results are relevant for policy makers and managers of firms in transition
economies. The evidence supports the well-studied consensus that obtaining
external formal financing is extremely difficult for firms in these countries. As a
result, they mostly rely on internally generated funds or informal financing
sources to support their investment activities and growth (Mateev et al. 2013).
We claim that institutional quality plays a crucial role in easing access to formal
debt financing, and thus extending financing choices for non-state firms.
Nevertheless, the situation has improved since the enactment of the new Law
on State Bank and Law on Credit Institutions in December 1997. State-owned
commercial banks were restructured toward stock holding institutions and the
State Bank of Vietnam was reformed toward specializing in monetary policy and
supervising the banking system. Credit institutions, regardless of ownership, are
growing in terms of quantity and quality, which provides firms with easier access to
various sources of financing in amoremarket-orientedmanner (World Bank 2005).
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5
How Important Are Management
Practices for the Productivity of Small
and Medium Enterprises?
Axel Demenet and Quynh Hoang
Neither husband nor wife knew how to read—a slight defect of educa-
tion, which did not prevent them from ciphering admirably and doing a
most flourishing business. [ . . . ] To relieve himself of the necessity of
keeping books and accounts, he bought and sold for cash only.
Balzac, Le Curé de Village, 1841
5.1 Introduction
Few will question the relevance of a multinational manufacturing corporation’s
expenditure on advertising.* However, eyebrows may be raised if the same
question is asked about a single, informal worker producing rubber sandals. The
purpose of this chapter is to investigate the matter, in a comparative manner: does
managerial capital (MC) have the same effect on productivity among micro, small,
and medium firms? While past and ongoing research in management studies and
economics has proved the relevance of MC for large or medium enterprises, the
population of micro and small enterprises has largely been ignored.
Given the weight of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in total
employment, and because the long-awaited development process is occurring
* The authors wish to thank all participants from the Vietnamese Central Institute for Economic
Management, the Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam, the Development Economics
Research Group (DERG) of the University of Copenhagen, and UNU-WIDER, involved in the design,
collection, and cleaning of the survey data on which this chapter is built. Special thanks are due to John
Rand. Previous versions of this work were meaningfully enriched by comments received at the 84th
ACFAS conference, Montreal; the STBI seminar at the University of Economics of Ho Chi Minh City,
and the 7th Vietnam Economist Annual Meeting, Ho Chi Minh City. The views expressed are the
authors’ own.
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through productivity gains, there is value in understanding the mechanisms that
foster (or limit) their expansion. Several types of constraints to expansion have
already been put forward, with access to savings (Dupas and Robinson 2013),
access to finance (de Mel et al. 2008), and human capital (Hsieh and Klenow 2009)
being among the more documented ones. The lack of MC, by contrast, has only
recently emerged as a constraint (Bruhn et al. 2010).
In the developing world, MSMEs rarely use what are considered to be elemen-
tary business practices in industrialized countries. The majority do not keep basic
written accounts, and they compete mostly with other local household businesses.
Yet, micro entrepreneurs themselves mention factors such as ‘keeping and inter-
preting financial records’ or ‘promoting products’ as being important for business
success (Bradford 2007). However, some enterprises do display high organiza-
tional and managerial abilities. This heterogeneity in MC endowment can enter
the production function as an additional efficiency factor; it could be argued that
even among micro firms, managerial inputs can improve the productivity of other
inputs. Competing more aggressively, advertising products, incentivizing wage
determination or innovating could lead to higher value added.
Proving a causal relationship between productivity and MC is challenging, as
the latter does not offer exogenous variations. It is, rather, part of the often-
blamed (and always unobserved) ‘ability’ of the firm’s operator, and any relation
found to productivity can be attributed to some other unobserved factor. Our
approach is therefore not to argue that the results are fully causal, which obser-
vational data would struggle to back up. Instead, it measures the effect of changes
in firms’MC on productivity and mark-up and compares this relationship by firm
size. To do this, we use a synthetic indicator of MC and consistent productivity
and mark-up estimates. We aim to show that MC matters for micro and small
firms, and to identify which dimension of MC is the most influential.
We rely on a panel of Vietnamese MSMEs which includes proxies for several
aspects of MC. We start by estimating the productivity and mark-up of firms,
controlling for simultaneity and input price bias. We propose a multidimensional
measure of MC based on five axes used to compute a weighted score. We then
investigate the effect of MC on firm-level productivity and mark-up, controlling
for unvarying heterogeneity. We find that changes in MC are associated with large
positive effects on productivity, but they do not enhance firms’market power. We
also test for heterogeneity of the effect by firm size category. While larger firms are
found to be more productive than smaller ones, on average, we find that the effect
of MC is still significant—and of comparable magnitude—among the smallest
firms. Micro and small firms that have higher levels of managerial ability are
indeed more efficient than others—and they are as much more efficient as
medium-size firms. We further investigate the separated effect of the MC indica-
tors and find the effect to be mainly driven by firms’ ability to advertise and
compete aggressively.
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Section 5.2 reviews the literature, Section 5.3 provides the empirical measures of
productivity and MC; Section 5.4 presents the estimation results of the link
between MC and productivity, and Section 5.5 presents the robustness test.
Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature Review: What Do We Know about the
Managerial Capital of Micro and Small Enterprises?
What exactly constitutes managerial capital (MC)? The notion has no widely
accepted definition and borrows from several fields of studies, which have com-
plementary definitions. As Syverson puts it (2011), ‘Managers are conductors of
an input orchestra.’ Defining MC then amounts to measuring the length of the
conductor’s baton, but it could also relate to the conductor’s attitude and psycho-
logical traits. In the related development economics literature that has recently
surged, MC is persistently proxied by business practices (and among micro and
small firms, by elementary business skills). Management studies, in which the
focus has long been on the influence of managers, additional features of MC relate
to the entrepreneurial spirit. Taken broadly, MC thus refers to all practices and
traits of an enterprise operator that potentially have an influence on the firm’s
efficiency. This can include formal book-keeping, inventory management, finan-
cial or strategic planning, and pricing strategy, as well as innovativeness or self-
confidence.
There is general consensus on what are considered to be ‘good practices’ for
large enterprises and the effects of these practices on productivity are well known
(Bloom, Mahajan, et al. 2010; Syverson 2011; Bloom, Eifert, et al. 2013; Bloom,
Schankerman, et al. 2013). The picture is fuzzier in the case of household micro
and small firms. This section starts by reviewing the literature to determine which
skills, practices, or characteristics can proxy managerial capital among micro and
small firms, and to what extent their influence on performance is established.
5.2.1 Business Practices: Mixed Evidence from
Business Training Programmes
Numerous programmes have been launched around the developing world to
improve the business skills of microenterprises, and this has led to a substantial
body of literature evaluating the impact of these programmes. The content of
these programmes gives insights into what economists consider to be important
business skills for this population. They are often elementary, compared to
those of larger firms, and frequently include book-keeping, separating house-
hold and business budgets, elaborating growth strategies, financial planning,
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pricing and cost calculation, marketing, inventory management, savings, and
debt management.
These programmes differ in content and in terms of target population, scale,
means, and implementation schemes, which makes it difficult to draw clear
conclusions. However, two recent papers have presented their results.
McKenzie and Woodruff (2014) reviewed 20 studies (including 16 randomized
control trials), of which only two had sufficient statistical power to show
significant impacts from these programmes. These two studies found that train-
ing had an impact on short-term profits and sales: Berge et al. (2014), by
combining survey data and lab experiment, and De Mel et al. (2014), by
evaluating a combination of training and grants. The other studies they reviewed
lacked statistical power, and long-term profits were not significantly affected.
This led McKenzie and Woodruff (2014) to conclude that ‘there is little evidence
to help guide policy makers as to whether any impacts found come from [ . . . ]
productivity improvements, and little evidence to guide the development of the
provision of training’. In addition to this review, Cho and Honorati (2013)
conducted a meta-analysis using 37 impact evaluation studies—with some over-
lap with the studies reviewed by McKenzie and Woodruff (2014). They obtained
constrasting results showing little effect of training programmes on labour
outcomes, although there was clearer evidence of improvement in business
practices. More importantly perhaps, they suggest that a combination of inter-
ventions is likely to yield better results than each intervention being applied
separately.
5.2.2 Entrepreneurial Orientation and the Managerial
Performance of Micro Enterprises
The traits and attitudes of managers may matter as much as business practices.
The analysis of attitudes and psychological factors is another topic covered by
some business training, which, unsurprisingly, has been more popular in man-
agerial studies than in economics.
Making business owners more proactive and perseverant seems to increase
their performance (Glaub and Frese 2011). This finding echoes a second and
complementary strand of literature on the link between management and the
performance of microenterprises. The concept of entrepreneurial orientation
(EO) is a potential proxy for unobserved managerial ability related to attitudes
(Miller 1983; Covin and Slevin 1989). EO can be measured at the firm level along
five dimensions: proactiveness, innovativeness, risk-taking, competitive aggres-
siveness, and autonomy of workers (Lumpkin and Dess 1996).
A recent set of papers aimed at providing empirical evidence on the link
between EO and the performance of microenterprises found a positive association
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between EO and performance in the case of Mexico, Argentina, Malaysia, and the
Philippines (Campos et al. 2013; Berrone et al. 2014; Lindsay et al. 2014; Munoz
et al. 2015). While their results converge, these studies, however, share numerous
and substantial methodological shortcomings. First, the samples are small, ran-
ging from 151 to 735 observations (with a 46 per cent response rate for the latter)
and generally non-random—with on-site or administrative identification of
respondents, which likely results in sampling errors. Second, the questionnaires
are often self-administered or mailed. Consequently, accurate measures of per-
formance are beyond the reach of these surveys, and all of the cited papers rely on
self-reported evaluations of performance, the consistency of which is highly
questionable.¹ Further meta-analysis, as carried out by Rauch et al. (2009), is
also problematic. Among the 53 samples used, the average sample size is just
under 270 respondents and only seven papers use a dependent variable that is not
‘perceived performance’.
Findings from the evaluation of training programmes aimed at improving
business practices have shown few significant improvements in performance.
Similarly, the empirical investigations into the role of EO (which approximates
the part of managerial ability related to attitudes) among microenterprises suffer
from too many methodological shortcomings to provide convincing evidence.
There is thus room for a closer look at the link between MC (understood as
practices and traits) and productivity and at the potential heterogeneity of this link
across firm size. The only contribution in this regard is by McKenzie and
Woodruff (2016), who looked at the influence on productivity of business prac-
tices in marketing, stock-keeping, record-keeping, and financial planning. Their
results, which to some extent contradict the lack of impact of business training,
show that these practices explain as much variation in outcomes in microenter-
prises as in large firms. Notwithstanding the importance of this contribution to
the literature on the MC of microenterprises, their data do not allow consistent
productivity levels to be estimated.
Against this backdrop, the present work relies on a rich panel data of MSMEs,
covering mostly micro and small informal firms, and several indicators of both
business practices and entrepreneurial attitudes. The estimation of consistent
firm-level productivity is a necessary, and complex, first step, as unbiased estima-
tion of production functions is an ongoing topic in empirical economics. Using an
MC index, we then estimate its influence on productivity, removing fixed observed
and unobserved heterogeneity and, more importantly, we test the heterogeneity of
this influence by firm size.
¹ In general, relying on self-reported perception is problematic for comparison purposes. In some
cases, the questions used are beyond the reporting capacity of many micro-entrepreneurs, e.g. ‘return
on capital employed’ or ‘growth of the company’s value’ (Campos et al. 2013; Munoz et al. 2015).
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5.3 Empirical Strategy
This empirical analysis relies on a panel of household firms surveyed between
2007 and 2013,² with 8,864 observations of 2,901 unique firms. The sample is
primarily made up of micro firms, which consistently represent around 70 per
cent of observations, depending on the year. Informal household firms, defined as
having no business registration certificate, represent 26 to 34 per cent of firms per
year. The average firm size is around 14 workers. Fewer than 35 per cent of firms
operate in premises that are dedicated to production only, which means that the
majority operate at home or in shared spaces.
If MC does have an influence on productivity, it should enable firms to reach a
similar level of output with less inputs—or conversely to increase output while
inputs are kept constant. This may reflect firms being more efficient in their
production processes, but it may also signal increased market power. In order to
evaluate this link and to further test its relevance by firm size, the necessary
first step is to estimate firm-level productivity and mark-up. Sections 5.4.1 and
5.4.2 provide details of these estimations, which have to overcome a number of
endogeneity concerns. Section 5.4.3 describes the proxy variables for managerial
capital and the construction of the index, which is based on business practices
(formal accounts, advertising, wage determination) and entrepreneurial traits
(innovation, aggressive competition).
5.3.1 Estimating Firm-level Productivity
Empirical study of the link between MC and firm-level productivity can only be as
good as the first-stage estimations of this productivity. The correct identification
of the production functions is among the oldest challenge in the empirical
economic literature and is still evolving. Essentially, true productivity levels
remain unobserved and so are productivity shocks to which firms may react
differently. As long as input levels are chosen in relation to these unobserved
determinants, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations will be biased.
Specifying a Cobb–Douglas value added function:
VAit ¼ β0 þ β1lit þ β2kit þ ωit þ εit ; ð5:1Þ
where VAit is the value added of firm i at time t. l and k, are respectively the labour
and capital inputs. All variables are transformed in natural logarithm. The error
² The SME survey has been conducted nine times, most recently in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013,
and 2015. As the proxy indicators of MC changed substantially in the 2005 and 2015 survey rounds, we
restrict our sample to the 2007 to 2013 rounds. The sample size for each survey was initially around
2,500 firms, from which observations present in only one year were dropped.
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term has two components, ωit and εit, the former being correlated with inputs. The
size and direction of the bias of the OLS coefficient on capital will depend on the
correlation between inputs and productivity shocks, and more crucially on
whether this correlation varies with time. If it does not, the inclusion of firm-
level fixed-effects will yield consistent coefficients. Provided firm exit is also
determined by this unobserved but unvarying productivity, then fixed effects
will also solve potential selection bias due to endogenous exits. The unvarying
nature of the unobserved productivity could, however, be a rather strong hypoth-
esis, especially when using long-term panels. Other approaches allow for inputs to
be endogenous with respect to a time-varying unobservable. Three contributions
largely frame the empirical literature in this regard: Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg et al. (2015) (henceforth OP, LP,
and ACF respectively). The first two rely on the relationship between some
intermediate input entering the production function and the unobserved
productivity:
mit ¼ ftðkit;ωitÞ: ð5:2Þ
This function can be inverted, assuming in particular a monotonic increase in ωit
so that the productivity is a function of two observed inputs:
ωit ¼ gtðkit;mitÞ: ð5:3Þ
OP build on the idea that firms change investment (conditional on capital stock)
in response to productivity shocks and provide a non-parametric representation
of this inverse function to estimate production functions in two stages. However,
investment may not react strongly to productivity shocks—or at least, not
monotonically—and the adjustments may take place at other levels. LP suggest
using, instead, a more varying intermediate input demand function such as
material expenditure or energy costs. ACF highlight a functional dependence
problem with the specifications of both OP and LP, whereby labour can be a
deterministic function of the variables on which the first stage is conditioned.
They propose an alternative (though quite related) estimation strategy, where
inverted input demand functions are conditional on the choice of labour
input. Wooldridge (2009) additionally proposes a stacked version of LP’s
moments, estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM) with efficiency
gains, again based on unconditional input demands.³ As well as being more
efficient than the two-step estimators, this procedure can also correct for serial
correlation (Van Beveren 2010).
³ Comprehensive reviews of production function estimation techniques include Eberhardt and
Helmers (2010) and Van Beveren (2010).
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We rely on a combination of FE, LP, and Wooldridge’s (2009) estimations of
production function in addition to the benchmark OLS regressions.
OLS estimation of the firm-level value added function hence follows Equation
(5.1), including a time trend. Assuming that the unobserved productivity is mostly
fixed in time, we estimate the same equation with firm-level fixed effects:
VAit ¼ β0 þ βl lit þ βkkit þ ωi þ εit : ð5:4Þ
From both regressions, we can predict the productivity levels by taking:
ω̂ ¼ ðεit  β̂llit  β̂kkitÞ: ð5:5Þ
Further controlling for the simultaneity of inputs using LP, OP, or ACF requires
additional hypothesis on the evolution of productivity and on the timing of firms’
choices. As investment only concerns 45.5 per cent of firms across years (only 33.7
per cent among firms with one or two workers), it cannot be used as a proxy
without introducing selection bias. Among the available non-parametric correc-
tions, the LP procedure thus makes more sense and electricity costs are used as
intermediate input proxy in the core of the analysis. Productivity is then typically
assumed to follow a first-order Markov process: ωit ¼ Eðωit jωit1Þ þ ξit where ξit
is uncorrelated with kit but can depend on lit . The LP procedure then assumes that
given kitthe firm will decide on lit , and then determine mit accordingly. The
rearrangement of Equation (5.1) is thus:
VAit ¼ βl lit þ φitðkit ;mitÞ þ εit; ð5:6Þ
where:
φitðkit ;mitÞ ¼ β0 þ βkkit þ gtðkit;mitÞ ð5:7Þ
and
Eðεitjlit; kit;mitÞ ¼ 0 ð5:8Þ
The ACF critique essentially states that lt and mt are instead chosen simultan-
eously, which plagues the identification of βl in the first stage. Following
Wooldridge (2009), the last and preferred specification of productivity estimation
in this analysis consists in estimating βk and βl directly by GMM.
Assuming:
Eðωit jlit; kit ;mit ; lit1; kit1;mit1;:::; li1; ki1;mi1Þ ¼ 0 ð5:9Þ
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and restricting the dynamics of productivity shocks:
Eðωitjkit ; lit1; kit1;mit1; :::Þ ¼ Eðωit jωit1Þ ¼ jðωit1Þ ¼ jðgðlit1; kit1ÞÞ:
ð5:10Þ
We can write ωit ¼ jðωit1Þ þ ait with Eðait jkit; lit1; kit1;mit1; :::Þ ¼ 0: In
other words, inputs lit and mit are correlated with productivity innovations ait ;
whereas kit , which is set at the previous period, is not. Neither are all past values of
lit ; kit and mit . They provide a set of instruments to identify βl and βk.
We estimate the four models (OLS, FE, LP, and Wooldridge) of value added
function from the unbalanced panel of firms.⁴ We use the log of deflated value
added as outcome, the log of total employment at year n, and the log of real capital
value at the end of the previous year as inputs. The LP model further includes the
log of real electricity expenditures from the last period as proxy. Wooldridge’s
estimations of productivity rely on lagged values of li and exponential functions of
log inputs and intermediate input.
Concerns about input prices bias, the endogenous exit of firms, and industry-
specific effects may remain. Indeed, if firms face different input demand functions
(and/or operate at different points of the curves), the correction introduced by the
proxy intermediate input variable will further bias the results. Electricity costs are,
however, arguably similar across firms, and should not introduce further differ-
ences. Material expenditures are used as robustness checks to estimate alternative
productivity measures (available upon request). Next, to the extent less productive
firms are more likely to exit the sample, it is still possible that the productivity
estimations will suffer from endogenous exit. The only method that directly
corrects for this is the OP estimation, and, in practice, the corrections for firm
exit are very small.⁵ Lastly, a common practice—challenged, among others, by
Bernard et al. (2009)—consists in estimating production function separated by
industry. Given the high concentration of our sample firms within a few sectors,
industry-specific estimates would require grouping arbitrarily sectors where few
observations exist, and would result in introducing additional noise rather than
separating heterogeneous manufacturing firms. Productivity is thus estimated on
the full sample of firms.
Table 5.1 presents the coefficient estimates of the firm-level production function
on the whole population of firms, using the unbalanced panel. Column 1 corres-
ponds to OLS estimation of Equation (5.1) with an additional time trend, column
2 further introduces fixed effects to estimate Equation (5.4), column 3 applies
⁴ On implementing production function estimators in Stata, see Yasar et al. (2008), Petrin (n.d.) and
Petrin et al. (2004).
⁵ Such is the case for Newman et al. (2015) using Vietnamese data on larger firms.
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the LP procedure with electricity costs as intermediate input, and column 4
implements Wooldridge’s GMM estimation. Values of inputs, output, and value
added are all deflated using the regional price deflator for the 2005–15 periods.
Past values of inputs are limited to one lag in order to prevent losing years of
observations. Values of inputs in 2007 are only used as past values in the LP and
Wooldrige specifications. The LP and Wooldrige results also use fewer observa-
tions due to missing information on intermediate input variables. Looking at
excluded firms did not reveal any specific pattern. In particular, excluded firms
were not concentrated among the smallest microenterprises, which could have
been using proportionally less electricity.
Compared to the benchmark and expectedly biased OLS estimations, all
corrections consistently reduce the estimated returns to capital, which is con-
sistent with the simultaneity bias (more productive firms choosing more cap-
ital). The reduction in the labour coefficient is less marked; heterogeneity in
productivity levels may arguably allow employing more workers altogether, or
producing the same output with less workers. Fixed effects estimations over-
correct the bias for both inputs and find lower returns (and overall decreasing
returns to scale). Correcting for fixed and varying simultaneity, both models
find returns to capital of nearly 15 per cent at the mean, and the preferred
Wooldridge specification yields high average returns to labour, close to the OLS
estimates. One explanation may lie in the proportion of micro firms in the
sample for which more productive firms are those who can employ an add-
itional worker.
Table 5.1 Production function estimations
OLS FE LP Wooldrige
Log of labour 0.967*** 0.686*** 0.892*** 0.941***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020)
Log of capital 0.226*** 0.150*** 0.143*** 0.154***







Constant 7.306*** 9.239*** 0.210
(0.095) (0.137) (2.533)
Observations 8,759 8,759 5,822 5,797
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors. by firms in models 1, 2,
and 4, bootstrapped with 250 replications for LP estimates.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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5.3.2 Estimating Mark-ups
Two key aspects of firm performance have been emphasized in the literature—
technical efficiency in production and market power. If the market is perfectly
competitive, price is equal to marginal cost and, then, product efficiency is a
sufficient measure. However, perfect competition is hardly ever found. A firm that
takes advantage of the price–cost margin, may earn higher profits while not
necessarily improving its technical efficiency. Thus, in addition to firm product-
ivity, we estimate mark-ups as another measure of firm performance to distin-
guish different channels by which MC may have any effect on firms.
The literature on mark-up estimation is quite extensive, starting with Hall’s
(1986, 1988, 1990) approach, and then Klette (1999). We focus on the empirical
framework developed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) (hereafter DLW),
covering firm-specific mark-up estimation. Their empirical model is based on the
assumption that a firm minimizes its cost for a variable input that can be adjusted
freely. Holding other inputs constant, a competitive firm will expand its use of one
input (material in our case) until the revenue share of materials equals the output
elasticity, which reduces as materials input increases. However, a firm may choose
not to increase this input to the equality point, but to produce a lower quantity
and raise the output price instead. In this case, it indicates that the firm is able to
exercise market power by charging a price above marginal cost. The mark-ups
expression is given by:
μit ¼ θXit ðαXit Þ1; ð5:11Þ
whereμit is the mark-up or price-marginal cost fraction of firm i at time t; θ
X
it is the
output elasticity of an input X; and αXit is the expenditure share of the input X in the
total sales. This variable input could be either labour or intermediate materials.
However, in our data, many firms are household businesses that do not pay wages
(approximately 1,600 observation), making us unable to calculate the expenditure
share of labour in the total shares. Thus, we estimate mark-ups using materials as
our variable input. It can be seen that while the revenue share of materials can be
directly obtained from the data, the estimation of output elasticity is more
challenging. Indeed, we need to estimate the gross output production function
in order to find output elasticity of materials.⁶ The gross output translog produc-
tion function is given by:
⁶ See DLW (2012) for the GMM procedures to identify the output elasticity of materials followed in
this paper.
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Outputit ¼ βl lit þ βkkit þ βmmit þ βll l2it þ βkkk2it þ βmmm2it þ βlklitkit
þβlmlitmit þ βkmkitmit þ βlkmlitkitmit þ ωi þ εit : ð5:12Þ
The output elasticity for an input free of adjustment cost (materials) is then
estimated as:
θ̂itM ¼ β̂m þ 2β̂mmmit þ β̂mllit þ β̂mkkit þ β̂ lmklitkit : ð5:13Þ
After estimating the output elasticity of materials (and the share of materials in the
total output), we can calculate the firm’s mark-ups. Our estimated mark-ups based
on the Cobb–Douglas production function is 1.92 at the mean and 1.30 for the
median, while the estimation is 1.14 and 0.83, respectively, under a translog
production function. Our estimated mark-ups under translog specifications are
slightly lower than DLW’s (2012) estimations for firms in Slovenia and mark-ups
reported by Rand (2017) who use the same survey but at different periods of time.
The gap would be due to the differences in the nature of the dataset between a
survey and a census (Rand 2017) in the case of DLW (2012) and due to the
differences in approach, between estimations based on output elasticity of labour
and elasticity of materials. We will use the preferred translog specification in
examining the link between MC and firm performance in Section 5.
5.3.3 A Multidimensional Measure of Managerial Capital
Managerial capital (MC), as shown in Section 5.2, relates to all the practices and
traits of business operators that have the potential to influence firms’ efficiency.
A major advantage of the SME survey in this regard is that it not only provides
indicators linked with business practices, but also proxies of entrepreneurial
attitudes. In this study we use a multidimensional measure of MC, based on five
proxy variables that are found (and are consistent) in all rounds of the survey. The
incidence of each indicator by firm size is provided in Table 5.2.
First, book-keeping is indicated by whether the respondent does ‘maintain a
formal accounting book’. Thirty-eight per cent of firms across years do keep formal
accounts, and the proportion strongly increases with firm size. It should be stressed
that this variable captures the existence of a complete set of accounts; a negative
answer may not indicate the total absence of books, as many microenterprises may
keep simple records through personal notes. Second, a binary indication of
marketing efforts is based on a positive answer to the question ‘do you advertise
your products?’, and includes all practices from door-to-door information to radio
or TV spots. Advertising is almost inexistent amongmicro firms (4 per cent), but is
less rare among medium firms (26 per cent). A third indication of business
practices is the method of wage determination, indicating whether wages are
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determined by following other sectors’ rates, following local competitors’ rates, by
individual negotiations, by the paying capacity of the firm, or by none of these
methods (which is the case for almost 15 per cent of firms that have no employees).
The most common method for determining wages in all firms is individual
negotiations, while micro firms, even among those paying wages, predominantly
report no fixed method for determining wages (29 per cent). The last two indica-
tors proxy dimensions of firms’ entrepreneurial orientation. Innovation is used as
the third axis, and covers all forms of innovation from ‘introducing new products’
or ‘new processes or technologies’, to the ‘improvement of existing products’. On
average, more than 55 per cent of MSMEs in Vietnam have at least one kind of
innovation—the bigger they are, the higher their level of innovation.
Finally, we construct an indicator of competitive aggressiveness combining two
variables: firms that report ‘fixing prices lower than competitors’, and firms that
report ‘bribes to gain new markets’. The latter is probably less consensual, but
while bribes in general have a negative impact on many outcomes, firm-level
corruption restricted to ‘non-extortive’ bribes can have a positive impact (Vial
and Hanoteau 2010). Only 7 per cent of small and medium firms and 3 per cent
Table 5.2 Proxies of managerial capital: incidence by firm size
Formal accounts Advertising Innovation Aggressive
competition
Micro 0.20 0.04 0.47 0.03
Small 0.79 0.26 0.72 0.08
Medium 0.99 0.49 0.80 0.07
Total 0.38 0.12 0.55 0.05








Micro 0.29 0.11 0.01 0.01
Small 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.04
Medium 0.01 0.23 0.22 0.08
Total 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.02








Micro 0.01 0.38 0.16 0.01
Small 0.01 0.43 0.27 0.02
Medium 0.01 0.35 0.28 0.02
Total 0.01 0.39 0.19 0.02
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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of micro firms show some degree of aggressive competitive behaviour. The
discriminating power of most of the MC proxies is high, with few firms reporting
‘good’ business practices or entrepreneurial behaviours.
A synthetic indicator of MC is built using multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA) for each year, and is used in estimating the effect of MC on productivity
(before using each indicator separately). All variables except wage determination
are binary. Wage determination is kept flexible in MCA as there is no indication of
one method being a priori superior to the other. MCA builds a binary indicator
matrix that shows the incidence of each axis by firm, which is used to obtain
weights from the factorial axis. A firm’s MC score is thus calculated by the





whereMCi is the i-th observation’s managerial capital score,Dij the response of unit
i to dimension j, andWj the MCA weight for the first axis applied to category j.
The distribution of the MC normalized score by firm size is plotted in
Figure 5.1. The score values can be compared between firms, rather than directly
interpreted in levels. Units with a higher score display a mix of more frequent
business practices (keeping written accounts, advertising, fixing wages in line with
the state authorities’ rate or relatively to local competitors) and more entrepre-
neurial traits (competing aggressively, innovating through products or technolo-
gies). As expected, the smaller the firm, the lower the MC: micro firms are









Micro firms Small firms Medium firms
2011 2013
Figure 5.1 Managerial capital normalized score by year and firm size
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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5.4 The Link between Managerial Capital
and Firm Performance
This section investigates the link between managerial capital (MC) and
productivity, and tests whether this link depends on firm size. OLS regressions
of MC on productivity are likely to be biased by the exclusion of variables
positively associated with both MC and productivity, even when both variables
are measured convincingly. As MC essentially aims at measuring owners’ abilities,
any proxy can only capture part of this. Our strategy is to get as close to causal
inference as possible using the whole population of firms, and then to test whether
these associations are similar across firm size. The assumption is that even though
some varying heterogeneity could plague the estimation of the MC-productivity
link, these potential biases can be constant by firm size, and comparing the
significance and size of the effects is hence feasible.
In order to control for all fixed determinants of MC and productivity, whether
observed or not, all estimates use firm-level fixed effects. The outcome variable is
the total factor productivity estimated in Section 5.4. Specifically, we use the
standardized productivity estimates of the preferred specification (Wooldridge
2009). The baseline specification is thus:
Ωit ¼ β0 þ β1MCit þ β2Sit þ γC þ ωi þ εit; ð5:14Þ
where Ωit represents firm-level productivity estimated by Wooldridge’s (2009)
GMM, MCit is the managerial capital score of firm i at time t, Sit is the firm size
category, and C is a vector of controls for trends. This set of control variables aims
to remove potentially differentiated evolutions by years, sectors, or regions (and
finally with time*regions). As neither the productivity levels nor the MC scores
can be directly interpreted in levels, all results are provided as standardized
variations. The results of this baseline estimation are provided in the first column
of Table 4.3. We find that a standard deviation in MC score results in an 8 per cent
increase in productivity, on average, among the MSME sample, significant at
1 per cent. This average effect is net of the influence of firm size.
A further concern regarding bias arises from the limited indicators of man-
agerial capital available in the data. As other practices and traits that could serve as
additional proxies are not available in our data, part of the manager’s ability
remains unobserved by our MC score. We introduce a set of controls to proxy
individual ability, which shows some variation across year (firm owner does
change in some cases). Gender, education (higher secondary or more), and age
are controlled for in the following model (included in the X vector). An additional
set of time-varying firm characteristics is included: informality (being registered
or not), type of premises, and access to infrastructures (road, in this case). We also
add a set of social networks, measured by the number of contacts in the same
business sector, different sector, banking officials, and politicians/civil officials. All
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can vary during the time period considered and may influence productivity. These
additional controls have little influence on the MC coefficient, which tends to
indicate that fixed-effects estimates removed most of the existing bias.
Looking at the description of MC score by size, we know that larger firms have
both better business practices and more entrepreneurial attitudes. We also know
from Section 5.4.1 estimates that productivity levels strongly and constantly
increase with firm size. The results provided in Table 4.3 are net of this firm size
effect, but the coefficient of MC score can nevertheless have different slopes
depending on the size category if its influence on microenterprises is lower than
in small and medium firms. A third model includes interactions between MC
index and size categories to test for a differentiated effect of MC depending on the
category. In Table 5.3, we report a Wald test for joint significance of the inter-
action term.
Table 5.3 Managerial capital and productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standardized values
of (MC)
0.083*** 0.089*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.111***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Small size (11–50) 0.562*** 0.545*** 0.601*** 0.600*** 0.595*** 0.516***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Medium (51–300) 1.177*** 1.144*** 1.149*** 1.147*** 1.147*** 1.025***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059)
(Small)*MC 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.085***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
(Medium)*MC 0.057* 0.057 0.043
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033)
Log of mark-ups 0.338***
(0.041)
Controls (ability) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (social
networks)
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes No No
Time*region
interaction
No Yes Yes Yes No No
District dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Time*District
interactions
No No No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.179*** 0.308** 0.289** 0.359*** 0.244 0.112
(0.006) (0.120) (0.119) (0.123) (0.165) (0.153)
Observations 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,843
R-squared 0.281 0.314 0.320 0.323 0.380 0.447
Number of id 2,782 2,782 2,782 2,782 2,782 2,767
Note: Testparm interactions (column 5): F (2, 2,781) = 11.55. Prob > F = 0.000. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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MC and productivity levels do depend on firm size. However, the extent to which
MC does influence productivity does not: MC is as important amongmicro firms as
it is among medium ones.⁷ The MC indicators, although more scarcely found
among micro firms, discriminate equally or more in this population between
productive firms and subsistence businesses. The effect of business practices and
EO on productivity is thus as large as among larger enterprises.
We continue our analysis of the association between MC and mark-ups by
re-running all the above estimations using log of mark-ups as the outcome
(Table 5.4). Firm size has a strong association with mark-ups but our variable of
interest, MC, does not have a consistent significant effect on mark-ups. Since
Table 5.4 Managerial capital and firms’ mark-ups
Log of mark-ups (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized values of
(MC)
0.009 0.012 0.017 0.017 0.018*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Small size (11–50) 0.191*** 0.204*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.223***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Medium (51–300) 0.282*** 0.307*** 0.338*** 0.339*** 0.333***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.048) (0.048) (0.057)
(Small)*MC 0.015 0.014 0.019
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
(Medium)*MC 0.033 0.032 0.025
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028)
Controls (ability) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (social
networks)
No No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes No
Time*region
interaction
No Yes Yes Yes No
District dummies No No No No Yes
Time*District
interactions
No No No No Yes
Constant 0.177*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.186** 0.319***
(0.007) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.103)
Observations 5,901 5,901 5,901 5,901 5,901
R-squared 0.033 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.180
Number of id 2,773 2,773 2,773 2,773 2,773
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
⁷ The marginal effects of MC by size category and significance levels are available upon request, and
confirm this finding.
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mark-ups reflect firms’ market power, the insignificant results mean that the
market could be highly competitive and higher MC would not play a role in
increasing the firm’s mark-ups. We then use log of mark-ups as a control for our
estimation on MC and productivity. The results are shown in column 6 of
Table 4.3. We find that mark-ups have a positive association with firms’ product-
ivity but our coefficient of MC on productivity does not change. This suggests that
the role of MC lies mainly in technical efficiency.
These results provide a global picture of the relationship between MC and
productivity by firm size. They show that when every other factor (except some
possibly remaining time-varying heterogeneity) is controlled for, including the
same levels of inputs, firms with a higher MC generate more output because they
are technically more efficient. However, they say little about the relative import-
ance of our indicators of MC. Different types of business practices or entrepre-
neurial attitudes have different types of impact. Formal written accounts or wage
determination may influence the labour or capital productivity (as each additional
worker or capital unit may be more effective). On the other hand, marketing,
aggressive competition, or innovation might directly increase the value added for
given levels of inputs. A first indication lies in the individual contributions of each
variable to the MC score, where advertising, accounts, and competition seem to be
the most discriminating factors. An alternative possibility is to regress all indica-
tors separately on productivity.
Table 5.5 provides the coefficients of the separate indicators. As they conceptu-
ally represent different parts of a single variable, including all the indicators jointly
could result in multi-collinearity. It is nevertheless possible to gain an insight into
which has the largest influence. The wage determination variable is transformed
into a binary indication: autonomy in wage setting if a firm determines wages based
on local private rates, state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) or authority’s rates (these
three methods are found to be the most weighted in the MC score).
Entrepreneurial orientation, measured by innovation, and business practices,
measured by autonomy in wage determination aggressiveness, turn out to be the
most influential factors in all models. The absence of significant effects of other
dimensions should not lead to the conclusion that they are irrelevant dimensions
of MC; the joint influence of all factors is proven above; it is rather the intensity of
each variable that is jointly evaluated here.
5.5 Robustness
Most of the previous analysis relies on the firm-level productivity estimated in the
first stage. A remaining bias in these estimates would cast doubt on the results of
the second stage, in particular if the bias is somehow also correlated with MC. The
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results were re-obtained using an alternative estimation of productivity, based on
a different correction for simultaneity using material expenditures.⁸
Returns to capital and labour go through overall comparable corrections when
using this alternative proxy of material expenditures, although the coefficients of
capital of the LP andWooldridge estimators are higher (and the returns to labour are
lower). Firm-level productivity is then used as outcome variable and the results of
similar regressions to those in Section 5.5 are provided in Table 5.6. The effect ofMC
is consistent and still yields a 10 per cent increase in productivity per standard
deviation. The heterogeneity of the coefficient by firm size is, again, impossible to
back up: MC does matter among small firms, at least asmuch as it does for medium-
size ones. Finally, productivity estimates using corrections other than the preferred
Wooldridge specification (fixed effects and LP) were used with similar results.
5.6 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter provides a straightforward answer to an open question of growing
importance. It uses rich panel data consisting of 8,864 observations of 2,901
Table 5.5 Managerial capital indicators and productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advertising 0.049** 0.024 0.027 0.032*
(0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Innovation 0.052*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Competition 0.047* 0.018 0.023 0.031
(0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Accounts 0.051* 0.026 0.023 0.035
(0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Wage determination 0.026 0.026** 0.025* 0.021
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Size categories No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
Time and regions dummies No No Yes No
Time and district dummies No No No Yes
Constant 0.058*** 0.219*** 0.401*** 0.266
(0.012) (0.012) (0.127) (0.169)
Observations
R-squared 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893
Number of id 0.011 0.267 0.300 0.358
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
⁸ Results of the production function estimations are available upon request.
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unique firms surveyed between 2007–13, in which a set of MC indicators is
available and consistent across years. One original feature is that these indicators
enable combining standard indicators of business practices and less frequent
indicators of firms’ EO into a single score of MC. The results of consistent firm-
level productivity and mark-up estimates are regressed on this score. A variation
of one standard deviation in the MC score is associated with an 8 to 11 per cent
significant increase in productivity. The interaction terms with firm size category
are significant, as confirmed by further marginal results. However, we do not find
a significant association with firms’ market power.⁹
Even though a large number of biases are technically controlled for, variations
in MC remain unexplained. Rather, the statement is that MC does matter among
Table 5.6 Managerial capital and alternative measures of productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized values of (MC) 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Small size (11–50) 0.528*** 0.507*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.551***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Medium (51–300) 1.090*** 1.052*** 1.056*** 1.056*** 1.050***






Controls (ability) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (social networks) No No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes No
Time*region interaction No Yes Yes Yes No
District dummies No No No No Yes
Time*District interactions No No No No Yes
Constant –0.167*** –0.259** –0.244* –0.313** –0.216
(0.006) (0.127) (0.125) (0.130) (0.172)
Observations 5,913 5,913 5,913 5,913 5,913
R-squared 0.253 0.300 0.305 0.308 0.364
Number of id 2,775 2,775 2,775 2,775 2,775
Note: Testparm interactions (column 5): F (2, 2,774) = 9.4. Prob > F = 0.000. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
⁹ A useful comparison for challenging the validity of these results is the paper of McKenzie and
Woodruff (2016), in which the effect of business practices on profits is large (22 per cent at the mean for
a one standard deviation in MC).
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micro and small firms, at least as much as it matters among medium ones. The
results of low estimated mark-ups and insignificant association between mark-ups
and MC can be interpreted as follows: in highly competitive markets (concen-
trated in some specific sectors such as food and beverages, fabricated metal
production, etc.), MC is important for firms to gain technical efficiency rather
than to acquire greater market power. It is further shown that the part of MC score
related to entrepreneurial attitude (innovation) is the more significant factor when
considering all indicators separately rather than when combined.
The implications of these results are, however, not straightforward. By using
observational data we are able to employ a more complex measure of MC,
including elements that one cannot exogenously change with a training pro-
gramme. But a key preliminary question would be to determine whether MC,
and in particular its EO component, is teachable at all. If the observed variations
find no explanation, one would be left with the frustrating justification of unob-
served individual talent (as Balzac attributes to Monsieur Graslin, whose educa-
tion level plays no part in explaining entrepreneurial talent). A rough indication is
given by regressing MC scores on the set of available individual characteristics
with OLS to provide some insights into its variation. Around 30 per cent of the
variance of the MC score is explained by the (limited number of) individual
characteristics. Yet, besides younger individuals having higher MC scores, educa-
tion has by far the largest influence. The little variance explained can be inter-
preted as proof of the relevance of the MC index—which indicates more than the
differences in education.
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Are Politically Connected Firms Less
Constrained in Credit Markets?
John Rand
6.1 Setting the Scene
A wide range of outcomes related to political connections of firms has been
researched. These include (i) the influence on choice of dispute settlement,
(ii) quality of corporate governance, (iii) initial public offering (IPO) firm value,
(iv) effective tax rates paid by the company, (v) firm performance, (vi) societal
cost, etc. (among others: Ang and Jia 2014; Fan et al. 2007; Adhikari et al. 2006;
Faccio 2006; Claessens et al. 2008). Within this literature, some focus especially on
the impact of firm-level political connections on access to formal finance. The
heterogeneity in results is striking, as some studies conclude that lenders, espe-
cially in developing countries, do favor politically connected firms (e.g., Mian and
Khwaja 2005; Claessens et al. 2008; Boubakri et al. 2012), while others have
questioned such generalizations (Jackowicz et al. 2014; Siegel 2007), emphasizing
that there are significant costs of being politically connected as well. This chapter
addresses the question to what extent political connections influence firm-level
access to formal finance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam,
taking into account that there may be heterogeneity in firm-level access to cheaper
informal credit options.
The literature studying the benefits of political connectedness often takes point
of departure in the resource dependency theory, which studies how external
resources affect organizational behaviour. Resources form the basis of power,
which is relational and situational, and can be mutual between actors within a
network (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Using this perspective, political connections
facilitate relatively easier access to relevant resources (such as access to finance)
and increase the likelihood of receiving government contracts. Assuming that
there is only a limited amount of political capital available for private firms to
acquire, and that political ties lead to preferential access to resources (bank
lending), inequality of political capital across locations is one key determinant
of the benefit a firm can derive from acquiring such capital. The underlying
rationale then becomes that the more political capital there is available, the smaller
the returns to acquiring such capital will become.
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Using the resource perspective Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find, in the
case of Indonesia, that political connections help to attain preferential local
financing, but work at the expense of a dynamic integration into global financial
markets. However, cross-country evidence by Richter (2010) shows that political
connections help improve a company’s access to finance beyond the domestic debt
markets. It is further suggested that political connections hereby are a firm-level
substitute for strong national property rights that can therefore reduce the per-
ceived risk of connected firms in an environment with low rule of law. Studying
the lending behaviour of Pakistani firms between 1996 and 2002, Mian and
Khwaja (2005) observe that politically connected firms borrow more than uncon-
nected firms, and have a remarkable 50 per cent higher default rate on their
liabilities. The analysis further reveals that the political status is the sole driver
thereof, and that the benefits increase according to the political importance of the
respective connection. Interestingly, their findings are not robust for private
lenders, which indicates that political connections only facilitate access to credit
from state-influenced financial institutions. Given that two-thirds of formal
financing to the Vietnamese SMEs considered in our sample come from State
Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), this result may be of particular importance
in the context of Vietnam.
Another argument is that government ties can help overcome market/state
imperfection such as red-tape, low enforcement of property rights, heavy govern-
ment regulations or ‘extra-legal fees’ (Chen et al. 2011). This is in accordance with
the argument that ‘Chinese managers rely perhaps more heavily on the cultivation
of personal relationships to cope with the exigencies of their situation’ (Child
1994: 150). Li et al. (2008) examine how membership of the communist party
affects performance of Chinese private firms in an environment of continued
ideological discrimination against private ownership. The authors observe a
positive effect conditional on firm-specific variables, and attribute most of the
effect to lower cost-of-capital facing political connected firms. Interestingly, the
influence is stronger in regions with weaker institutions and legal protection
(Li et al. 2008). Studying how the cost of equity capital correlates with being
politically connected, Boubakri et al. (2012) confirm this observation in a cross-
country study addressing possible endogeneity concerns, where the authors find
that political connections lower the cost-of-capital, especially for older and larger
firms and for firms operating in weaker institutional environments.
When examining the disadvantages of being politically connected, point of
departure can be taken in the argument that government bureaucrats tend to be
more interested in rent seeking and political objectives than longer-term corporate
and industry efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny 1998). Political connections can there-
fore be seen as unfavourable, because of the concomitant increased exposure to
government actors. In a politically unstable environment (Poland) Jackowicz et al.
(2014) show how the operational performance of non-listed firms is negatively
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affected by political connections, and that this negative influence on firm per-
formance is intensified as the number of connections rises. Supportive evidence in
Siegel (2007) analyses how South Korean firms shape cross-border alliances based
on connections to socio-political networks. Network connections to political
enemies of the respective current regime in power are found to substantially
slow the rate at which cross-border strategic alliances are established. As such,
overall industry dynamics are distorted, harming both politically connected and
unconnected firms in the economy. Finally, in a study in France, Bertrand et al.
(2018) find that political connections impose significant economic costs on firms,
as firm managers and owners grant political favours to local government in the
form of generating employment opportunities around election time. Moreover,
politically connected firms have a lower operating profit due to relatively higher
labour cost (per unit efficiency). Furthermore, Fan et al. (2007) show how political
connections can negatively influence companies’ performance, as the connections
tend to harm the board of directors’ corporate governance.
In an effort to reconcile such contrasting findings on the costs and benefits of
political connectedness, several studies take a contingency perspective that iden-
tifies ownership, the enterprise’s stage of development, and/or the quality of the
political connections as underlying cause of the ambiguous outcomes (e.g., Du and
Girma 2010; Peng and Luo 2000; Chen et al. 2011). As an example, Du and Girma
(2010) use a panel of over 106,000 Chinese private start up enterprises between
1999 and 2004 and they find that political connections do enhance firm survival.
However, conditional on firm survival, productivity growth is higher in firms that
operate without political connections while politically connected firms are more
focused on job creation. Furthermore, the benefits of political affiliation are
stronger in capital-intensive industries and in cases where the firm is connected
to local, rather than prefecture-level authorities. The authors also conclude that in
terms of overall efficiency, political connections lead to a suboptimal allocation of
resources, and especially credit, by interfering with traditional market forces.
A similar argument has been brought forward by Chen et al. (2011) who observe
that firms are more likely to establish political connections where market orien-
tation of the local economy is low and where the government’s discretion in
allocation of economic resources is high. Thereby, incentives for officials to engage
in rent-seeking motivate private firms to seek political connections in order to
protect themselves from such behaviour, which relates to Shleifer and Vishny’s
(1998) notion of the state as a ‘grabbing hand’.
To summarize, the existing literature relies on the resource dependency of firms
and the grabbing hand of a rent-seeking state to motivate arguments for positive
or negative firm outcomes of political connections. While ambiguous outcomes
are observed, contingency perspectives try to understand how and why outcomes
differ, and highlight that the impact of political connections is highly context-
specific. To our knowledge there is only limited firm-level evidence regarding the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
  117
impact of political connections in Vietnam, and the fact that most of existing
research stems from countries with more volatile political environments, raises the
question to which extent existing research applies to Vietnam. We know of one
study for Vietnam at the firm level studying the impact of political connections on
credit access (Malesky and Taussig 2009). Using data from 6,400 firms across all
provinces in 2006 it is observed that one additional political connection increases
the probability of obtaining a loan by 4 per cent. During a subsequent test of the
impact of credit access on firm performance, the authors however observe that
political connections do not influence profit or investment growth. These results
challenge the assertion that relationship-based lending is an effective substitute for
legal institutions. Rather, they indicate that political connections are ineffective in
channelling bank credit to the most profitable investors. However, this study
(given its cross-sectional nature) is subject to concerns of individual heterogeneity
being a simultaneous driver of both access to finance and political connectedness.
This chapter instead utilizes a panel of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
observed biannually between 2005 and 2015. Controlling for unobserved time-
invariant firm-level heterogeneity as well as differences in productivity between
firms (to indirectly control for self-selection of the most productive firms into
being politically connected) and having access to informal credit markets, we
show that firm owner membership of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) (all
else equal) decreases the likelihood of being constrained in formal financial
markets by 4 percentage points. In addition, when accessing formal credit,
politically connected firms face 2–5 per cent lower cost-of-capital than non-
connected SMEs. Finally, we document that political connections are especially
valuable during periods of financial distress both in terms of credit access and
cost-of-capital when obtaining loans from formal financial institutions, whereas
these benefits are less prevalent during business cycle upswings.
6.2 Defining Credit Constraints and Political Connectedness
Data to analyse the relationship between politically connected firms and access to
finance and credit constraints come from the Vietnam Small and Medium Enter-
prise (VSME) tracer panel survey carried out biannually between 2005 and 2015
in the following nine provinces in Vietnam: Ha Noi (including Ha Tay), Hai
Phong, Ho Chi Minh City, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam
Dong, and Long An (CIEM 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016).¹ It should be
noted that although the survey focuses on SMEs, the tracer dimension of the data
¹ Provinces were not chosen randomly. It was decided that the surveys should cover the main urban
cities as well as selected rural areas. The choice of rural provinces was driven by funding related issues
(each selected province was either a Danida or Sida focus province at the time).
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allows to track and interview firms with more than 300 employees, if they have
been previously interviewed. The data are based on face-to-face interviews with
owners/managers of businesses and are collected in the months of June–August.
The sampling frame of the tracer survey was established in 2005, where the
population of listed non-state manufacturing enterprises in the selected provinces
was established based on two data sources from the General Statistics Office of
Vietnam (GSO); the Establishment Census from 2002 and the Industrial Survey of
2002–04.² Additional details on the sampling can be found in CIEM (2006).
One important aspect of the data needs attention. The majority of firms con-
sidered are smaller household businesses. Some of these are administratively listed
firms (sampled appropriately using census data information), and others are non-
listed household businesses (obtained through on-site ‘block’ identification) oper-
ating alongside the formal entities. Thus, while the group of listed firms well
represents the ‘formal’ manufacturing sector in the ten selected provinces, our
sample of informal household businesses may not be representative of ‘non-listed’
manufacturing firms in Vietnam, as they may represent the more established and
productive informal entities. The distinction between formal and informal enter-
prises may be important when analysing credit access. On the one hand, informal
businesses will not be eligible for formal loans in the company name, but have to
rely on formal financing obtained based on personal wealth records without reliance
on firm assets as collateral. On the other hand, since the data at hand (for the
majority part) are smaller household businesses, informality will not necessarily
matter that much for the relative probability of obtaining formal financing. Results
reveal that using a control for being a household business and/or being an informal
business did not change the results. We therefore in the following only report results
from distinguishing between household and non-household enterprises.
6.2.1 Defining Political Connectedness
Vietnam is by and large a one-party nation with four formal political structures
making up the regime: (i) the CPV, (ii) the people’s armed forces, (iii) the Vietnam
Fatherland Front and (iv) the state bureaucracy. Through the National Party
Congress, the CPV elects the Central Committee (CC), which again elects the
Politburo. Most political power is entrusted in these two government entities. The
CPV sets the policy direction, which is implemented through different sub-levels
of government (national, provincial, district, commune). At the sub-national level,
² The population of individual business establishments that do not satisfy the conditions stated in
the Law on Enterprises of Vietnam (also referred to as household enterprises) is obtained from the
Establishment Census. This information is combined with data on enterprises formally registered
under the Law on Enterprises from the Industrial Survey; see CIEM (2006) for details.
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the People’s Council (PC) is the highest legislative institution, and it selects the
People’s Committee (PCOM) to serve as the executive institution at each respect-
ive local governmental level. PC members, who in most cases are members of the
Communist Party (Malesky et al. 2014), are selected through voter elections.
Members of local PCOMs are also elected, but by PC members only, and their
choice needs the consent of the PCOM at the next higher level (Kerkvliet and
Marr 2004).³ As such, membership of the Communist Party seems to a necessary
first step for closer ties to local legislative and executive government bodies. Before
the 12th National Congress of the CPV it was estimated that over 4.5 million
members were represented. This indicates that only around 5 per cent of the
population are members of the CPV.
As alluded to in the introduction, being politically connected may bring both
benefits and costs, which is also illustrated in Gainsborough (2010) in the case of
Vietnam. In Vietnam, new private entrepreneurs continued to have relatively strong
political ties after the initiation of the Vietnamese Doi Moi reform process. Some of
these new entrepreneurs even stayed directly politically involved in local government
matters, and a non-negligible batch of younger private sector entrepreneurs were
children of the political elite. Gainsborough (2010) even states that to succeed in
business, private companies are reliant on local governments; a statement clearly
signalling the potential benefits of being politically connected. One mechanism
highlighted in Gainsborough (2010) goes through easier access to formal finance,
which is the focus of this paper. However, there is also evidence signalling that the
benefits of being politically connected at the local level in Vietnam may be limited.
Local government have generally been more accountable toward higher levels of
government than toward local populations and businesses (Markussen and Tarp
2014), and public funding has generally prioritized infrastructure, health and edu-
cation, and offered relatively little support to private businesses (Malesky et al. 2014).
In this chapter, we use an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm owner
is member of the CPV, and zero otherwise, as proxy for political connectedness.
In Tables 5. 1A and 1B we document summary statistics, by political connected-
ness and by year, for all variables subsequently used in the analysis of the impact
of political connections on the probability of being financially constrained.
Related to our definition, we see that 8.1 per cent of the sample are politically
connected, ranging from 7.1 in 2007 to 9.4 in 2011. Note that variation exists
even when only considering the balanced panel; a variation that we are utilizing
below for identification. Moreover, Table 6.1A shows that differences exist
between politically connected firms and non-connected firms along observable
characteristics. Politically connected firms are larger, have higher debt-ratios,
lower profit shares and are more formal (less likely to be a household firm).
³ Further details on Vietnamese election processes can be found in Malesky and Schuler (2011).
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6.2.2 Defining Credit-Constrained Firms
Defining firm-level credit constraints has been discussed intensively in the small
and medium size enterprise (SME) literature over the last couple of decades. Beck
and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) use the World Business Environment Survey (WBES)
data and utilize a perception-based approach were firms are asked whether they
perceive themselves as financially constrained and whether this is creating an
obstacle to their firm growth. Hansen and Rand (2014a) show that using Invest-
ment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys almost 50 per cent of the firms perceive
lack of access to credit to be a serious or very serious constraint to firm growth.
Table 6.1A Summary statistics, by connectedness
All Politically connected Not Connected
Politically connected 0.081 1.000 0.000 *
Credit constrained (Yes=1) 0.258 0.241 0.260
Have informal loans (Yes=1) 0.578 0.597 0.577
Number of employees (log) 1.736 1.965 1.716 *
Revenue (log) 13.465 13.637 13.450 *
Capital stock (log) 13.647 13.854 13.629 *
Intermediate Inputs (log) 13.003 13.169 12.988 *
Debt ratio 0.077 0.102 0.074 *
Have debt (Yes=1) 0.504 0.560 0.500 *
Profit share 0.652 0.621 0.654 *
Household business (Yes==1) 0.692 0.568 0.703 *
Number of observations 13,819 1,117 12,702
Table 6.1B Summary statistics, by year
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Politically connected 0.085 0.071 0.073 0.094 0.091 0.071
Credit constrained (Yes=1) 0.253 0.241 0.266 0.280 0.308 0.207
Have informal loans (Yes=1) .. 0.596 0.695 0.640 0.624 0.340
Number of employees (log) 1.904 1.832 1.778 1.697 1.615 1.574
Revenue (log) 13.379 13.449 13.567 13.490 13.436 13.471
Capital stock (log) 13.499 13.699 13.738 13.886 13.628 13.450
Intermediate inputs (log) 12.917 12.978 13.136 13.018 12.987 12.982
Debt ratio 0.092 0.084 0.081 0.064 0.064 0.072
Have debt (Yes=1) 0.575 0.531 0.581 0.487 0.492 0.355
Profit share 0.634 0.670 0.659 0.662 0.648 0.639
Household business (Yes==1) 0.720 0.716 0.689 0.681 0.673 0.668
Number of observations 2,446 2,324 2,341 2,227 2,166 2,315
Note: * indicates differences in means tested at the 5% significance level.
Source: author’s calculations.
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Moreover, in the context of Vietnam, Rand (2007) shows that more than 50 per
cent of SMEs perceive access to finance as the most severe obstacle to firm growth.
As also emphasized in Hansen and Rand (2014b), perceptions about being
financially constrained does not imply that the firms are in fact credit-constrained.
Boulier and Goldfarb (1998) summarize the discussion about how (and if) surveys
should be used for analysis of economic inference. They conclude that the
reliability of these different types of survey data information can be ranked, and
according to their analysis, the most reliable information is obtained through
simple direct questions (i) related to an action taken in relation to a given activity
and (ii) easily verifiable through a ‘third party’. As such, perception-based ques-
tions are not seen as a reliable source of information.
Focusing on credit-related questions, the recommendations in Boulier and
Goldfarb (1998) would rank a question such as ‘Has your firm during the past
two years applied for a bank loan?’ as more reliable than a subjective/perception-
based question such as ‘Do you think that the access to credit presents any
obstacle to the current operations of your establishment?’ In the following we
therefore base our credit constraint definition only on questions that would rank
highly in a Boulier and Goldfarb (1998) reliability classification.
In addition, our measure of credit constraints needs to ensure that constrained
firms are only classified for firms having credit demand. Here we address this form
of selection bias following Bigsten et al. (2003), Rand (2007), Bentzen et al. (2010)
and Hansen and Rand (2014a, 2014b) in (i) first identifying firms with demand for
credit, and (ii) conditional on credit demand, identifying credit-constrained firms.
Following the reliability criteria described above, we in this chapter apply the
following question to distinguish between firms with and without credit demand:
‘no need for a loan – firm has sufficient capital’.
As in previous literature cited above, we classify a firm as credit-constrained if it
(i) applied for and was denied credit or (ii) did not apply for credit due to reasons
such as ‘application procedures too complex’, ‘collateral requirements unattain-
able’, or ‘possible loan size and maturity insufficient’. Firms not applying for a loan
and responding ‘interest rates too high’ or ‘did not think it would be approved’ as
reasons for not applying are still labelled as being financially constrained as these
answers may reflect that the investment project applied for is not competitive at
going interest rates.
Tables 5.1A and 1B report that 25.8 per cent of the sample can be classified as
financially constrained. This number reflects a steady increase from 2005–13
(from 25.3–30.8 per cent), accompanied by a significant drop in 2015 to only
20.7 per cent being credit-constrained (in formal financial markets). Moreover,
this significant drop in credit-constrained firms in 2015 is accompanied by a
significant reduction in the number of firms having informal loans, but is also
reflecting that only one-third of firms in 2015 have debt as compared to around
half of the firms in the other survey years. As such, the 2015 decline in credit-
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constrained firms may be reflecting a general decline in debt demand. Note also
from Table 6.1A, that no apparent difference in credit access (formal or informal)
is found between politically connected and non-connected firms. This apparent
lack of relationship between being politically connected and being financially
constrained is what we put under deeper scrutiny in the next sections.
6.3 Empirical Approach and Results
We operate with several different specifications for analysing the relationship
between the probability of being credit-constrained and political connectedness.
First, we rely on the following simple pooled non-linear (probit) model:
cit ¼ 1½β0 þ β1memberit þ x ́itσþ εit>0; ð6:1Þ
where c is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is defined as
credit-constrained and zero otherwise, member = 1 if the firm owner is a member
of the communist party and zero otherwise, x contains proxies for credit access,
and ε is a firm-specific error term.
However, the above specification does not utilize the dynamics observed in
political connectedness over time. We therefore also estimate the following pooled
non-linear (logit) model:
Pðcit ¼ 1Þ ¼ exp½γ0 þ γ1entryit þ γ2alwaysit þ x ́itσþ εit1þ exp½γ0 þ γ1entryit þ γ2alwaysit þ x ́itσþ εit
; ð6:2Þ
where entry = 1 if the firm owner goes from not being politically connected in
period t1 to becoming connected in period t (and zero otherwise), and always =
1 if the firm owner is politically connected throughout the 2005–15 period. The
coefficient on γ1 measures the difference in credit constraints for political
‘switchers’ as compared to firms staying politically unconnected throughout the
period under study. The coefficient γ2 measures a similar difference in the
probability of being credit-constrained between politically unconnected firms to
firms who are connected throughout the period under study.
As the above specification does not fully control for the individual fixed effects
affecting the probability of being credit-constrained we as a robustness check also
run the following conditional fixed-effects logit model:
Pðcit ¼ 1Þ ¼ exp½γ0 þ γ1memberit þ αi þ x ́itσþ εit 1þ exp½γ0 þ γ1memberit þ αi þ x ́itσþ εit 
; ð6:3Þ
where αi represents the firm-specific fixed effect.
Finally, we have to acknowledge that the relatively vibrant informal sector
credit market may influence credit constraint determinants in formal credit
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markets, especially for smaller household businesses. In order to take into account
the interaction of formal and informal financial markets, we will model the
determination of credit access in the two sectors jointly using a non-linear
biprobit model, which utilizes the fact that the propensity to have a loan in formal
and informal financial markets may not be independent:
cit ¼ 1½β10 þ β11memberit þ x ́1itσþ ε1it>0 ð6:4Þ
iit ¼ 1½β20 þ β21memberit þ x ́2itσþ ε2it>0;
where ε1itand ε2it have mean zero and unit variance, such that ðε1it ; ε2itÞ 
binormð0; 0; 1; 1; ρÞ and ρis the coefficient of correlation.
Table 6.2 reports the results from specification (1). Column 1 only includes
time-fixed effects in addition to the reported variables, whereas column 2 also
include both location- and sector-fixed effects. Column 3 adds additional variables
(described in Tables 5.1 and 5.2) likely to influence credit market access. Finally, in
columns 4 and 5 we do the analysis separately for household business and non-
HH firm entities. We consistently find that politically connected firm owners are
less likely to be constrained in formal credit markets. Controlling for location- and
sector-fixed effects we consistently find that membership of the communist party
lowers the probability of being financially constrained by 4 percentage points.
Table 6.3 reports results from specification (2) for the full sample (column 1),
household firms only (column 2) and non-HH enterprises (column 3), respect-
ively. It should be noted that this specification excludes firms that lost or did not
state precisely the nature of their political connections, which reduces the sample
by approximately 1,100 observations (8 per cent). We find that firms that are
politically connected throughout the survey and firms switching into connected-
ness are significantly less likely to be constrained in formal credit markets,
confirming the overall results in Table 6.2. Coefficient estimates for the full sample
in panel A, column 1 are equivalent to marginal effect estimates of -0.055 (always)
and 0.062 (entry), respectively. This means that excluding firm owners who lose
their membership (mostly due to change of owner) or who did not precisely state
the nature of their political connection (party membership or local cadre member)
increases the marginal effects as compared to results in Table 6.2. Moreover, it
should be noted that the effect is larger in non-HH enterprises. Panel B of Table
6.3 reports results from estimating specification (3). Allowing for individual fixed
effects strengthens the conclusion, leading to the result that political connections
reduce the probability of being credit-constrained, especially for non-HH
enterprises.
Finally, in Panel A of Table 6.4 we report results from the bivariate probit
model (specification (4)). The reported test for independence between the equa-
tions shows that the null hypothesis of independence is rejected and in Panel B of
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Table 6.2 Credit constraint determinants
1 2 3 4 5
All All All Household firms Non-HH firms
Politically connected 0.030* (1.96) 0.040*** (2.71) 0.042*** (2.83) 0.046** (2.49) * (1.66)
Number of employees (log) 0.025*** (4.14) 0.019*** (2.94) 0.000 (0.01) 0.013 (1.26) 0.009 (0.73)
Capital stock (log) 0.016*** (4.55) 0.021*** (5.84) 0.019*** (5.12) 0.017*** (4.06) 0.023*** (2.93)
Intermediate Inputs (log) 0.024*** (5.78) 0.023*** (5.46) 0.023*** (5.23) 0.019*** (3.76) 0.021*** (2.34)
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,819 13,819 13,819 9,561 4,258
Pseudo R-sq 0.014 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.033


























Table 6.4 we also confirm that the likelihood of being constrained in formal credit
markets is significantly related to having obtained an informal loan (if a firm has
an informal loan the probability of being financially constrained in formal credit
markets is 15 per cent higher than if the firm does not have informal loans). The
results of the bivariate probit model therefore suggests that the informal credit
market is a (good) substitute for the formal credit market, especially for smaller
household enterprises (not reported). In addition, we see from column 2, that
conditioning on having access to informal credit, the well-determined effect of
politically connections on reducing the probability of being constrained in formal
financial markets is only maintained by newly connected firms.
Table 6.3 Always connected versus getting connected
PANEL A: Pooled logit
1 2 3
All Household firms Non-HH firms
Always connected 0.318** (2.17) 0.308 (1.56) 0.388* (1.81)




Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,696 8,920 3,776
Pseudo R-sq 0.036 0.035 0.037





Entry (getting connected) 0.592*** (2.61) 0.308 (1.06) 0.989** (2.40)




Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,241 4,939 1,967
Firms 1,726 1,153 551
Note: t-stats (in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Source: author’s calculations.
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Overall, we therefore conclude that we find a well-determined relationship
between becoming politically connected and having easier access to formal finan-
cial markets. And this reduced probability of being credit-constrained in formal
markets does not reduce the firm’s probability of obtaining informal financing.
Table 6.5 documents simple loan characteristics for formal and informal loans
respectively. Looking at formal loans in Panel A, we see that two-thirds of formal
loans are obtained from State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), most loans
require collateral, and both of these seem independent of whether the firm owner
is politically connected or not. Moreover, interest rates do not seem to differ along
Table 6.4 Formal versus informal lending
PANEL A: Biprobit—constrained and informal lender
Constrained Informal Constrained Informal
Politically connected 0.096* 0.120**
(1.83) (2.39)
Always connected 0.135 0.278***
(1.47) (3.25)
Entry (getting connected) 0.203** 0.009
(2.06) (0.11)
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes
Province-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes
Observations 11,373 10,452
Rho 0.307 17.00 0.311 16.53
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
PANEL B: Pooled logit—constrained with informal lender control
1 2
All All
Politically connected 0.114 (1.29)
Always connected 0.119 (0.77)
Entry (getting connected) 0.345** (2.00)
Informal 0.871*** (16.86) 0.882*** (16.36)
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes
Province-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes
Observations 11,373 10,452
Pseudo R-sq 0.059 0.060
Note: t-stats (in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Source: author’s calculations.
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the connectedness dimension, and formal loan characteristics do not seem to
differ conditioning on having access to informal loans (columns 3 and 4). In Panel
B of Table 6.5, we document the characteristics of the informal loans obtained by
firms. Almost two-thirds of these loans are from friends and family and many of
these loans are obtained without having to pay interest. In addition, few informal
loans require collateral. In our sample of almost 14,000 SME observations we on
average find that informal loans are smaller, easier to obtain and cheaper. As such,
informal lending markets seem to be a competitive alternative to formal financing
among smaller SMEs. Interestingly, it also looks as if politically connected firms
face higher cost of informal capital than their non-connected counterparts do.
Given the differences in attributes between politically connected SMEs and
non-connected firms, in Table 6.6 we run simple cost-of-capital regressions for
formal loans, controlling for the observable heterogeneity between the two groups.
Column (1) only includes production function and credit access controls in
addition to year-fixed effects. Column (2) adds a control for access to SOCBs.
Being politically connected may facilitate easier (and maybe cheaper) access to
SOCB finance, but it may also create a negative lock-in effect (negative network
externalities may force politically connected firms to obtain finance from a specific
SOCB, maybe even at a higher cost than the alternative financial opportunities
available—weakness of strong ties argument). Column (3) adds location- and
sector-fixed effects, whereas column (4) tests whether there has been cost-of-
capital changes over time for politically connected firms.
First, we see that the cost of formal capital is lower for politically connected
firms. Being politically connected lowers interest rates on formal loans with
between 0.025 and 0.057 percentage points, equivalent to a 2.2–5.1 per cent
Table 6.5 Formal versus informal loan characteristics
Panel A: Formal loans 1A 2A 3A 4A
All Connected All Connected
with informal with informal
State bank 0.667 0.672 0.675 0.627
Interest rate (%/month) 1.120 1.112 1.144 1.123
Collateral needed 0.922 0.892 0.931 0.881
Panel B: Informal loans 1B 2B 3B 4B
All Connected All Connected
with formal with formal
Friends and family 0.615 0.554 0.584 0.559
Interest rate (%/month) 0.678 0.821 0.827 0.844
Loans with no interest
(share of total)
0.559 0.432 0.479 0.407
Collateral needed 0.082 0.071 0.099 0.102
Source: author’s calculations.
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lower cost-of-capital than non-connected SMEs. We also see that obtaining a loan
from a SOCB is relatively more expensive than receiving external finance from a
formal private bank (about 0.016 percentage points difference in interest rates).
However, this is not explaining the difference in interest payments between
connected and non-connected firms (column 2), and controlling for location
and sector only reduces the coefficient on party membership but the estimate
remains well-determined at the 10 per cent level. Finally, column 4 shows that the
favourable cost-of-capital conditions for politically connected firms has dimin-
ished in recent years, and in fact in 2013 and 2015, we find no differential cost-of-
capital effect along the connectedness dimension.
Having documented that politically connected firms over the period 2005–2015
are less credit constrained and had more favourable loan conditions (at least in the
earlier years) when obtaining external finance, makes it interesting to do a back-
of-the-envelope estimate of the differences in the desired level of debt for polit-
ically connected and unconnected firms, respectively. Following the approach by
Rand (2007), we use a two-step sample selection model, recording whether
Table 6.6 Cost of capital and political connectedness
1 2 3 4
Formal loan Formal loan Formal loan Formal loan
Politically connected 0.034** 0.037** 0.025* 0.057***
(1.99) (2.36) (1.68) (2.67)














Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location-fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Sector-fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 3,522 3,522 3,522 3,522
R-sq 0.314 0.367 0.418 0.419
Note: t-stats (in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Source: author’s calculations.
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enterprises with positive debt holdings are credit-constrained and conditional on
being a credit-constrained firm, holding positive debt, and estimate the desired
level of debt of the individual firm.
The estimation problem is that the desired debt level of a firm is only observed
if the firm has positive debt and the firm cannot be labelled as being financially
constrained. Direct estimation of the demand for formal external financing using
all firms will be therefore biased if the same variables determining whether a firm
has debt or is credit-constrained, also affect the level of observed debt. Therefore,
inverse Mills ratios from estimating a (i) debt probability model and (ii) credit
constraint probability model, have to be obtained, and thereafter the demand for
debt can be modelled as:







FðbiÞ are the inverse Mill’s ratios for being credit-constrained and
having debt, respectively, and φð*Þ and Fð*Þ are the probability and cumulative
distribution functions, respectively. Having estimated determinants for demand of
external finance using (6.5) (not reported) we inquire how much SMEs would
increase their debt burden if all credit constraints were removed and their desire
for external finance was fully met. This we do for the (i) full sample, (ii) political
connected firms and (iii) non-connected firms. Based on these estimates the
so-called credit gap can be calculated using the approach in Rand (2007) as:
GAP ¼ dc fcf þ duc
fuc
f
 da ¼ β1xc
fc
f
þ duc fucf  da; ð6:6Þ
where dc and duc are desired debt for constrained and unconstrained firms, respect-
ively; fc and fuc are the number of constrained and unconstrained firms respectively,
and da is the average actual debt. Means of observables for the constrained firms are
represented by xc and β1 are the estimates obtained from (6.5).
Table 6.7 shows that the average debt burden lies between 1.7 (in 2007) and 4.7
(in 2013) per cent. Given that the number of credit-constrained firms is between
20.7 (in 2015) and 30.8 (in 2013) per cent of the sample, this signals (using
equation (6)) that Vietnamese SMEs would increase their debt burden by 20.4
(2007) to 72.2 (2013) per cent if all credit constraints were removed. Looking at
the trend, unfulfilled credit demand is as expected increasing from 2007–2013
during the period of financial distress, but sharply declining in 2015. Moreover, we
note that especially during the crisis period (2007–11) politically connected firms
have much less unfulfilled credit demand than non-connected SMEs. These back-
off-the-envelope calculations therefore suggest that political connections are espe-
cially valuable in terms of access to formal external finance during periods of
financial distress (both in terms of credit access, non-rationing and cost-of-capital),
whereas these benefits are less prevalent during more financially favourable periods.
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6.4 Conclusion
In the context of SMEs in Vietnam this paper asked the simple questions: Are
politically connected firms (i) more likely to get formal credit and (ii) if obtaining
finance, do they receive cheaper loans. Results reveal—controlling for unobserved
time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity, productivity self-selection concerns, and
access to alternative credit markets—that having a firm owner that is (or becomes)
a member of the Communist Party of Vietnam is linked with a lower likelihood of
being constrained in formal financial markets. In addition, politically connected
firms obtaining formal finance face on average lower cost-of-capital than non-
connected SMEs. However, results also indicate that the impact of political
connections is most valuable during periods of financial distress. Whether this
preferential treatment in formal credit markets of politically connected firms is a
causally dominating mechanism with respect to the overall impact on firm
performance is a question going beyond this chapter.
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7
Why Do Household Businesses
Stay Informal?
Thi Bich Tran and Hai Anh La
7.1 Introduction
In spite of the benefits of formalization such as the improvement in firms’ profits
and customer base, better access to infrastructure and other public goods, and
protection from corruption (Boly 2018; Cling et al. 2012; Demenet et al. 2016;
Fajnzylber et al. 2011; McKenzie and Sakho 2010; Rand and Torm 2012a), the
informal sector remains large (La Porta and Shleifer 2014; Williams et al. 2016).
This sector is observed with a heterogenous structure which is composed of lower
tiers of vulnerable workers with low levels of education and upper tiers of high
earnings and skilled employers. The informal sector is also perceived as a weak-
ness in economic development (Loayza 1996; C. Nguyen et al. 2013) with tax
erosion (Dabla-Norris et al. 2008), the unequal playing field for firms which
comply with regulations (Tenev et al. 2003), and the disadvantages for employees
working without social security. Therefore, the identification of the factors asso-
ciated with informality and formalization becomes a desirable policy goal.
Theories explaining the existence of the informal sector can be classified into
two categories. The first strand of the literature attributes burdens of regulations
as a catalyst for the prevalence of informal activity among lower tiers of the sector
(Rauch 1991; Loayza 1996; Marcouiller and Young 1995; Azuma and Grosman
2002). Avoiding heavy regulatory burdens—including tax, labour regulations, and
entry costs—is therefore recommended (Nelson and De Bruijn 2005; T. Nguyen,
Verreynne, and Steen 2014). However, there may be another primary reason:
informal employers are too weak to have incentives to formalize (Cunningham
and Maloney 2001; Fajnzylber et al. 2011; Günther and Launov 2012).
The second strand of the literature focuses on the quality of the legal system
as one of the determinants which induce informality (Tenev et al. 2003; Dabla-
Norris et al. 2008; Fajnzylber et al. 2009; Soto 1989). Among them, Dabla-Norris
et al. (2008) find different effects of regulatory burdens on the size of informality
across countries. They show that while a heavier burden of regulations correlates
positively with the size of the informal sector in countries with a weak rule of law,
such an effect may not happen in countries with better legal quality. In addition,
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De Andrade et al. (2014) reveal that firms are forced to register by government
interventions in countries with a weak rule of law.
Our research is motivated by these legal system-related findings and the
literature on the ‘exit’ view that recognizes an informal firm as a decision-maker
considering net benefits of formalization. For these firms, the evasion of tax and
social security costs for labour are perceived as benefits. They will persist in the
informal sector as long as these benefits are higher than the costs that they pay for
their illegal action (Rand and Tarp 2012). In addition, in Vietnam, collusion
corruption, or a handshake, between household businesses and government tax
officials for personal gains at the expenses of the state is very common (Giang et al.
2016). It may provide one of many explanations why a household prefers to stay
informal given its profit maximization function.
In this chapter, we look at determinants explaining why household businesses,
with a particular focus on those in the top tiers, stay informal. There are two
reasons for paying more attention to thetop tier. First, only these households can
consider costs and benefits of formalization whereas businesses in the lower tier
are too weak to afford the cost of formalization (Cling et al. 2012). Second, while
empirical evidence (Demenet et al. 2016) and our descriptive statistics show that
formalized businesses often belong to the upper tier, a significant proportion of
businesses in this spectrum of the informal sector remains informal. We contrib-
ute to the literature by focusing on the legal system-related reasons, especially
regarding tax evasion and government controls, and their effects on formalization
in Vietnam. It should be noted that in this research the division of household
businesses into lower and upper tiers is based on households’ revenues. This
classification is closely related to the entrepreneurs’ ability, as empirical evidence
shows that businesses with higher value added and profits are run by more
educated owners and have more workers (Rand and Torm 2012a; Nguyen et al.
2013; Boly 2018).
Because most of the informal firms in Vietnam are household businesses, we
limit our study to the household sector. According to Vietnamese laws, all non-
farm household businesses which employ up to ten employees and have one
establishment have to register for a business licence and a tax code. The exemption
is for households which earn less than a certain amount and mobile street vendors
including motorbike taxis (xe om) (Decree 88/2006/ND-CP). However, because
only very few household businesses have an income less than this threshold, they
generally should be registered (Cling et al. 2012). Nevertheless, in practice the
informal sector in Vietnam is prevalent, not only among the lower but also in the
upper tiers.
The remainder of our chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 overviews the
existing literature on the heterogeneity of the informal sector and its associated
factors. In Section 7.3 we describe the dataset and discuss the analytical approach.
Section 7.4 presents the main empirical results and Section 7.5 concludes.
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7.2 Literature Review
Since the work of Maloney (2004), the literature has converged into unanimous
consensus on the heterogeneity of informality in developing countries. Accord-
ingly, informal workers are classified from the lower to the upper tiers of the
informal labour market spectrum, and their existence is observed as the last resort
and as the preference of workers. The last resort view considers informal workers
as those in the lower tiers who could not find a job in the formal sector, then
escape unemployment by working involuntarily in the informal sector (Harris and
Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954). The preference view argues that informal employment
is the choice of workers in the upper tiers given their profit and utility maximiza-
tion (Hart 1973; Levenson and Maloney 1998).
Empirical evidence on the issue of heterogeneity of informality can be found for
the case of Mexico (Cunningham and Maloney 2001), Côte d’Ivoire (Günther and
Launov 2012), and Vietnam (Cling et al. 2012; T. Nguyen et al. 2014). Often, the
literature finds at the lowest level of the informal labour market segmentation
poorly educated, unskilled, and vulnerable employees. For these people, entry
barriers to the formal sector do not matter given their inability (Cunningham and
Maloney 2001). They are not generally able to afford the costs of formalization
(Cling et al. 2012; Demenet et al. 2016; Nelson and De Bruijn 2005). They have no
choice but to stay informal for surviving. Therefore, instead of losing constraints,
development policies need to identify disadvantages that they face and focus on
helping these people for the objective of inclusive growth.
Within this lower tier of informal employment, Roubaud (1994) and Bacchetta
et al. (2009) present two approaches that segment the informal labour market into
further detail. The ‘dualist’ approach considers the informal sector as the residual
component of the market, which is entirely unrelated to the formal economy.
On the other hand, the ‘structuralist’ approach focuses on the interdependencies
between the informal and the formal sector (Moser 1978, Portes et al. 1989).
According to the ‘structuralist’ approach, when young people start up as small
informal businesses, they might have interaction with the formal sector and are
eager to transform into the formal status. Moreno-Monroy (2012) argues that
when formal and informal firms take part in the value chain through backward
and forward linkages, and if informal enterprises undertake part of the production
process of formal enterprises through sub-contracting, benefits such as product-
ivity and wages could occur. This more detailed classification implies that regu-
latory burdens may impede firms in the higher end of the lower tiers to formalize.
In the heterogeneous informal labour market, the upper tier of informal
employment comprises successful and voluntary entrepreneurs. As indicated in
the literature, those people select the informal sector as their preferences and their
earnings are as high as salaried workers in the formal sector (Cross 2000; Rand
and Torm 2012b; Snyder 2004). Despite empirical evidence on the benefits of
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
136      ?
formalization such as increases in profits and investment (Rand and Torm 2012),
customer base (McKensie and Sakho 2010), access to information and protection
from corruption (Cling et al 2012), government assistance (Nguyet et al. 2013),
and the cost of informality (Tenev et al. 2003), these entrepreneurs stay informal.
Regulation burdens are often cited as the main reasons for the existence of
informal households in these upper tiers. Rauch (1991), Loayza (1996),
Marcouiller and Young (1995), and Azuma and Grosman (2002) show that high
tax and regulation burdens are the determinants of informality while entry costs
(Auriol and Warlters 2005), labour regulations (Friedman et al. 2000; Johnson
et al. 1997; Botero et al. 2004), and financial constraints (Straub 2005) are
identified as obstacles for formalization.
As informality is partly seen as a weakness in economic development (Loayza
1996; C. Nguyen et al. 2013) with tax erosion (Dabla-Norris et al. 2008), the
unequal playing field for firms which comply with regulations (Tenev et al. 2003),
and the disadvantages of employees working with no social security, identifying
factors associated with informality and formalizing the sector is a desirable policy
goal. However, formalization mainly belongs to the upper tiers of the informal
labour market segmentation, and the degree of transition depends on several
factors including businesses’ characteristics and the macroeconomic environment.
For instance, Tenev et al. (2003) and Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) find that the
quality of the legal system is a critical determinant of informality while Demenet
et al. (2016) reveal that micro-enterprises decide to operate in a more competitive
environment.
In Vietnam, heterogeneity in informal household businesses is very common.
The majority of the sector comprises of small and weak informal businesses.
Households in this lower tier tend to be run by old entrepreneurs, with low levels
of education and technical skills. They also have weak social capital and product-
ivity. Household businesses in this group have no incentive to register their
businesses. Their informal status can be explained by either their lack of know-
ledge of laws or lack of control from the government. Most of small informal
businesses feel they are ignored by the government (Cling et al. 2012).
The upper tiers of the informal sector include younger and higher educated
employers. Households belonging to this group are more modern with high
electronic access. They achieve the highest level of productivity and efficiency
and have more opportunities to grow (C. Nguyen et al. 2013). Formalization
mostly happens among household businesses at the upper tiers (Demenet et al.
2016; C. Nguyen et al. 2013). Tax and regulation burdens, as well as the level of
access to resources, affect the firm informality (Tenev et al. 2003). Cling et al.
(2011; 2012) find that a business size, income, and professional premises, access to
information, large customer base, and protection from corruption are positively
and significantly correlated with its registration decision. Moreover, the education
level of entrepreneurs influences their behaviour when working under regulations.
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In this chapter, we will unveil factors associated with the formal/informal
status of micro firms in Vietnam. According to qualitative studies from Cling
et al. (2012) and Rand and Torm (2012a), there are two types of registered
households. The first is composed of households that are encouraged by their
perception of benefits of formalization such as an increase in the probability of
accessing formal credits and public facilities (Rand and Torm 2012a). The
second type includes businesses which want to avoid harassment and bribes
from state officials (Cling et al. 2012). Therefore, in addition to the character-
istics of households and household owners, we examine the quality of the legal
system, tax evasion, corruption behaviours, and government controls on infor-
mality in Vietnam.
The recent literature has focused on the link between corruption and firm
informality. Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) investigate this correlation using cross-
country micro-firm data from China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia. They
find that informality is positively correlated with corruption. Similar results are
found for the case of Vietnam (Tenev et al. 2003). On the other hand, Rand and
Tarp (2012) discover that informality is negatively associated with bribe inci-
dence. They then argue that the informal status helps firms easily hide their
visibility. Nevertheless, none of these above studies distinguish between two types
of corruptions: extortion (corrupt practices which household businesses are
exposed to) and collusion (corrupt acts they actively engage in) and the reason
may be lack of data.
Giang et al. (2016) are amongst the first persons who separate two types of
corruption while investigating corruption in the formal household businesses in
relationship to business formalization, tax compliance, and access to information
and capital in Vietnam. They find that while extortion in the form of requests for
bribes seemed to be low, hidden extortion is quite widespread, especially in the tax
area. It is quite common in the business sector that business owners have
incentives to collude with state officials for personal gains at the expenses of the
state. Using cross-sectional household data in the two biggest cities in Vietnam,
Hanoi, and Ho Chi Minh City in 2007, Cling et al. (2012: 649) reveal that while
household businesses express their incentives of registration to avoid corruption,
they are in fact the hardest hit by corruption.
These above findings from the literature for the case of Vietnam induce us
to hypothesize that collusion corruption is one of the factors that cause self-
employed entrepreneurs in the upper tiers of informal employment to stay
informal even if they are subject to being registered. If informal households can
collude with tax officials for personal benefits, they will not formalize. Although
we do not have information to evaluate whether tax evasion arises from collusion
or extortion corruption, we can evaluate whether benefits from tax payment are
correlated with the size of informality in Vietnam.
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7.3 Data and the Analytical Framework
In this chapter, we use panel dataset from the Small and Medium Enterprise
(SME) surveys conducted every two years by the Central Institute for Economic
Management of Vietnam and the University of Copenhagen in 2005, 2007, 2009,
2011, 2013, and 2015. The SME surveys use a stratified sampling approach to
sample formal enterprises and registered households in ten cities and provinces of
Vietnam. The sampling frame for formal enterprises and registered households is
selected from the enterprise censuses of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam.
Informal household businesses, which were included in the SME surveys, were
sampled randomly by the enumerator in surveyed districts. Therefore, it is worth
noting that the sample of informal household businesses may not be entirely
representative of the informal sector in Vietnam (see Rand and Torm (2012a) for
more details about the surveys).
As mentioned above, most of the informal firms in Vietnam have household
status, and we limit our study to the household sector. The 15th International
Conference of Labour Statisticians defines an ‘informal household business’ as a
household which sells parts of its products, has no business registration certificate,
and has a small size regarding the number of employees (Hussmanns 2004b). The
size varies across countries (Hussmanns 2004a). In Vietnam, this threshold is set
up to ten workers. Households using more than ten workers have to register under
the Enterprise Law (Decree 88/ND-CP). According to Vietnamese laws, all non-
farm household businesses which employ up to ten employees and have one
establishment need to register with the exemption of two types: (i) those who
earn less than a certain amount set at district level (usually the minimum wage
stipulated by the law)¹ and (ii) mobile street vendors including motorbike taxis
(xe om) (Decree 88/2006/ND-CP). Moreover, within ten days since it has
obtained a Business Registration Certificate (BRC), a household needs to register
for a tax code at the local tax office (Article 22, Tax management law).
Under the first criteria (that households with an income above the minimum
wages need to register), and using data from representative informal households
surveys in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in 2007–2009, Cling et al. (2012) show
that 95 per cent of Informal Household Businesses (IHBs) should register in
both cities. If adding the second criteria (that a household business should have
a fixed premise), the share of informal households drops to 70 per cent. This
result implies that almost all IHBs in Vietnam should register under the laws.
¹ Before 2015, the threshold above which a household had to pay taxes is set up by the local
government at the district level, and this threshold cannot be below the minimum wage stipulated by
the law. Therefore, this limit depends on the discretion of the local government. Since 2015, the
amendment of the Tax Law has set up taxes of households on revenue and families do not have to pay
taxes if their revenue is below 100 million VND per year (Tax Law number 71/2014/QH13).
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Nevertheless, IHBs account for 81.5 per cent of the total household businesses in
2007 (Cling et al. 2011).²
Among household businesses which are registered, many households have a
business registration certificate but do not have a tax code (Rand and Torm
2012a). On the other hand, some have a tax code but do not have a business
registration certificate (Demenet et al. 2016). This is because the tax office still
provides a household with a tax code for the purpose of tax collection even when a
household does not have a business registration certificate (Cling et al. 2012). This
fact is understandable because a household business applies for a business regis-
tration certificate at the district registration office while their request for a tax code
is submitted to the tax office. Until now, these two systems of registration have
been separated in Vietnam. Therefore, under regulations, a firm is formal if it has
either a business registration certificate or a tax code. In this chapter, we define
formal household businesses as those who have a tax code.³
Our unbalanced panel sample for the descriptive section includes all household
businesses with at least two observations during the studying period. This sample
covers always-formal businesses (976 or 41.8 per cent of the total), switched firms
(933 or 39.9 per cent of the total) and always-informal firms (427 or 18.3 per cent
of the total). We limit the sample to only informal and switching businesses for the
shake of identifying the reasons behind formalization within the informal sector.
It means that the final sample only covers firms that were under informal status at
the start of the interviews. These 1,360 informal businesses at the starting points
form a panel of 5,424 observations. Out of these businesses, 28.2 per cent have
observations in all six surveys, 10.4 per cent have five observations, 15.7 per cent
have four observations, 22 per cent have three observations, and 23.5 per cent have
two observations.
Our purpose in this chapter is to examine factors associated with the status of
informality in Vietnam. As indicated in Section 7.2, households remain informal if
either they are too weak or they can evade taxes. Furthermore, formalized house-
holds may include businesses that can perceive the benefits of formalization such
as an increase in the household performance, or may include businesses which want
to escape bribes and harassment. For the first type of formalization, we investigate
the impacts of formalization on households’ performance and tax payment. For the
² Using data on informal household businesses from the Vietnam Establishment Census carried out
by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam in 2012 (the census covers all fixed location businesses
(household businesses), production establishments (enterprises), administrative organizations, and
political and non-profit associations (GSO 2013)), we calculate the proportion of informal household
businesses in the household sector. The share is 63 per cent. We think that this drop is not mainly
related to changes over time but may be due to different ways of defining informal household
businesses. In our data, an informal household business needs to match both the criteria: not
registering and having fixed premise, while we think Cling et al. (2011) use only the first criteria.
³ In the SME data, the number of households having only a business registration certificate is almost
the same as those having a tax code.
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second type of formalization, we use the probit model to examine the effects of
government controls and bribes on the household decision of registering.
To examine the impacts of formalization on household performance and tax
payment, we follow the method proposed by Boly (2018). The benefits of formal-
ization on household performance and tax payment can be estimated using the
following equation:
yit ¼ β0 þ β1Fit þ β2NSi þ β3Xit þ λi þ γt þ εit; ð7:1Þ
where the dependent yit represents revenue (in logarithm form), taxes and fees
(in logarithm form) and ratio of taxes to revenue of firm i at time t. To take into
account the time and provincial differences in prices and living costs, both
revenue and taxes are converted into values of year 2015 using the spatial cost
of living index (SCOLI). The main variable Fit is a dummy which is equal to 1 if
the household is identified as formal at any point of time on the panel and 0
otherwise. Similar to Boly’s (2018) method, we create a non-switcher variable NSi
which equals to 1 for all years if the businesses remained informal through these
surveys, and 0 if an informal business has become formalized at any time
during the study period. With the construction method as above, NSi can capture
firm-type time-invariant unobservable differences between non-switchers and
switchers while Fit captures the net effect of formalization. We apply the random
effects model for this equation due to the time-constant nature of the non-
switcher variable. We run this model over the whole panel sample and among
top tier informal households. The top tier informal household businesses are
identified as the top 10 per cent among all household businesses at any time
before formalization during the survey period.
The literature which studies the benefits of formalization can be split into two
types: experimental and non-experimental approaches. Experimental studies
involve the use of randomized control trials and often show that the costs of
formalization outweigh the benefits (Boly 2018; McCaig and Nanowski 2017). On
the other hand, almost all non-experimental studies which use either cross-
sectional analysis (Fajnzylber et al. 2009, 2011; McKenzie and Sakho 2010;
Monteiro and Assunção 2012) or panel data (Boly 2018; Demenet et al. 2016;
Rand and Torm 2012a) reveal the benefits of formalization. For instance, Rand
and Torm (2012a) report an increase in profits of 12 to 16 per cent, Demenet et al.
(2016) show a growth of 20 per cent in value added while Boly (2018) report an
increase in profit and value added of 9 to 11 per cent due to formalization in
Vietnam. The only exceptional case is the study of McCaig and Nanowski (2017)
who use double-difference methods and data from Vietnam Household Living
Standards Surveys. They find that registering is not accompanied by an increase in
profits and other performance outcomes. They therefore suggest that controlling
for the trend of pre-formalization period is crucial to unveil the ‘de facto’ effects
of formalization.
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The reason for controversial results from the non-experimental approach may
come from the fact that the decision to formalize is endogenous. Formalized or
switched firms may not be comparable to non-switchers due to unobserved
heterogeneity. As indicated by McCaig and Nanowski (2017), while household
fixed-effects in panel data can control for unobserved time-invariant heterogen-
eity, unobserved time-variant heterogeneity may remain, such as firm-specific
time trends, and these trends may be correlated with changes in business
performance and the decision to formalize. Thus, controlling for the pre-
formalization trend is important to estimate the correct impacts of formalization.
It is fortunate that each year, the SME survey collects information on firms’
revenue in two previous consecutive years. Therefore, instead of using double-
difference methods, we control for household-specific time trend effects before
formalization by utilizing the growth rate of revenue. The revenue growth rate is
calculated based on the financial reports of two continuous years in the same
survey (e.g, revenue recorded in 2012 and 2011 for the 2013 survey).
Control variables are also incorporated in the model. They consist of observable
firm characteristics variables Xit such as the gender, age, and education level of the
owner/manager; the number of regular full-time employees (in logarithm form),
the share of production and service workers, the percentage of female workers,
and owning a Certificate of Land Use Right (CLUR). Other time-invariant control
variables ðλiÞ include industry dummy variable, location dummies (rural/urban
and central cities/smaller provinces) to capture variations in local governances.
Year dummies ðγtÞ are also included to control for potential time effects.
To identity factors (including government control and bribes) associated with
the household decision to formalize, we use the probit model as presented below:
Fit ¼ 1½α1Zi þ α2Xit þ λi þ γt þ εit ; ð7:2Þ
where 1[.] is the binary indicator function; Zi, the leading independent variable, is
a dummy variable which equals 1 (i) if a business paid at least one informal
payment during the last financial year, or (ii) if a household had to spend time
dealing with business issues with government officials, or (iii) if a business has poor
knowledge of or is not interested in tax laws. The first two variables are used as
proxy for government control and the level of harassment. All these dummy
variables, Zi, are identified before a firm is formalized to test the hypothesis that
firms will formalize to avoid harassment. These dummies are unchanged over time.
7.4 Empirical Results
First, we analyse the characteristics of the informal sector in Vietnam and then
discuss the reason behind formalization using results from the analytical model
presented in Section 7.3.
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7.4.1 Characteristics of the Informal Sector in Vietnam
Considering solely the informal sector, our sample shows that 31 per cent of
households are always informal and the majority of them are in the bottom
90 per cent (394 observations in Table 7.1a). Formalization happens more fre-
quently among the top 10 per cent than the bottom 90 per cent groups (73 per
cent versus 68 per cent). However, when we exclude the data of the six rounds of
this survey in 2015 due to its irrationally high formalization rate among the
household business group (96 per cent) when panelled with the 2013 survey,
IHBs are predominant in the sample, accounting for 72 per cent. Moreover, the
percentage of formalized households in the top 10 per cent is much lower
(only 44 per cent in Table 7.1b).
To shed light on the reasons why some households stay informal but others
do not, we provide descriptive statistics on the characteristics of households and
household owners for the whole sample (Table 7.2) and for the top 10 per cent
(Table 7.3). Results from Table 7.2 show that switchers are stronger than non-
switchers in terms of economic performance. However, they experience lower
revenue growth rate after formalization, especially for the top 10 per cent
(8.9 per cent compared to 1 per cent before and after switching; Table 7.3).
Table 7.1a Frequency of business types
Bottom 90% Top 10% Total
Non-switcher 394 33 427
(%) 31.85 26.83 31.40
Switcher 843 90 933
(%) 68.15 73.17 68.60
Total 1237 123 1360
100 100 100
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
Table 7.1b Frequency of business types during 2005–13
Bottom 90% Top 10% Total
Non-switcher 773 57 830
(%) 71.44 51.82 69.63
Switcher 309 53 362
(%) 28.56 48.18 30.37
Total 1082 110 1192
100 100 100
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–13.
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Furthermore, formalized businesses pay much more taxes than before switching
and they have to be controlled more by government officials after formalization
(Tables 9.2 and 9.3). On the other hand, the non-switcher group pays the least
taxes and informal fees. Households in this group spend less time to deal with
Table 7.2 Income, tax, and bribe by business types: all sample
Non-switcher Pre-switching After-switching Total
Revenue (mil VND) 552.8 862.0 1172.1 2425.5
(772.0) (2775.8) (5728.8) (7988.3)
Revenue growth rate (%) 5.723 6.437 4.117 5.722
(20.44) (19.05) (30.30) (24.35)
Taxes and fees (mil VND) 1.452 4.252 7.740 43.40
(3.484) (15.48) (31.34) (153.8)
Tax/Revenue (%) 0.388 0.631 0.679 2.544
(0.868) (1.378) (1.199) (2.486)
% paid at least one informal
payment
12.42 19.59 22.88 37.48
(24.01) (33.36) (36.69) (33.48)
% spend time to deal with
government officials
47.22 61.38 80.92 92.23
(35.37) (38.41) (36.40) (18.32)
% with poor knowledge/no
interest in tax law
82.86 78.58 83.50 57.38
(26.66) (33.81) (31.69) (34.41)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard deviation. We first take average each variable of each firm,
and then calculate the mean of each group.
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
Table 7.3 Income, tax, and bribe by business types: top 10%
Non-switcher Pre-switching After-switching Total
Revenue (mil VND) 2321.4 3832.0 3346.4 3402.0
(1488.3) (7902.7) (4468.5) (6018.0)
Revenue growth rate (%) 7.186 8.906 1.044 5.524
(19.44) (16.85) (17.36) (17.78)
Taxes and fees (mil VND) 4.032 13.39 17.62 13.59
(6.754) (40.11) (47.28) (40.27)
Tax/revenue (%) 0.383 0.400 0.631 0.488
(0.805) (1.048) (1.271) (1.112)
% paid at least one informal
payment
28.60 29.41 46.36 35.99
(32.87) (35.00) (43.33) (38.98)
% spent time to deal with
government officials
61.26 75.05 92.71 79.87
(35.13) (32.86) (22.24) (31.54)
% with poor knowledge/no
interest in tax law
73.60 71.22 72.89 72.26
(29.51) (35.97) (36.45) (35.11)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard deviation. We first take average each variable of each firm,
and then calculate the mean of each group.
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
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government officials than switchers. Overall, the results indicate that strong
firms can formalize whereas weaker households retain their informal status. In
Section 7.5, we investigate whether these factors are associated with the house-
hold decision to formalize.
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 present the characteristics of household owners by types. As
can be seen from Table 7.4, while the age of owners/managers of households is
similar across groups, the percentage of owners who complete higher secondary
school is higher in the switcher group compared to that of the non-switcher
counterparts. While the result for the whole sample is in line with the literature
which shows that informal households are operated by persons with a low level of
education, a different story is found for the top 10 per cent. The education level
of the households in the switcher group is lower than that of the non-switcher
businesses (Table 7.5). Furthermore, knowledge on tax law is similar between
non-switchers and formalized households before they register. Results from
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 also show that household businesses in urban areas are more
likely to be formalized than those in rural places.
Table 7.4 Owner and household business characteristics by business types: all sample
Non-switcher Switcher Total
Male owner (%) 67.25 69.22 63.27
(40.75) (38.57) (41.61)
Age of owner 46.81 46.17 46.37
(10.33) (8.634) (9.382)
Owner completed higher secondary school (%) 38.74 46.76 56.37
(41.61) (41.38) (41.12)
No. of dependent household members 1.320 1.372 1.453
(1.037) (0.985) (1.105)
Total labour force (people) 4.649 5.447 8.848
(4.663) (7.570) (17.02)
Share of female workers (%) 38.80 39.13 34.47
(26.99) (25.12) (22.86)
Share of production and service workers (%) 63.91 59.15 67.30
(18.11) (20.40) (15.27)
Have a CLUR (%) 68.27 74.54 67.93
(37.74) (35.59) (39.59)
Urban areas (%) 27.10 35.90 67.91
(44.49) (47.99) (46.71)
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, and HCM city (%) 12.26 18.52 56.94
(32.83) (38.86) (49.54)
Medium, high-tech sector (%) 28.41 23.58 38.47
(43.79) (41.82) (47.08)
Note: We first take average each variable of each firm, and then calculate the mean of each group.
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
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7.4.2 Which Households Are More Likely to Formalize?
In this section, we test the most common hypotheses that firms will register either
when they perceive benefits of formalization or they want to avoid bribes and
harassment. As indicated in the analytical framework, the estimation of the first
should consider the issues of endogeneity carefully because firm heterogeneity
may be both time-invariant and variant. On the other hand, the estimation of the
second type of formalization is straightforward by using the probit model.
Staying in the informal sector because benefits outweigh the costs
Households will consider to register or stay in the informal sector based on their
perceived benefits and costs of formalization. Household businesses may compare
the benefits such as the increase in their revenues and profits with the costs
including taxes and labour regulations. In this chapter, only taxes will be
considered because household businesses are not required to register for the
use of labour (Rand and Torm 2012a) in Vietnam. We will evaluate the benefits
of formalization covering the increase in the household revenue and the cost of
Table 7.5 Owner and household business characteristics by business types: top 10%
Non-switcher Switcher Total
Male owner (%) 77.03 78.19 77.90
(37.70) (32.05) (33.45)
Age of owner 41.71 45.48 44.52
(8.540) (8.623) (8.730)
Owner completed higher secondary school (%) 51.44 44.89 46.56
(41.97) (38.96) (39.70)
No. of dependent household members 1.656 1.519 1.554
(1.215) (1.053) (1.094)
Total labour force (people) 9.718 12.70 11.94
(7.398) (17.43) (15.53)
Share of female workers (%) 33.35 37.77 36.64
(25.33) (23.66) (24.08)
Share of production and service workers (%) 75.98 75.21 75.41
(14.30) (13.15) (13.41)
Have a CLUR (%) 74.46 74.91 74.79
(37.56) (33.90) (34.74)
Urban areas (%) 21.62 25.93 24.83
(41.73) (44.03) (43.35)
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, and HCM city (%) 16.22 24.07 22.07
(37.37) (42.95) (41.61)
Medium, high-tech sector (%) 29.73 14.66 18.51
(46.34) (34.69) (38.40)
Note: We first take average each variable of each firm, and then calculate the mean of each group.
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
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paying taxes. Revenue is chosen as an indicator of household performance
because it allows us to quickly match them with the tax indicator. The reason
is that although before 2015 households had to pay taxes based on their value
added (Law on Tax management, 78/2006/QH11), tax officials use households’
revenues to compute an amount of tax payment for households. This is because
almost all informal households in the sample do not have accounting books
(Tables 9.4 and 9.5).
Similar to Boly’s (2018) study, we firstly use the random effect (RE) model to
examine whether household businesses switch to the formal status because of their
expected revenue increase. As indicated in Section 3, random effect models
are applied because the non-switcher variable is time-constant. The benefits of
formalization on a business revenue and its growth are documented in Table 7.6.
In this table, the dummy variable ‘non-switcher’ (1 for non-switcher and 0
otherwise) reflects the differentials in revenues of informal households and their
formalized counterpart. As the way to construct this variable explained in Section
7.3, it should be noted that the sub-sample ‘non-switcher’ may include the
informal status of formalized businesses before they register. Therefore, the
variable ‘switcher’ (after formalization) reflects the net effects of formalization
on a switched firm. That means it reflects the revenue that a household gains after
formalization.
Model 1 in Table 7.6 shows our estimation for the whole sample. As indicated
in the literature and shown in our descriptive section that formalization mostly
happens among top tier informal firms, we divide our sample into two groups
based on their revenues before they switch from informal to formal status. Model
2 in Table 7.6 indicates the estimates for the top 10 per cent.
Results from model 1 reveals that non-switchers have lower revenues than
formalized ones (Table 7.6). The coefficient of this variable in model 1 indicates
that overall the revenues of informal household businesses (non-switchers) is
about 20 per cent less than their formalized counterparts. The coefficient of
variable ‘switcher’ (after formalization) indicates that formalization increases a
firm’s revenue by approximately 15 per cent on average, holding other constant.
Rand and Torm (2012a) find a similar rate of profit gains for formalized house-
holds using the same SME surveys in 2007 and 2009.
The estimation for the top 10 per cent reveals an interesting story. While
formalized households are much stronger than informal businesses, formalization
does not bring them any benefit. The coefficient of the variable ‘switcher’ (after
formalization) is insignificant (model 2, Table 7.6). Furthermore, when we
control for pre-formalization trend by using the dependent variable as the growth
of revenue, the variable ‘switcher’ (after formalization) becomes negative and
significant at 10 per cent as shown in model 3, Table 7.6. This indicates that
non-switchers have no disadvantages over their formalized counterparts. McCaig
and Nanowski (2017) also show that formalization does not bring any benefit for
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rate: Top 10% (3)
Switcher (after formalization) 0.152*** 0.064 0.059*
(0.033) (0.112) (0.031)
Non-switcher 0.197*** 0.237* 0.014
(0.042) (0.127) (0.030)
Male owner 0.084*** 0.021 0.005
(0.028) (0.101) (0.027)










Ln(Total labour force) 0.773*** 0.509*** 0.007
(0.021) (0.057) (0.015)
Share of female workers 0.279*** 0.353* 0.099**
(0.050) (0.182) (0.048)




Have a CLUR 0.029 0.029 0.029
(0.027) (0.092) (0.025)
Urban areas 0.094** 0.026 0.013
(0.041) (0.146) (0.034)




Medium, high-tech sector 0.043 0.251* 0.011
(0.042) (0.149) (0.035)
Year 2007 0.075** 0.110 0.129***
(0.033) (0.116) (0.035)
Year 2009 0.239*** 0.133 0.052
(0.034) (0.117) (0.035)
Year 2011 0.323*** 0.405*** 0.136***
(0.037) (0.126) (0.037)
Year 2013 0.367*** 0.323** 0.034
(0.038) (0.136) (0.040)
Year 2015 0.323*** 0.038 0.024
(0.052) (0.168) (0.048)
Constant 13.019*** 14.367*** 0.189
(0.248) (0.824) (0.213)
Observations 5,424 516 516
Chi2-Statistics 2,580 140 74
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.481 0.205 0.126
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
148      ?
formalized firms if controlling pre-formalization trend using the double-difference
method. The result may be one of the reasons explaining why some firms in thetop
tiers do not register.
We now turn to evaluate the cost of formalization by considering whether
households have to pay higher taxes if they register or benefit from tax evasion
if they stay in the informal sector. Table 7.7 documents the random effects of
formalization on a firm’s percentage of taxes to revenues. As can be seen from
this table, household businesses pay higher taxes after formalization and the
results are robust in all specifications. Specifically, a formalized household in
the top 10 per cent has to pay around two times more taxes than before
registering (model 3, Table 7.7). On the other hand, staying in the informal
sector saves households’ costs. An informal household can preserve 0.002
percentage points of taxes over revenue compared to formalized businesses in
the whole sample. Therefore, households do not formalize because they benefit
from tax evasion.
As indicated by Giang et al. (2016), it is quite common in the business sector
that business owners have incentives to collude with state officials for personal
gains at the expenses of the state. Although we do not have information to
indicate whether tax gains come from collusion or distortion, our evidence
shows that informal households benefit from not paying taxes. For the top 10
per cent, we cling to the assumption that those households cannot benefit from
tax evasion without the help from tax officials. Our assumption rests on the fact
that the bigger the household is, the more ‘visibility’ it has (Rand and Tarp
2012). It is also shown in our descriptive statistics (Tables 9.4 and 9.5) that
households with higher revenues, for example the top 10 per cent, have the size
in terms of labour workforce which is almost double that of small businesses.
Therefore, IHBs might deal with tax officials to stay informal for the benefits of
tax evasion.
Do government controls promote formalization?
As indicated in the literature, firms are more likely to register in countries with a
better quality of the legal system (Dabla-Norris et al. 2008) or they are forced to
register by government interventions in countries with a weak rule of law
(De Andrade et al. 2014). We add one more reason for the case of Vietnam
where informal households formalize to avoid harassment and bribes from state
officials (Cling et al. 2012). In order to investigate effects of these factors on the
probability of staying in the informal sector, we estimate random effect probit
model where the dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value one if a
household is formalized and zero if a business is informal. The results are
documented in Table 7.8.
To examine how government controls and households’ knowledge on the legal
system, especially on the tax law, are associated with the probability of being
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Switcher (after formalization) 0.005*** 0.004*** 2.064***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.356)
Non-switcher 0.002*** 0.001 0.571
(0.001) (0.002) (0.417)
Male owner 0.000 0.000 0.461
(0.000) (0.001) (0.322)
Ln(Age of owner) 0.001 0.000 1.350**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.687)




No. of dependent household members 0.000 0.000 0.129
(0.000) (0.000) (0.105)
Ln(Total labour force) 0.001*** 0.001 0.856***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.183)
Share of female workers 0.001 0.001 0.284
(0.001) (0.002) (0.585)




Have a CLUR 0.000 0.003** 0.569*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.294)
Urban areas 0.001** 0.004** 0.731
(0.001) (0.002) (0.477)
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, and HCM city 0.007*** 0.010*** 1.316**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.533)
Medium, high-tech sector 0.002*** 0.000 0.465
(0.001) (0.002) (0.489)
Year 2007 0.003*** 0.001 0.373
(0.001) (0.001) (0.367)
Year 2009 0.005*** 0.000 0.775**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.371)
Year 2011 0.005*** 0.001 0.497
(0.001) (0.002) (0.401)
Year 2013 0.006*** 0.002 0.197
(0.001) (0.002) (0.432)
Year 2015 0.009*** 0.003 1.370**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.535)
Constant 0.003 0.006 0.943
(0.004) (0.011) (2.659)
Observations 5,424 516 516
Chi2-Statistics 422 78 136
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.119 0.218 0.274
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
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Table 7.8 Random effect probit model of formalization: all sample
(1) (2) (3)
Paid at least one informal payment 0.126***
(0.014)
Spend time to deal with government officials 0.162***
(0.011)
Poor knowledge/no interest in tax law 0.307***
(0.011)
Male owner 0.019* 0.023** 0.022**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Ln(Age of owner) 0.024 0.041* 0.054***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Owner completed higher secondary school 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.030***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
No. of dependent household members 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Ln(Total labour force) 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.044***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Share of female workers 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.051***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Share of production and service workers 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.090***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Have a CLUR 0.019* 0.021** 0.019*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Urban areas 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.046***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, and HCM city 0.089*** 0.062*** 0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Medium, high-tech sector 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.022*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
Year 2007 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.143***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Year 2009 0.214*** 0.208*** 0.214***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Year 2011 0.314*** 0.305*** 0.304***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Year 2013 0.342*** 0.326*** 0.299***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Year 2015 1.027*** 1.008*** 0.980***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 5,424 5,424 5,424
Chi2-Statistics 6,325 6,486 7,205
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.503 0.524 0.571
Notes: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
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Table 7.9 Random effect probit model of formalization: top 10%
(1) (2) (3)
Paid at least one informal payment 0.027
(0.040)
Spend time to deal with government officials 0.194***
(0.042)
Poor knowledge/no interest in tax law 0.268***
(0.043)
Male owner 0.049 0.059 0.063
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
Ln(Age of owner) 0.040 0.079 0.070
(0.085) (0.081) (0.079)
Owner completed higher secondary school 0.047 0.043 0.030
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
No. of dependent household members 0.034*** 0.026** 0.024**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Ln(Total labour force) 0.029 0.024 0.013
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Share of female workers 0.019 0.010 0.012
(0.073) (0.070) (0.069)
Share of production and service workers 0.010 0.009 0.018
(0.101) (0.099) (0.098)
Have a CLUR 0.014 0.013 0.013
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Urban areas 0.013 0.045 0.051
(0.057) (0.054) (0.052)
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, and HCM city 0.112* 0.128** 0.054
(0.061) (0.056) (0.055)
Medium, high-tech sector 0.031 0.022 0.029
(0.058) (0.054) (0.052)
Year 2007 0.099** 0.099** 0.101**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Year 2009 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.168***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Year 2011 0.353*** 0.350*** 0.360***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049)
Year 2013 0.494*** 0.480*** 0.485***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
Year 2015 0.955*** 0.937*** 0.945***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 516 516 516
Chi2-Statistics 482 504 532
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.456 0.487 0.509
Notes: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculation using SME data 2005–15.
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registered, we separate the impacts of ‘paying at least one informal payment’ (1 if
paid and 0 if did not pay anything), ‘spend management time to deal with
government officials’ (1 if spent time and 0 if did not), and ‘poor knowledge or
no interest in tax law’ (1 if the household has poor knowledge of tax law and 0
otherwise) in three specifications in Table 7.8. These variables are taken in the pre-
formalization period, based on the assumption that firms are more likely to
register if they were more inspected or had a good knowledge of tax law.
Our results show that paying the informal payment and dealing with govern-
ment officials in the past do not increase the likelihood of formalization (Tables
9.8 and 9.9). Moreover, the coefficient of variable ‘poor knowledge or no interest in
tax law’ indicates that households, which have poor knowledge of tax law, are less
likely to register (model 3, Table 7.8). For the top 10 per cent, households are
indifferent with formalization regardless of involving informal payment or not. In
addition, the likelihood of formalization in thistop tier business reduces when
households spend more time to ‘deal with government officials’ and ‘have poor
knowledge or no interest in tax law’ (models 2 and 3, Table 7.9). As indicated by
Giang et al. (2016: 413), the majority of household businesses are subject to be
checked at least once a year and businesses often give informal payment each time
they are inspected. Furthermore, business owners often do not understand how
the tax level is calculated and have to pay what they are told. It seems that
household businesses deal with government officials to stay informal and there-
fore, they do not need to acquire good knowledge on the tax law.
The above results do not support findings from Cling et al. (2012)’s qualitative
study that households register to avoid bribes and harassment. Instead, the results
might support our assumption in the previous section that there may be a
handshake between informal households, especially those in the top tiers, and
tax officials. Although our findings lack evidence to examine whether there is a
potential collusion between informal households and tax officials, these are
worthy for future qualitative and quantitative studies to investigate the collusion
corruption as determinants of informality in developing countries.
7.5 Conclusion
The informal sector remains large in poor and developing countries. Since the
existence of the sector has been seen as a weakness of the economy, identifying
determinants of informality to promote the process of formalization is an ideal
policy goal for any country. In this chapter, we investigate factors associated with
the informality of household businesses in Vietnam using the unbalanced panel
data from the SME surveys in Vietnam in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015.
The chapter finds that most of the informal households are in the bottom of
90 per cent. They are run by lower educated owners and have lower revenue than
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formalized and formal households. On the other hand, informal household
businesses in the top 10 per cent have no disadvantages in terms of human capital
over their formal counterparts. In line with the literature, our results reveal that
only strong firms can formalize whereas weaker households stay informal. Fur-
thermore, household businesses in urban areas are more likely to be formalized
than those in rural places. Although we find that formalization happens more
frequently among the top than the lower tiers, results from the chapter show that
not all stronger firms formalize.
Using the random effect method, we find that while switchers in the whole
sample benefit from an increase in revenues, formalized households in the top
10 per cent do not benefit or even experience a negative revenue growth rate
when controlling for pre-formalization trend. Whereas staying informal reduces
business costs from tax evasion and this gain is higher if a household is in the top
tiers. Results from the chapter may explain why a proportion of households in the
top-tiers remains informal.
The chapter also examines whether government controls and household know-
ledge on tax law help to promote formalization. The results reveal that being more
inspected by government officials and paying the informal payment in the past do
not promote the likelihood of formalization, especially among the top 10 per cent.
This, coupled with tax benefits from staying informal, raise a suspicion on the
handshake between informal households in the top tiers and government tax
officials for personal gains. This opens room for future qualitative and quantitative
studies to investigate the collusion corruption as a determinant of informality in
developing countries.
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8
Slack Resources and Innovation
in Vietnamese SMEs
A Behavioural, Stewardship, and
Institutional Perspective
Tam Thanh Nguyen and Chieu Duc Trinh
8.1 Introduction
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play an important role in socioeconomic
development.* These firms provide a growth engine for the economies through
creating jobs and supplying goods and services that are not provided by larger
counterparts (Acs and Audretsch 1990, 1993; Cunningham 2011; Honjo and
Harada 2006; Storey 1994). This sector accounts for more than 95 per cent of all
firms and 60 per cent of employment in developed countries (OECD 2000). They
also contribute between half and three-quarters of the value added in the OECD
enterprise sector (Mazzarol 2014). Especially in developing economies, the devel-
opment of SMEs is crucial for society stabilization and poverty alleviation
(Smallbone and Welter 2001). The development of SMEs provides solutions for
poor people to escape from poverty through attracting them to work or even to
start an enterprise themselves (Beck et al. 2005; Bauchet and Morduch 2013).
Additionally, the SME sector helps to absorb economic shocks and natural and
social disasters (Smallbone and Welter 2001). In Vietnam, according to the
General Statistics Office (GSO 2017), 98.7 per cent of operating enterprises are
SMEs in terms of the number of employees and they hire around 60 per cent of the
total labour force in the enterprise sector.
Despite their important role in economies and society, SMEs are now facing
many challenges during their development that may prevent them from profitable
operation, such as limited access to markets and customers, and difficulties
in sustaining growth. The facts show that innovation provides an efficient
tool for these firms to overcome these shortcomings (Cefis and Marsili 2006).
* The authors thank John Rand for his invaluable comments, and Thinh Nguyen for his assistance
in preliminary data analysis.
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Through introducing new products, firms have advantages in the access to new
markets and new customers (Hausman and Johnston 2014). Meanwhile, the appli-
cation of new business processes allows firms to reduce production costs and enrich
the specifications of current products that enable firms to gain market share and
sustain growth (Hall et al. 2009). However, common constraints for the innovation
of SMEs-such as shortage of capital and lack of qualified staff-prevent firms from
investing in innovation activities that are as such risky and costly (Hadjimanolis
1999; Madrid-Guijarro et al. 2009; Sandberg and Aarikka-Stenroos 2014). The
presence of slack resources might provide an efficient solution for firms to innovate.
There is extensive research on the role of slack resources on performance and
innovation. Slack resources would equip firms with a buffer from resource short-
ages which provides sufficient capital for innovation activities (Cyert and March
1963). The existence of slack resources also motivates firm owners/managers to
search for business opportunities to fully utilize those unused resources, resulting
in the introduction of new products, new processes or new markets (Penrose
1959). However, possessing resource slack is not always associated with innov-
ation (Nohria and Gulati 1996). The possible interest difference/conflict between
owners and managers drives managers to maintain excessive resources in the
operation of firms, thus causing a resource waste in low-risk investments (Fama
1980). Consequently, this discourages firms to innovate. In addition, too much
slack occupies the required resources for innovation thus restricting the efforts of
introducing new products (Tan and Peng 2003).
A first possible explanation for the different influences of slack is the difference
in business types. In family-run businesses where the benefits of the business are
strongly connected with the welfare of family members, one of the owners/
managers’ priorities is to ensure the longevity of the firm, which in the long run
benefits various family members (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). Consequently, this
may prevent firms from using slack to finance firms’ activities including innov-
ation. This is different in large firms with well-organized structures where the
managers are willing to deploy those excessive resources to meet the demands of
the firm.
Second, different types of slack have different impacts on innovation. Slack is
different in terms of divisibility, tangibility, and mobility (Mishina et al. 2004).
Those differences in turn affect the ability of firms to exploit and deploy the slack
for innovation activities (Wang et al. 2016). For instance, divisible slack is more
easily mobilized to meet the resource demand of innovation activities, thus
positively influencing the innovation of firms.
Another reason for the different directions and influences on firms’ innovation
is that slack resources do not work in isolation. The impact of slack resources
depends on the combination with other external and internal innovation support
factors that have been less understood (Marlin and Geiger 2015). Extant research
explores this relationship focusing on firms in developed countries, whereas in
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developing countries, the impact of slack resources may be more pronounced due
to the less mature nature of both the capital and the labour market (ILO 2016).
Taken together, the heterogeneity across firms in different business environments/
circumstances and the differences among types of slack challenge the impact of
slack resources on innovation.
Therefore, in order to respond to these speculations, we ask two connected
research questions. The first question is whether different types of slack resources
improve innovation and the second question is how the institutional context
strengthens or hinders the impact of slack resources on the innovation of firms.
We investigate these two research questions through an exploration of a longitu-
dinal dataset for Vietnamese SMEs. To do this, we first provide a brief literature
review of innovation and slack resources, culminating in a research model and
hypotheses. We then explain our data collection and methods and conclude with a
discussion of our findings and possible theoretical and practical contributions.
8.2 Conceptual Background and Hypothesis Development
8.2.1 Innovation
Innovation is well studied under the theme of economics and management
(Schumpeter 1939; Peters et al. 2017). Innovation involves a range of activities
such as Research and Development (R&D) and product delivery and occupies a
large amount of financial and human resources with the final aim of introducing
something new that potentially benefits the firm’s operations and performance
(Hogan et al. 2011). This includes the introduction of a new product/service,
production technology, and organizational management method (OECD 2005,
2010). Although the induction of innovation may be either new to the world, new
to the market or new to firms, it all shows the importance for the survival/
existence and development of firms through the retention and widening of the
customer base, opening of new markets, reduction of production costs, and
allowing more efficient management (Agarwal et al. 2003; Hausman and Johnston
2014). Consequently, innovation attracts lots of efforts from scholars to examine
its nature, determinants and driving forces which again provides insights for
managers/owners and governmental agencies into the promotion of innovation
in firms (Acs and Audretsch 1988; Freeman 1982; Hall and Rosenberg 2010).
Extant research on innovation literature has investigated a range of different
determinants of innovation arising from both external and internal factors. The
external factors include components outside firms that have an influence on the
innovation activities such as the dynamic business environment, technological
development trends, preference changes of customers and suppliers and also the
industrial and economic structure (Capaldo et al. 2003; De Jong and Vermeulen
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2004; Romijn and Albaladejo 2002). Meanwhile, the internal factors comprise of
the resource availability, the capability to sense, seize and transform business
opportunities into real innovation output, and the characteristics of managers/
owners such as risk-taking (Mel et al. 2009). Furthermore, recent scholars argue
that not one single factor influences the innovation output, but the combination of
both internal and external factors benefits innovation of firms, of which the
internal ones play a crucial role in those innovative activities (Hogan et al. 2011;
Ngo and O’Cass 2009). Among those factors, slack resources are a key ingredient
that promote firms’ innovation.
8.2.2 Slack Resources
Slack resources are well explored in their role for firm performance. Slack
resources are defined as the overabundance of resources that exceed the required
amount to ensure the normal production of firms (Bourgeois 1981; Geiger and
Cashen 2002; Nohria and Gulati 1997). It is the unused resources that exist within
firms and can be mobilized to serve particular needs of firms (Child 1972; Cohen
et al. 1972). Slack resources are also considered as the non-fully utilized resources
that firms can further fully utilize through appropriate strategies and actions. The
existence of slack resources is obviously due to the nature of indivisibility of
resources (Penrose 1959). Because ‘resources are only obtainable in discrete
amounts’, thus, if a resource is demanded for a single activity or service, it would
not be fully utilized for the need of that demand (Penrose 1959: 67). Consequently,
this non-fully deployed resource creates an excess of resource within the firm.
In addition, the knowledge created through business operations further generates
the resource excess through more efficient resource deployment methods (Cyert
andMarch 1963). In other words, the knowledge creation allows firms to reduce the
execution time required for normal activities, thus generating slack (Pitelis 2007).
The importance of slack resources in innovation is well understood. Prior
research has shown that slack is considered as the determinant and also driving
force for firms to innovate (Cyert et al. 1959; Damanpour 1991). The presence of
slack provides a buffer against shortage of resources for innovation activities
which is common among SMEs (Mishina etal. 2004). Slack resources also motiv-
ate firms to search for business opportunities to deploy that slack, resulting in a
new product a business process. The presence of slack encourages owners/
managers to invest in innovative business activities that may lead to the intro-
duction of a new product (Penrose 1959). In addition, the excess resource not only
provides an endogenous incentive to innovate but also enables firms to recombine
available resources in more creative ways (Nason and Wiklund 2015). However,
notwithstanding the extensive theoretical and empirical studies, the relationship
between resource slack and innovation remains ambiguous. Some scholars argue
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
       161
that too much slack creates struggles for firms in mobilizing resources for innov-
ation activities as the necessary resource is locked within such slack (Fama 1980;
Katila and Shane 2005). As a result, this prevents firms from investing resources in
innovative activities. Furthermore, the high level of slack indicates the lower risk-
taking levels of the owner/managers, thus, does not encourage them to look for
business opportunities to fully deploy that slack (Singh 1986).
A first possible explanation for the controversial results is that the impact
depends on the slack types and firms’ characteristics. First, slack differs among
firms. For example, in small firms, slack rarity is worse than in larger counterparts.
Slack is also found to have different impact mechanisms in privately held firms
than in public firms (George 2005). Second, slack resources are different in terms
of availability, fungibility, absorbability, and recoverability (Voss et al. 2008). For
example, there is absorbed and unabsorbed slack, genetic and rare slack. These
differences influence the role of slack in supporting innovation. For instance, there
is slack that is more fixed in certain business activities, therefore, is not easily
allocated to other tasks. This slack is supposed to have less impacts on innovation.
Among those types, financial and human resource slack are typical in organiza-
tions (Voss et al. 2008). These forms of slack are also important for SMEs to
overcome the common financial and human capital constraints in their survival
and development as will be explained next.
Financial slack typically refers to the excessive financial resources for the
normal operation of an organization (Ang and Straub 1998; Voss et al. 2008).
These financial resources are also not currently allocated for certain business
activities (Bizzi 2017; Yanadori and Cui 2013). Extant research has proven the
positive influence of financial slack on innovation of firms. For instance,
Natividad (2013) argued that the presence of a high level of financial slack
provides a resource buffer for innovation activities and thus enables firms to
innovate. However, in small-scaled family-run businesses, the impact directions
may differ. According to the stewardship theorists, in family business, the owners/
managers have the responsibility to look after dependants (Davis et al. 1997). They
act not only on behalf of the business but also of their family. Consequently, they
first have to ensure the benefits of the whole family (Corbetta and Salvato 2004;
Donaldson and Davis 1991). In other words, the well-being of family is strongly
connected with the successful performance of the family’s business. Therefore, if
the unused financial resources are used to develop innovation, it may lead to
constraints in the family’s living standard due to the risky nature of innovation
activities. Instead, the owners/managers prefer to use this financial slack in less
risky activities.
Moreover, in these small-scaled family businesses, there is a blurred line
between firm and family operational activities, especially in less developed coun-
tries. The underemployed financial resource can be used to meet the demand of
family rather than firm activities. In addition to that, financial slack is completely
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divisible across multiple activities (Greve 2003). Thus, any available financial slack
will be deployed for currently demanded activities, which are typically constrained
by limited internal resources in small firms, rather than be invested in innovation
that requires long-term commitment (Parida and Örtqvist 2015). Consequently,
possessing a high level of financial slack reduces the likelihood of introducing a
new product or business process. Therefore, it is theorized that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Financial slack negatively influences the probability of having
innovation
Human resource slack is defined as the human resources in excess of that required
for the efficient operation of an organization (Williamson 1963). The presence of
this excessive staff enables firms to allocate the required human resources to
additional tasks without interfering daily operational activities (Welbourne et al.
1998). From the stewardship theory perspective, because the firm and family
interests are guaranteed, the owners are more open to invest this human resource
slack to prepare for future growth. Moreover, human resource slack is less flexible
than financial slack. It is also an absorbed slack which is not easily redeployed into
variety use (Mishina et al. 2004). Therefore, it is not easy for the owner to use that
unused resource to meet the resource demands of family activities. Instead, the
human resource slack is preferred to be exploited within firms.
The presence of high levels of human resource slack means that the product-
ivity of the workforce is not currently maximized. In other words, the workforce
does not work at maximum capacity. This encourages the owner to further deploy
the underemployed staff by allocating this excessive human resource to additional
tasks. The reallocation of human resources allows firms to effectively respond to
emerging business opportunities and achieve higher growth. In other words, human
resource slack stimulates firms to search and transfer business opportunities,
resulting in the introduction of a new product or a new market (Chang et al.
2012). Additionally, excess human resources also motivate firms to reconfigure
the current production technology to maximize the capacity of the current work-
force. For instance, introducing a new business process is also a way to improve the
productivity in terms of human resource utilization. Therefore, we posit that:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The human resource slack positively influences the probability
of having innovation
8.2.3 The Moderation Role of Institutional Context
For SMEs that are typically facing resource constraints, the availability of slack
resources is essential to engage in innovation activities and offer new products or
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business processes. However, slack resources do not act in isolation. Though slack
equips firms with additional resources or motivates them to find business oppor-
tunities, the innovation outcome results from a range of connected activities.
Thus, firms still require other factors in addition to slack. Among those factors,
the institutional context plays an important role in enhancing the impact of slack
resources on innovation as will be explained next.
Institutions are ‘social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience’
(Scott 1995: 33). They include different cognitive, normative, and regulative
elements that operate at different levels of jurisdiction in the interpersonal,
organizational, national, and global system. Institutions contribute to the forma-
tion of a business environment for firms, thus having influence on the operation
and development of businesses (North 1991). The importance of institutions in
firm’s performance can be illustrated through the facilitating or hindering role.
For instance, institutions can help alter the constraints and the structure of
incentives in a society to direct self-interested behaviour towards either more or
less economically productive activities (Baumol 1990; Nee 1996). Institutions
also have an impact on the innovation of firms in both direct and indirect ways
(Wang 2013). The direct effect is reducing uncertainty in the business environ-
ment through a stable legislation framework (World Bank 2013). Meanwhile,
creating favourable conditions for firms to innovate such as developed inputs
and outputs market is an example of the indirect impact of institutions on
innovation (Mokyr 2007).
As noted, high levels of financial slack hinder the effort of introducing
innovation in the firm. Though the excessiveness of financial resources provides
a financial buffer for firms, the stewardship role does not encourage owners to
invest the excess resources in new activities. The fungibility of that type of slack
instead allows owners to easily allocate the financial excessiveness to activities
that ensure the welfare of family rather than innovation activities. However,
operating in different institutional levels may lead to different results in the
impact of financial slack on innovation. For instance, in a region with a stable
legal framework, the business environment is less uncertain, thus, reducing the
perceived risk of owners and transaction costs when implementing innovation
activities (Williamson 2005). Consequently, they are more open to invest the
financial slack in developing new products or acquiring a new production
technology. More importantly, the development of institutions may remove
the owners’ burden of ensuring family benefits. In a region with a developed
financial market, the access to financial resources is more favourable, allowing
the owners to have more alternative choices to ensure family welfare rather
than using the firm’s financial slack (Brown et al. 2012; Hsu et al. 2014).
Additionally, firms have more access to other necessary resources to combine
with financial slack in developing a new product or improve current products.
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Taken together, high levels of institutional development may help to exit the
family wellbeing trap, thus liberating the unused financial resources. Therefore,
it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The negative impact of financial slack is lessened in firms
located in areas with a more favourable business environment
Human resource slack improves innovation. The excess of this slack type encour-
ages owners to first search for business opportunities and second reconfigure
business operations to fully deploy the underemployed staff. First, high levels of
institutional development allow firms to have favourable conditions in accessing
financial and other resources such as premises, information and technology to
supplement for human resource slack. Firms also have more advantages to
develop their capabilities in a stable policy condition. These are crucial for the
successful development of a new product because innovation requires the com-
bination of a range of resources and capabilities (Hogan et al. 2011). Second, the
development of institutions contributes to the removal of barriers to market
entrance and creates an equal playing field among businesses. Firms have less
constraints when entering/opening new markets with new products or expanding
the current market with improved products as a result of consuming human
resource slack. Consequently, this enriches the impact of human resource slack
on innovation. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The positive impact of human resource slack is stronger in
firms located in areas with a more favourable business environment
8.3 Methodology
8.3.1 Sample
This study explores the longitudinal Vietnamese SME dataset collected biennially
from 2005 to 2015. The surveys were conducted under the collaboration of
Central Institute for Economic Management (Vietnam), Institute for Labour
and Social Affairs (Vietnam), and University of Copenhagen with sponsoring by
the Danish Development Agency and UNU-WIDER. The surveys cover around
2,500 small and mediummanufacturing firms in ten provinces of Vietnam namely
Hanoi, Ha Tay (ex), Hai Phong, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Lam Dong,
Khanh Hoa, Ho Chi Minh city, and Long An (CIEM 2007). The sample selection
is implemented with the aim to ensure the correct representation of the manu-
facturing sector development in Vietnam.
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8.3.2 Measurements
Dependent variables
In the study, we investigated three binary innovation dependent variables, namely
radical, incremental product and process innovation. In the survey, firms were
asked whether they introduced the following types of innovation: a new product, a
major improvement to a current product or a new technology/production process
(OECD 2005). The radical product innovation is determined by whether firm
introduced a new product to the market. Some authors argued that the radical
product innovation relates to the introduction of a product that is totally new to
the market. However, in our sample, the radical product innovation is only new
to firms but demonstrates a huge effort from these small firms to introduce this
new product (Slater et al. 2014). Thus, our sample could be a reasonable proxy for
radical product innovation. The second dependent variable is incremental product
innovation which is defined by the introduction of a major improvement to
current products. Meanwhile, process innovation is determined by the application
of a new product process or technology. These three dependent variables were
coded as binary variables that assigned value 1 if introducing innovation and 0
otherwise.
Explanatory variables
We measured financial slack as the difference between the ratio of total sale to
total assets of firms and the mean ratio for all firms operating in the same two-
digit industry (Bourgeois 1981). Meanwhile, human resource slack was calculated
by subtracting the number of full-time equivalent employees from the total sales
of firms and the mean ratio of the industry (Vanacker et al. 2017). These two
measures present the physical and human capital excess that firms use to generate
specific amount of sales as compared with other counterparts.
For institutional context, the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) is
employed to represent the level of business favourability. The PCI was first
introduced in 2005 in Vietnam and conducted annually (Malesky 2017). The
overall PCI comprises ten sub-indices, reflecting economic governance areas that
affect private sector development. A province that is considered to perform well
on the PCI is the one that has: (i) low entry costs for business start-up; (ii) easy
access to land and security of business premises; (iii) a transparent business
environment and equitable business information; (iv) minimal informal charges;
(v) limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and inspections;
(vi) limited crowding out of private activity from policy biases toward state,
foreign, or connected firms; (vii) proactive and creative provincial leadership in
solving problems for enterprises; (viii) developed and high-quality business
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support services; (ix) sound labour training policies; and (x) fair and effective
legal procedures for dispute resolution. The PCI is the weighted mean of the ten
sub-indices with a maximum score of 100 points.
Control variables
Four control variables that are important for firm-level analyses—namely firm
size, firm age, industry, and legal form—were included. Firm size was measured by
the number of the total regular workforce (log). Firm age was measured by the
number of years a firm was in business (log). Firm industries were classified based
on the Vietnamese Standard Industrial Classification that complies with the
International Standard Industrial Classification (OECD 2009). Legal form was
classified as household and non-household firms (Romijn and Albaladejo 2002).
The variables are summarized in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 Independent variables in the innovation models
Variables Explanation of variables
Financial slack Financial slack calculated by comparison between the firm’s
ratio of total sale over total assets and the mean ratio of firms
in the same industry (2-digit industrial code)
Human resource slack Human resource slack calculated by comparison between the
firm’s ratio of total employees over total sale and the mean
ratio of firms in the same industry (2-digit industrial code)
PCI Provincial Competitiveness Index calculated by taking
weighted mean of ten sub-indices with a maximum score of
100 points
Firm size The total number of full-time employees (Log)
Firm age Number of years in business (Log)
Household Dummy variable. If firms are household, Legal form=1,
otherwise Legal form=0




Dummy variable. If firms’ industry is medium-low




Dummy variable. If firms’ industry is medium-high
technology, thus, Medium_High_industry=1, otherwise,
Medium_High_industry=0
High industry (Ind_High) Dummy variable. If firms’ industry is high technology, thus,
High_industry=1, otherwise, High_industry=0
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2005–15 Vietnamese SMEs data.
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8.3.3 Bias Testing
We conducted a number of tests and techniques to ensure the avoidance of bias in
the estimation. First, the survey followed a random sampling procedure to assure
the representation of different types of firms in our sample, thus, sample selection
bias does not appear to be a problem (Pannucci and Wilkins 2010). Second, the
high response rate of typical governmental surveys indicates that non-response
bias is not an issue (Armstrong and Overton 1977). Third, we also performed a
Harman’s single factor test to find out whether there is a presence of common
method bias. The results show that the first factor did not account more than
50 per cent of variance of other factors; therefore, common method bias seems not
to be a main issue on our estimation (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Finally, together with
the inclusion of PCI data from the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
the application of direct interviews with firm’s owner/managers who have out-
standing knowledge about the operation of firms helps us to limit the bias arising
from using a single data source.
8.3.4 Research Method
As the dependent variables are binary, we apply binary probit regression as a method
to test our hypotheses (Wooldridge 2010). The specific model is described as:
EðyjxÞ ¼ expðxβÞ=½1þ expðxβÞ;
where EðyjxÞ is a binary probit function and x is a set of explanatory and control
variables.
A firm would initially be better endowed with innovation, thus raising concerns
about endogeneity leading to estimation bias. Therefore, statistical techniques
such as adding control variables and/or using robust standard errors will be
applied to control for endogeneity problem.
8.4 Results and Discussion
8.4.1 Results
Table 8.2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix on the variables
used in the study. There was 65 per cent of our sample operating as household
firms, indicating a high proportion of informal firms in the Vietnamese manufac-
turing industry. In our sample, as we keep track firms during a 10-year period since
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Table 8.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix







3 Process innovation 0.130 0.336 0.254*** 0.372***
4 Financial slack 0.656 3.184 0.004 0.025** 0.013
5 Human resource
slack
0.001 0.009 0.026** 0.014 0.026** 0.003
6 PCI 56.224 5.040 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.056*** 0.002 0.194***
7 Firm size 14.106 27.462 0.083*** 0.155*** 0.197*** 0.056*** 0.027** 0.031**
8 Firm age 14.242 9.522 0.032** 0.099*** 0.078*** 0.056*** 0.001 0.019** 0.094***
9 Legal form 0.654 0.476 0.066*** 0.138*** 0.164*** 0.004 0.013 0.097*** 0.449*** 0.187***
10 Medium- low-
technology industry
0.241 0.427 0.025** 0.048*** 0.016** 0.019** 0.006 0.015 0.033*** 0.024** 0.002
11 Medium- high-
technology industry
0.087 0.282 0.036*** 0.084*** 0.006 0.013 0.003 0.037*** 0.023** 0.018** 0.032*** 0.174***
12 High- technology
industry
0.022 0.148 0.086*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.041*** 0.025** 0.056*** 0.085*** 0.047***
Note: Spearman correlation. *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; and ***p < 0.001.

























2005, firmswere quitematurewith the average age ofmore than 14 years in business
which is typical in manufacturing industries. The average size of firms was 14
regular full-time employees. The majority of firms operated in low and medium-
low-technology industries such as food and beverage, garments and textiles. Only
9 per cent of firms are in medium-high-technology industries while 2 per cent in
high tech. This is the case of Vietnamese manufacturing industries which is
confirmed in the industrialization policy during the last 20 years (Anh et al. 2014).
The results also show the proportion of firms that introduced radical, incre-
mental product and process innovation. While 32 per cent of firms had major
improvements to current products, there was only 13.8 per cent launching a new
production process. The percentage of firms offering new products to the market
was 12.8 per cent. Table 8.2 also illustrates significant correlations between the
financial and human resource slack, firm size, firm age, legal form, and business
environment favourability.
Table 8.3 exhibits the results of our estimation on the impact of financial slack
on the three mentioned innovation types. The results show that the financial
slack is statistically significantly negatively related to incremental product
(p<0.001) and process innovation (p<0.05) (see Model 4 and 6). In other
words, firms encountering financial slack are less likely to make improvement
to the current product, and to engage in a new technology/production process.
However, the results do not demonstrate a statistically significant impact of
financial slack on the introduction of a new product (Model 1). Therefore, H1
was partly confirmed.
Table 8.4 demonstrates the estimation results of the impact of human resource
slack on the three mentioned innovation types. The estimation results show that
human resource slack has a positive impact on all three mentioned innovation
types at any considered statistical significance levels (Models 8, 10, and 12). In
other words, firms encountering human resource slack are more likely to intro-
duce new products, to make improvement to the current product, and engage in a
new technology/production process. Therefore, H2 was confirmed.
The estimation for the moderation impact of institutional context on the
relationship between financial slack and human resource slack and innovation is
illustrated in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. As expected, a location in regions with higher
levels of institutions reduces the negative impact of financial slack on incremental
product and process innovation (Models 14 and 15). However, this location does
not statistically impact on the relationship between financial slack and radical
product innovation (Model 13). Therefore, H3 was partially confirmed. The
results in Models 17 and 18 present the negative moderation of institutional
context on the relationship between human resource slack and incremental
product and process innovation. In other words, firms located in a more
favourable business environment will gain less positive impact from human
resource slack. Therefore, H4 was rejected.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Explanatory variable
Financial slack 0.004 0.021*** 0.014*
Control variables
Firm size (log) 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.261*** 0.264*** 0.282*** 0.284***
Firm age (log) 0.057** 0.056** 0.019 0.013 0.011 0.015
Medium-low- technology industry 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.230*** 0.233*** 0.057 0.056
Medium-high- technology industry 0.301*** 0.301*** 0.477*** 0.476*** 0.065 0.068
High-technology industry 0.290*** 0.289*** 0.127 0.120 0.091 0.086
Legal form 0.184*** 0.173*** 0.095** 0.090** 0.147*** 0.144***
Year 2007 1.395*** 1.395*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.488*** 0.487***
Year 2009 1.672*** 1.673*** 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.548*** 0.548***
Year 2011 2.259*** 2.259*** 1.192*** 1.196*** 0.951*** 0.951***
Year 2013 2.274*** 2.227*** 1.202*** 1.204*** 0.943*** 0.942***
Year 2015 0.425*** 0.425*** 1.336*** 1.338*** 1.106*** 1.105***
Constant 0.603*** 0.600*** 0.366*** 0.341*** 1.014*** 1.002***
Observations 15,589 15,589 15,589 15,589 15,589 15,589
χ² 2240.924*** 2240.40*** 2717.92*** 2770.08** 1412.91*** 1414.77***
Pseudo R2 0.2808 0.2808 0.1638 0.1653 0.1462 0.1470
Note: Probit regression. Based: Low technologyindustry, year 2005. *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; and ***p < 0.001.

































Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Explanatory variable
Human resource slack 7.925*** 4.522** 7.622***
Control variables
Firm size (log) 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.282*** 0.282***
Firm age (log) 0.057** 0.056* 0.019 0.019 0.011 0.011
Medium-low- technology industry 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.230*** 0.231*** 0.057 0.056
Medium-high- technology industry 0.301*** 0.302*** 0.477*** 0.477*** 0.065 0.065
High-technology industry 0.290*** 0.291*** 0.127 0.127 0.091 0.092
Legal form 0.184*** 0.174*** 0.095** 0.095** 0.147*** 0.147***
Year 2007 1.395*** 1.393*** 0.396*** 0.395*** 0.488*** 0.487***
Year 2009 1.672*** 1.671*** 0.463*** 0.462*** 0.548*** 0.547***
Year 2011 2.259*** 2.258*** 1.192*** 1.193*** 0.951*** 0.95***
Year 2013 2.274*** 2.273*** 1.202*** 1.202*** 0.943*** 0.942***
Year 2015 0.425*** 0.424*** 1.336*** 1.336*** 1.106*** 1.104***
Constant 0.603*** 0.603*** 0.366*** 0.362*** 1.014*** 1.014***
Observations 15,589 15,589 15,589 15,589 15,589 15,589
χ² 2240.924*** 2293.92*** 2717.92*** 2735.05*** 1412.91*** 1458.49***
Pseudo R2 0.2808 0.2810 0.1638 0.1639 0.1462 0.1464
Note: Probit regression. Based: Low technology industry, year 2005. *p < 0.05; **p<0.01; and ***p < 0.001.


























Around more than 80 per cent of Vietnamese SMEs experienced some constraints
(CIEM et al. 2016), including financial shortage, limited demand, and fierce
competition. Therefore, taking use of slack resources should be one of the
important solutions for dealing with their main constraints. The data analysis
revealed the impact of both financial and human resource slack on innovation but
in reverse directions. Financial slack shows the negative impact on innovation in
terms of incremental product and process innovation, meaning that firms encoun-
tering financial slack are less likely to make improvement to the current product,
and to engage in a new technology/production process. This confirms the firm
owners’ stewardship role in managing the family welfare (Donaldson and Davis
1991). The flexibility of financial slack allows firm owners to direct the use of those
excessive resources to meet the family demands rather than to invest in the firm’s
activities such as translating business opportunities into a new product or business
Table 8.5 The moderation impact of institutional context on the relationship between









Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Explanatory variable
Financial slack 0.043 0.177** 0.206*
PCI 0.010* 0.006* 0.007*
Financial slack *PCI 0.001 0.003* 0.003*
Control variables
Firm size (log) 0.054* 0.267*** 0.280***
Firm age (log) 0.135*** 0.008 0.017
Medium-low-technology industry 0.151** 0.215*** 0.087*
Medium-high-technology industry 0.126 0.387*** 0.115
High-technology industry 0.154 0.016 0.049
Legal form 0.169** 0.057 0.085
Year 2009 0.267*** 0.058 0.048
Year 2011 0.835*** 0.777*** 0.437***
Year 2013 0.862*** 0.782*** 0.429***
Year 2015 0.981*** 0.9*** 0.568***
Constant 1.482*** 0.385* 1.099***
Observations 12,787 12,787 12,787
χ² 1165.27*** 1701.53*** 690.09
Pseudo R2 0.2213 0.1300 0.1038
Note: Probit regression. Based: Low technology industry, year 2005. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and
***p < 0.001.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2005–15 Vietnamese SMEs data.
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process. In contrast, human resource slack illustrates a strong positive impact on
all mentioned innovation types in the data analysis, meaning that firms experi-
encing human resource slack are more likely to introduce new products, make
improvements to the current product, and to engage in a new technology/
production process. Unlike the financial slack, the human resource slack is more
fixed in firms (Voss et al. 2008). Workers employed by firms have specific
knowledge and skills to meet the requirements of the firm’s business activities,
which means that it is not easy for owners/managers to relocate this type of slack
to family activities rather than to the firm. Consequently, owners/managers are
more likely to deploy that underemployed resource to meet the demands of new
business opportunities that lead to the introduction of innovation.
The results also illustrate that the impact of financial slack resources on
innovation is also influenced by the institutional context, where a higher level of
business favourability causes smaller negative impact on incremental product and
process innovation. One possible explanation for this fact may be that the firms
Table 8.6 The moderation impact of institutional context on the relationship between








Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Explanatory variable
Human resource slack 70.981 30475.89*** 35621***
PCI 0.011* 0.002 0.003
Human resource slack *PCI 31.853 785.135*** 870.813***
Control variables
Firm size (log) 0.051* 0.258*** 0.276***
Firm age (log) 0.138*** 0.007 0.007
Medium-low-technology industry 0.147** 0.201*** 0.092*
Medium-high-technology industry 0.120 0.366*** 0.129*
High-technology industry 0.150 0.038 0.029
Legal form 0.162** 0.016 0.046
Year 2009 0.274*** 0.101** 0.073
Year 2011 0.847*** 0.852*** 0.491***
Year 2013 0.875*** 0.858*** 0.483***
Year 2015 0.970*** 0.978*** 0.624***
Constant 1.428*** 0.519** 1.295***
Observations 12,787 12,787 12,787
χ² 1171.94*** 1713.03*** 719.15***
Pseudo R2 0.2214 0.1367 0.1088
Note: Probit regression. Based: Low technology industry, year 2005. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and
***p < 0.001.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2005–15 Vietnamese SMEs data.
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operating in better business circumstances usually have more business opportun-
ities, including the expansion into a new market. Thus, it is easier for them to
make use of resource slack for their production compared to those firms operating
in more difficult business circumstances. Considering the fact that financial
shortage is usually the biggest constraint for SME development (CIEM et al.
2016), this finding may imply that improvement of business conditions should
suggest a better use of financial slack for SME innovation in Vietnam. More
importantly, the presence of high levels of institutions associated with the devel-
opment of the financial market expedites the access to financial sources, thus
giving firm owners more choice in sustaining their family’s financial capabilities
instead of using financial slack. On the other hand, financial slack now can be used
to serve the demands of growth of firms, resulting in the induction of new
products or technologies.
In the case of human resource slack and its impact on innovation, the findings
show that operating in more favourable business environment does not enhance
the impact. In contrast, it reduces the positive effect of human resource slack on
innovation. One possible explanation for this unexpected consequence is the
employee turnover. The high level of development of labour market in favourable
business environment allows the excessive employee easier to move to other firms.
This employee movement creates a loss in human capital and knowledge of firms
(Eriksson et al. 2014). Though firms might have chance in exploring business
opportunities in a favourable business environment, the presence of a loss of
knowledge does not at least allow firms to transfer these business opportunities
into real new product or business process. Consequently, it reduces the impact of
human resource slack on innovation.
As expected, firms operating in higher level of technology industries are more
likely to innovation than those in low technology counterparts in terms of
introducing new products and improving existing products. However, the results
do not show the significant difference amongst three considered levels of tech-
nology industries regarding to the process innovation. In addition, the results also
strongly indicate that larger firms are more likely to engage in innovation than
smaller firms at all three types of innovation. Finally, informal firms (household
businesses) are less likely to engage in innovation probability than formal firms.
8.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, the study deepens the understanding of the role of slack resources
in promoting innovation. By exploring a dataset from the Vietnamese SMEs
survey, the study offers a number of theoretical and managerial contributions.
First, the research expands the boundary conditions of the impact of slack
resources on family business innovation. This contributes to the explanation for
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the different impact of slack resource types on innovation. While in public firms,
there is a clear line between firms and owners’/managers’ family operational
activities, the blurred line in family business together with the stewardship role
motivates owners to direct the underemployed resource to first guarantee their
family benefits (Donaldson and Davis 1991, 1993). This leads to the negative
consequence of slack on innovation. This is more pronounced for slack resources
that are less fixed such as financial slack. Meanwhile, for more fixed slack, the
owners have no other choices but to invest in firm’s activities, thus explaining the
positive effect.
Second, the study sheds light on the relationship between slack resources and
innovation through the influence of institutional context in emerging economies.
The findings show that slack does not work in isolation in supporting innovation.
It requires an interaction with other external factors embedded in the institutions.
The constitution of business environment conditions thereby can hinder or
facilitate the impact of slack on innovation. In other words, it further confirms
the orchestra of resources in sustaining growth and competitive advantages.
The findings also suggest a number of managerial and economic policy impli-
cations. First, a clear direction in the deployment of different slack resource types
is crucial for the introduction of a new product or business process. While
financial slack is fungible across inner and outer business activities, the high levels
of that type of slack may not always be associated with innovation. Meanwhile, the
more fixed human resource slack is an important source of innovation support.
Second, ensuring the retention of human resources is supportive for the impact of
human resource slack on innovation. Third, the findings suggest that the facilita-
tion of the business environment, such as developing financial markets, will
motivate firms to more fully deploy their slack resources.
Although our study has advanced the understanding of the role of slack
resources on innovation, it is important to highlight some limitations. First, we
are unable to create continuous variables for innovation, thus the possibility of
measurement bias exists. We reduced the likelihood of that error by testing the
regressions with an assumed substitute variable of a continuous innovation slack
resource change level. The consistent results indicate a high degree of robustness.
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Certification and Business Risk
Neda Trifković
9.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the scope for international private standards to play a
role in reducing business risk. Standards are measures by which products, pro-
cesses and producers are judged (Hatanaka et al. 2005). Different products are
subject to information asymmetry problems, because consumers cannot easily
verify all the quality characteristics before the purchase. It is, for example, difficult
to ascertain by looking at the product, whether it is grown organically or whether
responsible labour, trade, environmental, or animal welfare practices have been
followed (Lee et al. 2010). Trade globalization is making the communication about
product attributes even more complex, as the consumption and demand for more
product information take place in high-income countries, while the production
takes place in developing countries with usually different levels of public regula-
tion stringency. Standards and certification schemes address the need for more
information by signalling specific attributes of, for example, product quality and
safety or social and environmental aspects of production processes. Signalling is
usually a part of a firm’s strategy to raise its credentials in the marketplace,
indicate reliability, and increase consumers’ trust (Fulponi 2006; Henson and
Jaffee 2006; Terlaak and King 2006).
The literature on standards in the context of transition economies and devel-
oping economies has mainly analysed the emergence of international standards
for safety, quality, and sustainability as a new global regulation mode (Hatanaka
et al. 2005; Henson and Reardon 2005). Even though the results are still ambigu-
ous, this stream of research highlights the trade-facilitating effects of international
standards (Beghin et al. 2015). Standards give an opportunity for firms in
emerging economies to increase access to international markets and to raise
their productivity and sales performance (Calza et al. 2019; Goedhuys and
Sleuwaegen 2013; Henson et al. 2011; Masakure et al. 2009; Trifković 2016). The
ability of standards to increase firm productivity comes from modifications in
internal practices, streamlining procedures, and improving workplace conditions
(Calza et al. 2019; Delmas and Pekovic 2013; Levine and Toffel 2010; Trifković
2017). These processes can also reduce uncertainty and the risk of supplying
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inferior goods to the market. This argument has been put forward in several
studies (Antle 1996; Terlaak and King 2006; Henson and Reardon 2005), but the
possibility of risk-reducing benefits of standards have not been empirically tested.
Risk is defined as the potential for financial loss or physical damage associated
with a business activity (Chapman and Cooper 1983). Future financial returns can
be subject to unpredictable processes, but they can also depend directly on the
firm’s activities, such as investment decisions. The primary measure of business
risk in this chapter is variability in revenue from three main products over time.
The choice of the measure is consistent with earlier empirical work (Gomez-Mejia
et al. 2001; Henkel 2009; Ruefli et al. 1999). If one part of the firm’s revenue
variability comes from a low ability to assure product quality and safety, then
standards can stabilize year-to-year revenue by reducing cases of malfunctioning
and discarded or contaminated products. Additional measures of business risk
include customer risk, based on the variability in the customer base, informal
payments, and temporary business closure.
The results based on a sample of small- and medium-sized enterprises from
Vietnam show lower levels of business risk among certified firms. Heterogeneity
analysis confirms the result for middle deciles of the risk distribution and location
differences in favour of firms located in rural areas and northern provinces.
Certification is also a useful risk-reduction tool for technologically advanced
firms. The overall conclusion of benefits from standards also holds for alternative
risk measures, namely customer risk, informal payments, and temporary business
closure. Certification is found to correlate negatively with customer risk, informal
payments, and temporary business closure. Estimations account for bias from
unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity, suggesting that firms could find pro-
tection from business downsides by investing in activities that go beyond minimal
regulatory compliance.
9.2 Key Concepts and Literature
The literature distinguished three ways of obtaining information about products
and therefore three types of goods (Darby and Karni 1973; Nelson 1970). Search
goods are those for which consumers have perfect information before purchase
(such as colour, shape, or size), but for other goods it may be difficult to have full
information beforehand. Products whose attributes are revealed only after the
consumption (such as taste) are called experience goods, and products whose
quality can be determined only with necessary expert knowledge are credence
goods. For example, pathogens that present food safety hazards or cancer-causing
toxins cannot be identified prior to the purchase. Instead, consumers may become
aware of them at the onset of illness. As a consequence, the imperfect information
in product markets will lead to an inefficient level of food quality and safety, and
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lower quality products will dominate (Akerlof 1970). Under these conditions of
asymmetric information, sellers know the product quality and they can signal
higher product quality with higher price. However, as the higher price strategy
undermines the price competition (Antle 1996), sellers are increasingly aiming to
remove the uncertainty about product attributes by making the information
available to consumers, most commonly through product labelling or certification
in accordance with international standards.
Standards are an increasingly important governance mechanism in global
production and trade between developed and developing countries (Ponte and
Gibbon 2005). They were traditionally devised and enacted by individual govern-
ments, with the intention to shape the market environment and influence the
behaviour of the concerned actors (Blind et al. 2017). With the increasing
trade globalization—where production occurs in various locations and under
different sets of rules and conditions—the standard-setting role of governments
is taken over by various non-governmental, international, and private regulatory
bodies. Private standards are thus developed by coalitions of private sector actors
(Henson and Humphrey 2010) and enforced by third-party certification
(Hatanaka et al. 2005). Focusing on a variety of quality attributes that are not
stipulated by public regulation, private standards are deemed more stringent
and more comprehensive than public regulation (Farina et al. 2005; Reardon
and Berdegué 2002).
Since the early 1990s, standards have been a way of responding to the requests
for specific product attributes, commonly transferred from consumers to produ-
cers. ISO 9001 is the most commonly used international standard. The Inter-
national Organization for Standardization (ISO) published the ISO 9001 standard
in 1987, as a framework for quality management from manufacturing to delivery.
Many firms have adopted the ISO 9001 standard as a way of meeting the demands
of global competition (Manders et al. 2016). The process of implementing the ISO
9001 standard and certification can be quite expensive, but the cost seems
justifiable to many firms across the globe. The ISO Survey (ISO 2016) shows
that more than one million organizations in 187 countries have ISO 9001 standard
certification. The second most commonly applied standard is ISO 14001, imple-
mented to improve environmental management practices of firms. ISO 22000 is
implemented for the purpose of managing food safety risks, which is particularly
relevant for the food industry.
Standards and certification schemes assure credibility of the production process
and inform about product quality and safety, as well as about the social and
environmental conditions of the production process. This illustrates the signalling
role of standard certificates, which are used strategically to raise the firm’s
credentials in the marketplace by indicating to external parties that the firm is a
reliable supplier and partner (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen 2013; Henson and
Jaffee 2006; Potoski and Prakash 2009; Terlaak and King 2006). One of the
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signalling benefits is the reduction in transaction and search costs, that is, the time
and resources customers need to identify eligible suppliers. Another benefit is the
ability of certified firms to address competitive pressures by shifting from price-
based competition to quality-based competition and from undifferentiated com-
modities to value-added differentiated goods (Henson and Reardon 2005). Such
product differentiation can increase profits (e.g. Spence 1976; Tirole 1988).
A particularly relevant aspect of quality-based competition for producers from
developing countries is using certificates as a way to differentiate themselves from
informal sector producers (Jaffee and Masakure 2005).
Apart from the signalling effect, standard certification could lead to internal
benefits for firm performance. Implementation of private standards such as ISO
9001 usually requires putting in place a set of planning, controlling, and corrective
activities, such as, for example, (i) examining adequacy of work processes and
methods for meeting product specifications; (ii) documenting work processes,
work instructions, and quality assurance procedures; (iii) internal auditing to
verify that activities comply with the procedures; and (iv) designing preventive
and applying corrective actions in response to audits (Naveh andErez 2004). Studies
link certification with process and product upgrading, better managed production
procedures and business practices, increasedmonitoring, increased efficiency in the
use of resources, and reduction of waste and pollution, as evidenced in a number of
studies (González et al. 2008; Iraldo et al. 2011; Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen 2013).
Improved control and increased efficiency can, in turn, create competitive advan-
tage (Caswell et al. 1998; Henson and Caswell 1999).
The internal benefits can also be generated through an effect on human
resources. Successful standard implementation is difficult without investments
in human capital. Building employee skills and capabilities through training and
improving workplace safety and satisfaction may contribute to better working
conditions and consequently to higher productivity (Delmas and Pekovic 2013;
Levine and Toffel 2010; Trifković 2017).
Enterprises face several types of risk. For example, strategic risk affects the
implementation of a particular business strategy, operational risk disrupts core
processing capabilities, customer risk affects the likelihood of customers placing
orders, financial risk arises from changing financial markets or debtor defaults,
while reputation risk erodes the value of the whole business due to loss of
confidence (Harland et al. 2003; Simons 1999; Smallman 1996). The sources of
risk can be direct and indirect. Human, organizational, and technological activities
can directly cause business crises, while regulatory, infrastructural, and political
factors can contribute indirectly (Smallman 1996). Conditions of the natural
environment can also be counted as indirect risk factors as they are beyond the
organization’s and individuals’ influence. Risks affect businesses negatively, caus-
ing financial, performance, physical, psychological, social, or time loss (Harland
et al. 2003). Risks should be managed, when doing so improves the expected value
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of outcomes or if the potential damage of events exceeds what the firm finds
acceptable (Bromiley et al. 2016).
While risk can refer to the firm’s preferences, behaviour, or actions, the focus
here is on the outcomes of risk.¹ Literature is far from unified in providing
guidance on how to measure risk, but one of the proposed ways is to use
information on variability in actual firm performance, which reflects uncertainty
about the firm’s income stream due to its particular decisions or activities.² If one
part of the firm’s revenue variability comes from a lack or limited ability to assure
product quality and safety, standards could serve as a risk-reducing tool and
stabilize revenue levels over time. This effect could come from obtaining better
insight into the firm’s processes and preventing undesired events such as cases of
malfunctioning and discarded or contaminated products.
9.3 Data
The analysis is based on the data from the biannual small- and medium-sized
enterprise (SME) survey for Vietnam. This survey has been conducted in 10
provinces in Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Hanoi, Hai Phong, Long
An, Ha Tay, Quang Nam, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Khanh Hoa, and Lam Dong. The
sampling frame comprises a consolidated list of formal enterprises obtained from
the Establishment Census from 2002 (GSO 2004) and the Industrial Survey 2004–
06 (GSO 2007). Firms are randomly drawn from this list, accounting for owner-
ship type to obtain representative data on household-owned, private, cooperative,
limited liability and joint stock enterprises. Apart from the officially registered
firms, the survey also includes informal firms that were identified randomly
on-site.³ As the survey traces the same firms over the years, it is able to capture
legal structure changes and formalization of unregistered businesses. Firms who
stop operating are randomly replaced based on the need to maintain a constant
level of household firms based on the information in GSO (2004) and the new
2014 population of firms registered under the Law on Enterprises obtained from
GSO (2015).
The analysis in this chapter is based on the data from the 2011, 2013, and 2015
survey rounds, because the question about the compliance with internationally
recognized standards was introduced in 2011. The survey targets non-state manu-
facturing enterprises from different sectors. Informal businesses are unlikely to
obtain a certificate of compliance with standards, as the main information on the
¹ Bromiley et al. (2017) offer a summary of different connotations of risk.
² Other empirical measures of firm-level risk include: stock price, variability in stock analyst
forecasts and discretionary firm activity, such as investment in research and development (Bromiley
et al. 2017; Chatterjee and Lubatkin 1990).
³ More details about sampling are available in CIEM et al. (2014, 2016).
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certificate is precisely the firm registration number. That is why informal firms are
excluded from the analysis. The total sample used in the analysis thus comprises
4,728 firms; 1,377 firms in 2011, 1,363 in 2013, and 1,988 in 2015.
The main questionnaire includes information on enterprise characteristics and
practices. All questions refer to the situation in the previous calendar year, namely
2010, 2012, and 2014, while the economic accounts contain information on two
consecutive years prior to the survey. The questionnaire has stayed almost the
same over the years, with the exception that the questionnaire from 2015 separ-
ately asks about international and domestic standards. The 2011 and 2013 survey
rounds only contain an indicator for whether firms have applied for any of the
internationally recognized standards, while the 2015 round reveals exactly which
standards are certified.
9.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics in Table 9.1 show average values and standard deviations of
key dependent and control variables. The first three rows show average values of
annual revenue in million Vietnamese Dong for three main products. The values
are deflated for spatial and temporal differences in the cost of living in different
areas of Vietnam. Firms were asked in the interviews to identify the most
important products in value terms. As the majority of firms are micro or small,
only 65 per cent produce more than one product. The consequence is that the first
most important product contributes the most to the value of the business risk
variable, whose average value has been steadily increasing in the observed six-year
period. Informal payments and the incidence of temporary closures have in
contrast decreased in the observed period. Customer risk, measured as variation
in the customer base, has not changed much between 2011 and 2015, indicating
on average a fairly stable customer portfolio.
The proportion of firms with internationally recognized private standards in
the sample is 7.7 per cent. This average masks a large drop between 2013 and 2015,
where the proportion of certified firms declined from 10 to 4.6 per cent. This is
similar to the observed twofold decline in the total number of ISO 9001 certificates
in Vietnam that decreased from 6,164 in 2012 to 3,786 in 2014 (ISO 2016).⁴ The
most commonly certified standards among the Vietnamese SMEs are ISO 9001,
⁴ In addition to the general declining trend of certification in Vietnam, there is a small possibility
that the drop in the number of certified firms in 2015 could be due to the change in the questionnaire.
Whereas the 2011 and 2013 survey rounds asked about certification against internationally recognized
standards, the 2015 round asked in addition about domestic standards. The wording of the question
about internationally recognized standards has remained the same, but it has perhaps offered a
possibility for some respondents to more carefully reflect on the type of the certification they have.
Another reason could be that companies reached a point when they needed to re-certify and could not
fulfil stricter conditions of re-certification.
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ISO 14001, and ISO 22000. Figure 9.1 shows how important different contacts
were for deciding whether to adopt standards. The most important input in the
certification decision comes from customers and surprisingly also from suppliers.
The former case indicates that certification works through signalling desirables
attributes of a product or a production process and it is well-described in the
literature (Henson and Humphrey 2010; Fouayzi et al. 2006). The latter case is
likely to occur for more technically advanced products or vertically integrated
value chains, where quality needs to be assured in downstream operations, such
as, for example, in the case of different assembly activities.
Table 9.1 also shows that the average firm size is about 17 employees. Micro
firms, defined as those with less than 10 employees, comprise 60 per cent of the
sample. One half of that fraction are small firms and the rest are medium firms,
employing between 50 and 300 employees. The average firm size has declined
between 2011 and 2015, which is in line with the general trend of declining firm
size in Vietnam (CIEM et al. 2014). Table 9.1 also shows a declining value of the
Table 9.1 Summary statistics of key variables
All years 2011 2013 2015
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Revenue 1st product 0.192 7.72 0.037 0.63 0.534 14.01 0.049 0.32
Revenue 2nd product 0.716 2.15 0.129 0.66 1.008 2.55 0.932 2.43
Revenue 3rd product 0.310 1.02 0.048 0.28 0.460 1.21 0.392 1.18
Business risk (ln) 1.074 0.35 1.102 0.34 1.041 0.36 1.078 0.35
Customer risk (ln) 1.310 0.46 1.322 0.46 1.263 0.46 1.338 0.46
Informal payments (%) 49.73 50.00 52.25 49.96 52.89 49.93 45.50 49.81
Temporary closure (%) 12.21 32.75 12.59 33.18 12.82 33.44 11.48 31.89
Certification (%) 7.67 26.62 9.34 29.11 10.10 30.15 4.61 20.98
Firm size 17.50 31.02 19.88 32.79 18.01 29.61 15.36 30.58
Capital–labour ratio 0.476 0.80 0.544 1.05 0.493 0.66 0.413 0.66
Export (%) 7.64 26.56 7.74 26.73 7.91 27.00 7.35 26.10
Post-secondary education (%) 74.91 43.36 71.63 45.09 78.29 41.24 74.77 43.44
Female owner or manager (%) 40.63 49.12 39.18 48.83 41.80 49.34 40.80 49.16
Household establishment (%) 54.01 49.84 50.89 50.01 49.77 50.01 59.50 49.10
Private/sole proprietorship (%) 9.49 29.31 11.17 31.51 11.03 31.33 7.09 25.67
Partnership/collective/
cooperative (%)
2.94 16.88 3.72 18.94 3.06 17.23 2.26 14.87
Limited liability company (%) 28.29 45.04 28.90 45.34 30.31 45.97 26.32 44.04
Joint stock company (%) 5.28 22.36 5.32 22.45 5.83 23.44 4.83 21.44
Observations 5,723 1,692 1,732 2,299
Note: Real revenue and capital values are in million Vietnamese Dong (VND). 1 USD  20,000
VND. The number of firms with revenue information for two products is 2,183 (3,770 observations)
and the number of firms with revenue information for three products is 1,591 (2,583 observations).
Source: Author’s calculation based on SME data.
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capital-labour ratio. About 8 per cent of firms from the sample export and this
proportion has remained unchanged over time.
In terms of owner or manager characteristics, about three-quarters have com-
pleted at least upper secondary school. About 41 per cent of firms are owned or
managed by women. The proportion of women in this role has been declining
since 2011. Around 40 per cent of enterprises belong to sectors characterized by
low intensity of technology: food and beverages, textiles, apparel, leather, wood
processing and recycling. Slightly more than half of the sample are enterprises
from rural areas, defined as locations different from Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City,
and Hai Phong.
Comparing the enterprises from the sample by certification, the first aspect to
observe is a significant difference in revenue between certified and non-certified
firms, as shown in Figure 9.2. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is 0.43,
indicating that the distributions of revenue in certified and non-certified firms are
statistically different (p = 0.00). Moreover, certified firms have significantly lower
business and customer risk value, as shown in Table 9.2. These firms have much
lower incidence of temporary firm closure, but higher incidence of informal
payments, perhaps due to higher visibility. Certified firms have a higher capital
value, indicating that they could be more technologically advanced than non-
certified firms. These firms are also much more likely to export than non-certified
0 2 4 6
Customers Suppliers
Same sector contacts Business association
Politicians and civil servants Different sector contacts
Bank officials Other
Figure 9.1 How important were the following contacts for your decision to implement
standards? (scale 0–7)
Source: Author’s illustration based on SME data.
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Figure 9.2 Differences in revenue for the three most important products by
certification
Source: Author’s calculation based on SME data.
Table 9.2 Differences between firms by certification (t-test)






Business risk (ln) 1.08 0.97 0.11 6.63*** 5,723
Customer risk (ln) 1.33 1.06 0.27 11.91*** 5,723
Informal
payments (%)
48.69 62.19 13.49 5.45*** 5,723
Temporary
closure (%)
12.74 5.92 6.81 4.20*** 5,723
Firm size 14.12 58.13 44.01 –30.84*** 5,723
Capital–labour ratio 0.47 0.61 0.14 3.57*** 5,723
Export 4.96 39.86 34.90 28.24*** 5,723
Post-secondary
education
73.05 97.27 24.22 11.37*** 5,723
Female owner or
manager
39.53 53.76 14.22 5.85*** 5,723
Source: Author’s calculation based on the SME data
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firms and to be managed by women who tend to be better educated than owners
or managers of non-certified firms.
9.4 Estimation
The main goal is to estimate the effect of certification on business risk over the
period 2011–15. The estimation follows the form specified in the following
equation:
yijt ¼ αi þ βiCit þ δXit þ ρj þ τt þ eijt
where i denotes firm, j denotes location and t denotes time period. αi; are firm
fixed effects and eijt is the statistical noise term. The dependent variable, yijt is
business risk. Following Ruefli et al. (1999) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001), it is
defined as performance variance relative to performance level, where performance
is measured as revenue. The revenue values are spatially and temporally deflated
using spatial cost of living indices for different years and provinces of Vietnam.
The risk is calculated as the logarithm of the ratio of the variance in revenue for
the three most important products, k = 1, 2, 3 divided by a term consisting of the





Other things being equal, the more the average revenue for a given period
exceeds the minimum revenue, the term in the denominator increases, and
business risk decreases accordingly. Conversely, as the variance in the revenue
(the numerator) increases, business risk increases accordingly. This index is
similar to the coefficient of variation, which is positively related to the variance
of performance outcomes over time and negatively related to the mean of the
distribution, implying a lower risk for higher mean performance outcomes (Miller
and Reuer 1996).
Following the same procedure, I obtain an alternative measure of business risk
based on the customer base structure, which measures the performance based on
the proportion of goods sold to individual households, tourists, non-commercial
government authorities, domestic non-state enterprises, state enterprises, foreign
invested companies or to export. Additional measures of business risk used in the
estimation are informal payments and temporary business closure.
The variable of interest, Cit , takes value 1 if a firm owns any internationally
recognized certification and 0 otherwise. Xit are time-varying firm-specific and
owner/manager control variables, such as firm size, ratio of capital to labour,
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export behaviour, gender of the owner or manager, and education level of the
owner or manager. Firm size category is determined from the total number of
regular full-time employees. It is a necessary control as larger firms have an
advantage in complying with standards. A positive size effect on the adoption of
standards was found in previous studies (Herath et al. 2007; Masakure et al. 2011;
Nakamura et al. 2001). One explanation could be that fixed costs that are bound
to be incurred in relation to implementation of standards are less significant for
larger firms. Ratio of capital and labour is also included in the estimation to
proxy for the cost and the nature of technology. This is measured as the deflated
value of the total assets of the firm divided by the total number of full-time
employees. Firms in contact with foreign markets are more likely to obtain
certifications, so the estimation controls for exporting. Managerial characteris-
tics are important for firm performance (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007), so the
estimation controls for gender and education level of the owner or manager.
Due to relatively high levels of completion of primary and secondary school in
Vietnam, the control variable for education is a dummy variable taking value
one if the owner or manager have completed any post-secondary education,
which captures a potential premium for higher education. The estimation also
controls for industry, province, and legal ownership form to account for com-
mon factors affecting all firms within industries, provinces, and particular legal
ownership forms. All monetary variables are corrected for spatial cost of living
between different provinces.
The key variable for certification is potentially endogenous, as there could be
unobserved firm characteristics that influence the firm’s certification decision that
are also correlated with risk performance. For example, a manager of a firm may
have access to specific information or experience, which could both lead to the
adoption of standards and better risk performance. Including firm-fixed effects
addresses this issue to some extent, given that it allows controlling directly for all
time-invariant unobserved firm-specific factors, such as manager preferences and
characteristics that do not change over time. In addition, time dummies, τt;
control for general trends that affect all firms, while location dummies control
for policy changes that may differentially impact firm performance in different
geographical areas.
The estimation could be biased by omitted time-varying unobservable factors
that impact both business risk and certification decisions, such as, for example, a
change in management. The bias due to time-varying unobservable factors could
be both positive and negative. For example, a change in management could be
such as to increase business risk and reduce investment in certification, in which
case the least squares effect size will be overestimated. It may also be that a new
management is more favourable of certification due to a change in regulations or
buyers’ preferences, which could reduce business risk and lead to underestimated
least squares effect size. These examples illustrate that the direction of causality
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may be difficult to disentangle, so the results are correlations without assigning a
causal interpretation.
9.5 Results
To see which firms decide to certify against international standards, the adoption
of standards is estimated as a function of observable firm characteristics, such as
size, asset ownership, production of final goods, ownership type, and location, as
described in the previous section. The results using pooled least squares and fixed-
effect estimations on the unbalanced and balanced panel, respectively, are shown
in Table 9.3. All least squares and probit specifications control for firm location,
technology type of the sector in which it operates, legal ownership form, and
survey year. Time-invariant sector and location controls, as well as the owner’s
gender are excluded from the fixed-effect model in column (6).
Table 9.3 shows the determinants of certification. We see from column (1) that
firm size is a strong predictor of the adoption of standards. The subsequent
columns show that other firm characteristics also contribute to the decision to
adopt standards, confirmed by a decrease of the firm size coefficient. Enterprises
that are endowed with more capital are, as expected, more likely to adopt
standards. Exporting firms are also more likely to decide in favour of certification.
The relationship is positive and significant across all specifications.
Table 9.4 shows the relationship between certification and business risk. Col-
umns (1)–(4) show least square estimation results. The first three columns show
the results for the unbalanced and column (4) shows the results for the balanced
panel. The final column shows the results with firm–fixed effects, which, as
described in the previous section, account for bias due to time-invariant unob-
servable heterogeneity. All specifications show a negative association between
certification and business risk. A decision to certify an internationally recognized
standard for managing the quality, safety, or environmental impact of the pro-
duction, associates with a 5.6 per cent lower business risk. Fixed-effects estimates
are slightly higher than the least squares estimates, indicating that the unobserved
heterogeneity correlates negatively with certification incidence. This suggests that
less productive firms are more likely to self-select into certification of international
standards and that fixed-effects correct for the downward bias in least square
estimation.
Control variables—such as firm size and having a female owner or manager—
also correlate negatively with business risk. Assets also show a negative association
with business risk and exporting shows a positive association, but the relationship
is imprecisely determined in all specifications.
Table 9.5 shows the relationship between certification and additional measures
of business risk, such as customer risk, temporary closure and informal payments.
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Table 9.3 Determinants of international standard certification
Dep. var. Certification OLS OLS OLS, balanced Probit marginal
effects
Probit, balanced FE, balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


























































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Legal FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Location FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
R² 0.16 0.24 0.26
Observations 5,803 5,792 4,448 5,792 4,448 4, 448
Note: OLS stands for ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

























Table 9.4 The relationship between certification and business risk
Dep. var. Business risk OLS OLS OLS OLS, balanced FE, balanced



























































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes Yes No
Legal FE No No Yes Yes No
Location FE No No Yes Yes No
R² 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.02
Observations 5,723 5,723 5,723 4,419 4,419
Number of firms 2,969 2,969 2,969 1,671 1,671
Note: OLS stands for ordinary least squares. Columns (1)–(3) show results from unbalanced panel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.

























Table 9.5 The relationship between certification and business risk: additional risk measures
Dep. var.: Customer risk Informal payments Temporary closure
OLS FE, balanced OLS FE, balanced OLS FE, balanced



















































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Legal FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
R² 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.02
Observations 5,792 4,448 5,792 4,448 5,792 4,448
Number of firms 2,986 1,671 2,986 1,671 2,986 1,671
Note: OLS stands for ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

























The results show again a negative association between certification and different
risk measures.
How does the effect of certification on business risk come about? It is likely that
simultaneously different mechanisms are in force that may influence several
dimensions of firm performance. The implementation of standards entails incen-
tives for adjusting the production systems towards planning and performance
analysis, which could stabilize the revenue streams over time. Standards are also
credited with improved working conditions and workplace practices (Levine and
Toffel 2010; Trifković 2017), leading to better employee performance, which could
lead to more stable revenue streams by reducing the number of instances of
product malfunctioning, damage, or contamination. Finally, standards inform
customers about higher product reliability, which could result in more stable
levels of purchase.
9.5.1 Heterogeneity Analysis
The distributional differences in the relationship between certification and busi-
ness risk are assessed in a more systematic way by focusing on different deciles of
the risk distribution. The specification of the quantile regressions is exactly the
same as the least squares regression in column (3) in Table 9.4. Least squares
and quantile regressions coefficients are given in Figure 9.3, where the red line
presents quantile regression coefficients and the black line shows the least
squares coefficients. The dashed part of the least squares line indicates the part
of distribution in which least squares and quantile regression coefficients are
statistically different, while the full line indicates the area where the coefficients
from two types of estimations are not statistically different from each other.
The results in Figure 9.3 show statistically significant and negative association
of certification and business risk in 30 to 50 per cent deciles. The point estimates
are highest around the median (0.14). The relationship between certification and
risk is not statistically significant in the bottom and the top deciles of the risk
distribution. This indicates that the gain from standards is a decline in business
risk of about 15 per cent for the middle risk levels. This finding indicates that
larger levels of business risk could require other means of risk management than
standards.
In Table 9.6, location controls are excluded to investigate if location differences,
such as urban–rural and south–north, are associated with different benefits
of certification. The south–north differences are particularly relevant due to
country's historical division into south and north regions, which nowadays
manifests in different modes of operation, behaviour and managerial styles
(Ralston et al. 1999). The estimates in column (1) show a negative association
between certification and business risk for enterprises located in rural areas. As
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shown in column (2), the relationship is also significant and negative among the
firms in the north, perhaps a consequence of higher competitive pressures.
The market in which main products are sold can affect certification decisions
(Adolph et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2018), so column (3) shows the result for firms
from the sample who export at least some part of their output. The estimates show
a negative correlation between certification and risk for exporting firms, but the
effect is not precisely determined. Similarly, there are no heterogeneous effects by
firm owner’s gender. Column (5) shows a significantly negative correlation
between certification and risk for firms that operate in technologically more
advanced industries.
More innovative firms, that is, those that tend to invest in innovative activities,
such as introducing new or modifying existing products or technologies, are found
to be more likely to adopt standards (Calza et al. 2019; Manders et al. 2016). This
relationship is not simple, as standards and innovation can have synergistic
benefits, but may also compete for resources, which is why the interplay depends
on the importance of signalling in the business model of the firm, firm motivation,
the sector and the region in which the firm operates. The results in column (6)
show a significantly negative correlation between certification and risk for firms
that do not implement product improvements, indicating opposite influence of
standards and innovation on business risk.
.1
0.10
.2 .3 .4 .5
Decile












Figure 9.3 Least square and quantile regression coefficients
Notes: The red line presents quantile regression coefficients and the black line shows the least squares
coefficients. The dashed part of the least squares line indicates the part of distribution in which least
squares and quantile regression coefficients are statistically different, while the full line indicates the
area where the coefficients from two types of estimations are not statistically different from each other.
Source: Author’s illustration based on the SME data.
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Table 9.6 Certification and business risk for different sub-samples
Dep. var. Business
risk
Rural North Export Female owner Medium to high
technology
No innovation





















































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Legal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.05 0.06
Observations 3,070 2,797 265 2,325 3,467 4,336
Note: OLS (ordinary least squares) regressions on unbalanced panel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.


























This chapter has examined the relationship between certification of international
standards and business risk on a sample of manufacturing firms from Vietnam.
The results show that certification contributes to a significant reduction in busi-
ness risk, measured as fluctuation of revenue of firm’s three most important
products over time. The result is in particular relevant for the middle deciles of
the risk distribution. Heterogeneity analysis by location shows risk-reducing
benefits of standards for firms located in rural areas and northern provinces, as
well as for firms that use technologically advanced production methods. Certifi-
cation also tends to assure a more stable customer portfolio, reduce informal
payments, and prevent temporary business closure.
The results suggest that certification of internationally recognized standards is a
strategic decision for firms, illustrating benefits from investing in activities that go
beyond minimal regulatory compliance. Policy support for certification could take
the form of tax deductions for one part of the implementation expenditures and
information campaigns on how to deduct some of the associated costs. This could
encourage further adoption of international standards by SMEs from Vietnam,
providing a way of sheltering from business downsides.
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10
Pecuniary Returns to Working Conditions
Christophe J. Nordman and Smriti Sharma
10.1 Introduction
Working environments can vary in terms of hazards that workers are exposed
to (e.g. noise, heat, asbestos, lead, and pesticides), poor ergonomics (heavy lifting,
repetitive tasks, sedentary work), unfavourable working times (working day
length, overtime incidence), and workplace discrimination and harassment.
Most studies in economics tend to focus on wages, wage growth, and occupational
attainment as indicators of labour market success, while paying little attention to
the quality of the work environment. This is especially important in developing
countries in which manufacturing sectors have generated jobs in the face of rapid
industrialization, but we have little knowledge about the working conditions
being offered.¹ However, growing evidence shows that working conditions and
job quality can have long-lasting effects on workers’ physical and mental health,
worker absenteeism, and more generally on life satisfaction (for overviews,
see Pouliakas and Theodossiou 2013; and Barnay 2016).² For instance—using
data from the European Community Household Panel—Datta Gupta and
Kristensen (2008) find that a satisfactory work environment promotes employee
health. Buhai et al. (2017) find that improvements in occupational health and
safety lead to an increase in performance among Danish manufacturing firms.
Somanathan et al. (2015), using high-frequency worker data spanning a variety of
manufacturing sectors in India, find that higher ambient temperatures in the
workplace have economically significant negative effects on worker productivity
and attendance. In a related vein, Adhvaryu et al. (2018) show that adoption of
LED lighting, an energy-saving technology that emits less heat, increases prod-
uctivity among garment factory workers in India.³
¹ The deadly collapse in 2013 of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh that housed five garment
factories producing for major apparel retailers is an infamous example of unsafe and poor-quality work
conditions.
² The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates show that work-related diseases and
accidents account for economic losses as high as 4 per cent of worldwide gross domestic product
(ILO 2003).
³ Dell et al. (2014) provide an overview of impacts on productivity arising from pollution and high
indoor/outdoor ambient temperatures.
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In this chapter, we first document working conditions in Vietnamese small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), and then examine the existence of compensating
wage differentials for vulnerable jobs and unfavourable working conditions. The
theory of compensating differentials which was formalized in the 1980s (Brown
1980; Rosen 1986; Murphy and Topel 1987) states that workers should receive
higher wages to compensate for the strenuous or hazardous nature of their jobs or
adverse working conditions.⁴ In developed countries, for example, it has been
observed that physically onerous and risky jobs are often better paid (e.g. French
and Dunlap 1998; Groot and Maassen van den Brink 1998; Lanfranchi et al. 2002),
while the existence of compensating mechanisms mostly depends on the workers’
labour market segment and their relative position in the wage distribution (Poggi
2007; Fernández and Nordman 2009). Despite the abundant explanations and the
strength of the theoretical predictions regarding compensating wage differentials,
the lack of appropriate data on job matches (including the workplace, the
employee, and the attributes of the job) has been an impediment to empirically
testing the theoretical predictions in developing countries. Using rich data on
working conditions faced by workers in Vietnamese SMEs, our aim is to contrib-
ute to this discussion. This is salient given the scope of SMEs in Vietna they
contribute to approximately 45 per cent of the country’s GDP and 60 per cent of
its employment.
In the UK, Fernández and Nordman (2009) assess the relative contribution of
working conditions to wages with an emphasis on differences along the earnings
distribution. They find that adverse working conditions—such as doing repetitive
tasks, working under tight deadlines or facing health risks on the job—are
associated with significant premiums, but sometimes also penalties. Quantile
regressions confirm the presence of penalties to poor working conditions that
are significant in the middle section of the earnings distribution. Böckerman et al.
(2011) also confirm the presence of compensating differentials using data from
Finland where they show that workers are compensated in terms of wages for
uncertainty arising from establishment-level worker turnover. Ose (2005) finds
that private sector manufacturing workers in Norway are not fully compensated
for working in noisy environments. Furthermore, his theoretical model shows that
only partial compensation for such disamenities can result in higher worker
absenteeism. Using data on gender-specific injury incidence in the United States,
Hersch (1998) finds that females are well compensated for occupational risk, while
for males in white-collar jobs, there is a negative relationship between job risk and
earnings. In contrast, there is scant empirical evidence to support the existence of
such risk premiums and penalties in developing countries. For West Africa,
⁴ The theory assumes that once job characteristics other than the wage become part of the labour
market decisions of workers and firms, the resulting equilibrium will equalize utilities, rather than
wages across individuals.
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Bocquier et al. (2010) shed light on the link between vulnerability and incomes for
wage workers and self-employed workers. They test whether workers in vulner-
able jobs are paid better than workers in less strenuous jobs. They also adopt a
distributional approach with the idea that vulnerability can have a different effect
on income depending on the worker’s relative position in the income distribution.
Their results show that a vulnerability-compensating mechanism is mainly
observed in the informal sector, and in the upper tail of the earnings distribution.
Employment vulnerability is not compensated for the poorest workers in the
private sector. They argue that long job queues and weak institutional protection
of workers may have reduced bargaining power in the formal sector.
The existence of compensating mechanisms—or lack thereof—at different
points of the earnings distribution can be due to bargaining power differences
and labour market imbalances. For instance, workers in the upper tail of the
earnings distribution may have greater bargaining power to demand and secure
higher compensation for the stress that their jobs entail. The employer’s capacity
to provide financial compensation for undesirable working conditions might also
differ depending on the type of imbalances found in certain market segments. For
example, in segments where labour supply far outstrips demand, employers are
reluctant to compensate workers for adverse working conditions. Like in
Fernández and Nordman (2009), this justifies looking at the existence of com-
pensating mechanisms across the wage distribution, and not only at the mean.
We use the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprise data in which the employee
survey has information on contract type, duration of work, provision of a range of
workplace benefits, and working conditions. Based on this, we construct indica-
tors of job vulnerability and working conditions. We first present descriptive
statistics on working conditions and job quality for three rounds of data—2011,
2013, 2015—as well as by the formality status of the enterprise. Multivariate
regression analyses at the employee level explore the existence of compensating
wage differentials. We estimate unconditional quantile regressions at the
employee level to discern whether the wage differential attributable to working
conditions changes along the conditional wage distribution when we consider
other wage shifters. One possible mechanism that can shift workers’ bargaining
power within the firm is the channel through which they were hired: formally or
informally through social networks (Berardi 2013). Hence, we also investigate
whether the hiring channel of the workers may differentially affect the relation-
ship between working conditions and wages. Finally, we estimate a mean decom-
position of wage gaps based on working conditions. This splits the wage gap
between workers in poor working conditions and workers in non-poor working
conditions into two parts: the first is due to differences in socioeconomic charac-
teristics between workers, and the second part is attributable to different valu-
ations of the workers’ characteristics in different jobs (the differences in returns to
characteristics).
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 provides a background on the
Vietnamese context. In Section 10.3 we describe the data and methodology, and
report descriptive statistics. Section 10.4 presents results from regressions and
decomposition analyses. In Section 10.5, we provide concluding comments.
10.2 Background
Analysing the wage consequences of employment vulnerability and working
conditions in Vietnam is particularly interesting since the country has experienced
spectacular social, economic, and political changes in the recent period. On the
labour market front, there are two striking features in recent years. First, the
increasing rate of wage and non-agricultural employment; and second, a sharp rise
in real wages and labour incomes (Cling et al. 2010). Wage dynamics have been
higher for the semi-skilled and highly skilled workers than for unskilled workers.
Although the formal sector of the economy has grown progressively, informal
employment, especially that in SMEs, represents an important part of the Viet-
namese labour market. Despite this, little is known about employment risks and
working conditions that workers in SMEs face, and that is the gap this chapter
intends to fill.
We now turn to a description of the landscape in Vietnam with respect to
laws on working conditions, social insurance as well as on occupational safety
and health. The Labour Code of 2012 is currently operational in Vietnam. As
compared to the Labour Code of 1994 which it superseded, it has introduced
significant changes that are potentially beneficial from the employees’ perspec-
tive. For instance, it stipulates that the employer and the employee are required
to sign a contract before the start of employment to ensure that employers
honour their statutory obligations towards employees. The new Labour Code
also requires a 15-day termination notice period to be served to employees on
definite-term contracts of 12–36 months duration. The Code also dictates limits
on working hours as well as overtime work. The first Law on Social Insurance
was introduced in 2006 with the aim of improving social protection. The law
applies to employees who work under a definite-term labour contract or a
contract exceeding three months. Compulsory social insurance, which both
employers and employees are obliged to join, includes sickness leave, maternity
leave, employment injury and occupational and disease benefit, old-age benefit,
and survivors’ benefit. It also stipulates unemployment insurance that came into
effect in 2009. The 2015 Law on Occupational Safety and Health applies to both
contract and non-contract workers in all enterprises. The Law states that
employers are obliged to provide training in matters related to occupational
safety and health. They are also to compensate workers in case of occupational
accidents or disease. Workers have the right to demand and work in safe
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working environments where they are provided information on hazardous
factors as well as on preventive measures.
Despite the existence of a comprehensive social protection that is legally
mandated, compliance and implementation remain a policy challenge. In a
2015–16 survey of 257 garment factories, ILO (2015) found that while there has
been improvement over time, non-compliance with the above-mentioned laws
remains high. For example, 40 per cent of factories were underpaying for overtime
work and 62 per cent of employers failed to specify all terms and conditions of
employment in the contract. Furthermore, in around 40 per cent of factories,
inadequate fire detection and alarm systems were observed. Trifković (2017)
examines the effect of internationally recognized management standards on firm
working conditions in Vietnam to find that firms that have adopted standards are
also more likely to offer formal contracts to their employees, although there is no
systematic effect on financial benefits such as sick leave, unemployment insurance,
accident insurance, etc.
10.3 Data and Methodology
10.3.1 Data
We rely on the 2011, 2013, and 2015 waves of the Vietnam Small and Medium
Enterprises data, that is collected jointly by Central Institute for Economic
Management (CIEM) of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) of
Vietnam, the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MoLISA) of Vietnam, the Devel-
opment Economics Research Group (DERG) at the University of Copenhagen,
and UNU-WIDER, Helsinki.
The enterprise-level surveys, administered to the owners or managers, are
longitudinal in nature and have been conducted biennially since 2005. In about
a quarter of randomly selected enterprises that are part of the enterprise surveys, a
random subset of employees is interviewed for the employee survey. However, it
should be noted that it is not possible to construct a panel dataset at the level of the
employee. For this chapter, we primarily use data from the ‘employee module’.
Through this, we have access to variables such as wages earned by these employ-
ees, their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, marital
status, educational attainment, prior experience (in years), tenure in the current
enterprise (in years), and occupation.⁵ In addition, the survey asks questions
⁵ Our analysis is limited to employees who report earning a monthly wage. This is about 88 per cent
of the sample. Due to concern about quality of wage data where workers report being paid per hour, per
day, and per week, we do not include those observations in our analysis.
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related to availability and type of contract, provision of social security benefits and
occupational safety and health and training, and areas in which employees
consider working conditions to be most adversely affected.
Our main variables of interest are those capturing vulnerable terms of employ-
ment and working conditions. To that end, we create a binary variable for
informal contract (takes value 1 if there is no formal written contract, 0 otherwise).
We construct a variable called financial benefits that sums up whether the follow-
ing nine financial benefits are provided: sick leave, maternity leave, retirement pay,
severance pay, survival benefit, health insurance, annual paid leave, unemploy-
ment insurance, and compensation for accidents/illness.⁶ For working conditions,
we create a binary variable that takes value 1 if the employee reports receiving no
occupational safety and health (OSH) training. We also create binary variables
that take the value 1 if the employee responds in the affirmative to each of the
following working conditions being adversely affected, 0 otherwise: air quality, fire
hazards, heat, lighting, waste disposal, and water pollution. We create an additive
index that sums up the binary variables corresponding to the unfavourable
working conditions and OSH training. All employees facing higher than the
median number of adverse working conditions are assigned a value 1 indicating
poor working conditions, 0 otherwise.⁷
10.3.2 Methodology
We begin with estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the follow-
ing type where i represents the employee and j represents the fir
Yij ¼ β0 þ β1 Informal Contracti þ β2 Financial Benefitsi
þ β3 Poor Working Conditionsi þ Xiαþ δj þ εi;
ð10:1Þ
Where Y is the log of real hourly wages of employee i in firm j. In addition to
variables capturing vulnerable employment (Informal Contract, Financial Bene-
fits) and working conditions (Poor Working Conditions), we include a vector X of
dimension K, controlling for employee characteristics such as gender (takes value
1 if female, 0 if male), marital status (takes value 1 if married; 0 otherwise), years of
experience prior to joining the firm and its quadratic term, tenure in the current
firm and its quadratic term (in years), dummy variables for highest level of
⁶ The question on maternity leave is answered by male and female employees.
⁷ We considered using principal components analysis to reduce the dimensionality of the vector of
working conditions. However, due to the low pair-wise correlations, five factors appeared to explain a
large part of the variance (i.e., eigenvalues exceeding 1). As this was not helpful, we resorted to creating
a binary variable based on an underlying additive index. The median number of adverse working
conditions is 3 (for the pooled sample as well as for individual years).
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educational attainment such as secondary, high school, vocational, and college
(with no education or primary being the omitted category) as well as dummy
variables for occupation such as manager, professional worker, office worker,
sales worker, and service worker (with production worker being the omitted
category). We include firm-fixed effects ðδjÞ that control for all time-invariant
firm-level characteristics. As we pool the survey years in the regression analyses,
we finally include dummies for survey years. To account for correlation in the
error terms between employees in the same firm, we cluster standard errors at
the firm level.
In the estimates, varying effects of working conditions and terms of employ-
ment on wages may result from worker selection by firms and vice versa. For
example, firms with poor working conditions could only select workers that accept
lower pay and are not inclined to bargain over wages. It may also be that some
observed firms with unsavoury work environments select or attract workers that
are more motivated or less reluctant to working in unfavourable situations.
Moreover, firms may decide to compensate for the bad working conditions of
the employees they seek to retain, i.e., those with greater unobserved productivity.
All these selectivity effects may then affect estimates of working conditions and
terms of employment in individual wage equations if one does not control for firm
and worker matching processes. Since it is impossible to fully control for these
phenomena with our data, we have little choice but to assume that selectivity and
matching effects are well accounted for by the inclusion of workers’ and firms’
controls, in particular the firm-fixed effects, and that residual effects may be
overlooked. However, due to the rigidity of the Vietnamese formal labour market
(with sluggish administrative procedures, and little public information on jobs
and workers), it is plausible that selection effects are less intensive than in
developed countries in general.
Furthermore, as the OLS regressions only capture the average relationship
between working conditions and hourly wages, we also conduct a distributional
analysis by estimating unconditional quantile regressions (UQR) à la Firpo et al.
(2009). This allows us to comment on how employment vulnerability and poor
working conditions matter at different points of the wage distribution. The main
advantage of this method over conditional quantile regressions is that the esti-
mated marginal effects do not depend on the set of explanatory variables in the
model. UQR is based on extending the concept of Influence Function to what has
been termed the Recentered Influence Function (RIF). The RIF for the quantile θ
of log wage (Y) is given by:
RIFðY ;QθÞ ¼ Qθ þ ½Y  dθ=fYðQθÞ; ð10:2Þ
where fYðQθÞ is the density distribution function of Y at Qθ and dθ is a binary
variable taking value 1 if Y  Qθ and 0 otherwise.
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After recalculating the variables of interest, the following is estimated by OLS:
RIFðY ;QθÞ ¼ XβUQR þ ε: ð10:3Þ
Finally, we conduct wage decompositions that allow us to discern how much of the
‘working conditions wage gap’may be due to differences in workers’ characteristics
across jobs, and howmuch of it is due to the price themarket pays for these workers’
attributes in these different jobs (i.e., the differences in returns to characteristics).
The most common approach for identifying sources of wage gaps is the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). The issue with these traditional
approaches is how to determine the reference wage structure. This choice poses the
so-called index number problem, given that either the poor working conditions
group or the non-poor working conditions group structure can be used as the
reference benchmark. While there is a priori no preferable alternative, the decom-
position can be quite sensitive to the selection made. The literature has proposed
different weighting schemes to deal with this index problem.
In this chapter, we rely on the general decomposition proposed by Neumark
(1988). This decomposition can be reduced to Oaxaca-Blinder’s two special cases
if it is assumed that the poor working conditions group structure is the benchmark
(the non-poor working conditions group would be underpaid), or if it is assumed
that the benchmark is that of the non-poor working conditions group (hence the
poor working conditions group would be overpaid). This benchmark is then
estimated using the weighted average of the wage structures of these two groups
using the pooled sample. Neumark’s approach usually provides estimates that lie
between the two opposing assumptions of the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions.
This is also true in these data.
10.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 10.1, we present summary statistics for each of the three survey years for
the variables included in this study. We first discuss the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of the study sample. Approximately 40 per cent of the
employees are female, and over three-quarters are married. On average across the
three years, 4–5 per cent are uneducated, 30–32 per cent have completed second-
ary education, and 21–24 per cent reached a college or higher degree level. The
share of employees reporting high-school education declined from 41 per cent in
2011 to 29 per cent in 2015. This was accompanied by an increase in those with
vocational education from 3 per cent in 2011 to 9–10 per cent in 2013 and 2015.
The average years of experience prior to joining the firm range between 6 and 7
years, and most employees have been at the current firm for around 6 years. In
terms of occupational structure, 60 per cent of employees are in the production
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Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics
2011 2013 2015
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Employment and working conditions
Informal contract 0.446 0.409 0.382
(0.497) (0.492) (0.486)
Financial benefits 3.418 4.115 4.076
(3.585) (3.722) (3.503)
No occupational safety and health training 0.445 0.569 0.682
(0.497) (0.495) (0.466)
Problem: air quality 0.393 0.540 0.461
(0.489) (0.499) (0.499)
Problem: fire hazard 0.339 0.471 0.411
(0.474) (0.499) (0.492)
Problem: heat 0.582 0.633 0.617
(0.494) (0.482) (0.486)
Problem: lighting 0.221 0.278 0.293
(0.415) (0.448) (0.456)
Problem: noise 0.452 0.505 0.461
(0.498) (0.500) (0.499)
Problem: waste disposal 0.121 0.155 0.130
(0.327) (0.362) (0.336)
Problem: water pollution 0.0919 0.0499 0.0439
(0.289) (0.218) (0.205)
Poor working conditions 0.300 0.448 0.486
(0.459) (0.498) (0.500)
Employee characteristics
Female 0.397 0.408 0.404
(0.490) (0.492) (0.491)
Married 0.796 0.838 0.785
(0.403) (0.368) (0.411)
No education/primary 0.0483 0.0456 0.0355
(0.215) (0.209) (0.185)
Secondary education 0.298 0.309 0.329
(0.458) (0.462) (0.470)
High school education 0.411 0.328 0.295
(0.492) (0.470) (0.456)
Vocational education 0.0306 0.104 0.0944
(0.172) (0.306) (0.293)
College education 0.212 0.214 0.246
(0.409) (0.410) (0.431)
Prior experience 6.723 6.388 6.811
(6.716) (6.190) (6.195)
Tenure 5.583 6.005 6.889
(4.595) (4.982) (5.329)
Manager 0.0836 0.103 0.0738
(0.277) (0.304) (0.262)
Professional worker 0.101 0.111 0.0953
(0.302) (0.314) (0.294)
Office worker 0.0860 0.0987 0.107
(0.281) (0.298) (0.310)
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worker category, with managers, professional workers, office workers, and sales
workers each making up about 7–11 per cent of the sample. Service workers are
about 3–4 per cent of the sample.
In terms of employment and working conditions, we find that between 2011
and 2015 there has been a significant drop in the share of employees with an
informal contract from approximately 45 per cent to 38 per cent (two-sided test of
proportions, p-value = 0.004), and a significant increase in the number of financial
benefits offered by employers (two-tailed t-test, p-value < 0.001). There is also
significant increase in the share of employees reporting overall poor working
conditions (i.e., those facing higher than the median number of adverse working
conditions) from 30 per cent in 2011 to 49 per cent in 2015 (two-sided test of
proportions, p-value < 0.001). In terms of individual components of working
conditions, we observe that, while in 2011 about 45 per cent of employees reported
receiving no OSH training at the workplace, this jumped to over two-thirds in
2015. There was also an increase in the share of employees reporting fire hazard,
heat problems, lighting, and poor air quality. On the other hand, there was a
decline in water pollution reported as a problem. There were no meaningful
changes in problems reported regarding noise and waste disposal.
In Table 10.2, we shed light on variation in employment terms and working
conditions based on the formality or registration status of the firm. On the one
hand, as per the compensating wage differential theory, informal firms might
compensate workers for not being covered by social security and for facing
generally poorer working conditions. On the other hand, according to efficiency
wage theory, formal firms may voluntarily pay higher wages to attract high quality
workers, to improve worker retention, and to elicit higher effort levels. Firms
are defined as being formal if they have an Enterprise Code Number (ECN) or if
they have a Business Registration Certificate (BRC) and a tax code. The share
of workers reporting informal contracts is significantly lower in the formally
registered firms, as expected (two-sided test of proportions, p-value < 0.001).
Sales worker 0.0777 0.0727 0.0720
(0.268) (0.260) (0.259)
Service worker 0.0377 0.0456 0.0346
(0.191) (0.209) (0.183)
Production worker 0.614 0.569 0.617
(0.487) (0.495) (0.486)
Observations 849 922 1070
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations in parentheses for each year of data included
in the study. The sample is limited to employees who report earning a monthly wage. The minimum
and maximum values for the financial benefits variable are 0 and 9 respectively. Poor working
conditions takes a value 1 if the sum of the adverse working conditions is higher than the pooled
sample median, 0 otherwise.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Survey for 2011–15.
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On average, less than one financial benefit is provided in unregistered firms
as compared to approximately four benefits in registered firms (two-tailed t-test,
p-value < 0.001). There is about a 7-percentage point gap between the shares
of workers in formal and informal firms reporting poor working conditions, and
this just fails to reach significance at conventional levels (two-sided test of
proportions, p-value = 0.106). Looking at individual components, 57 per cent of
workers in registered firms report no OSH training as compared to 65 per cent in
unregistered firms (two-sided test of proportions, p-value = 0.05). Significantly
higher shares of employees in the formal firms report problems related to fire
hazards, heat, light, and waste (two-sided test of proportions, all p-values < 0.1).
This suggests that poor conditions are not specific to informal firms only, as
unfavourable work environments seem to be prevalent in formal sector enter-
prises as well.
Table 10.2 Employment and working conditions: formal and informal firms
Informal firms Formalfirms
Informal contract 0.916 0.381
(0.279) (0.486)
Financial benefits 0.487 4.087
(1.305) (3.605)
No occupational safety and health training 0.649 0.571
(0.479) (0.495)
Problem: air quality 0.519 0.463
(0.501) (0.499)
Problem: fire hazard 0.331 0.413
(0.472) (0.493)
Problem: heat 0.513 0.617
(0.501) (0.486)
Problem: lighting 0.182 0.272
(0.387) (0.445)
Problem: noise 0.448 0.474
(0.499) (0.499)
Problem: waste disposal 0.0909 0.138
(0.288) (0.345)
Problem: water pollution 0.0325 0.0618
(0.178) (0.241)
Poor working conditions 0.481 0.415
(0.501) (0.493)
Observations 154 2687
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations in parentheses. The sample is limited to
employees who report earning a monthly wage. The minimum and maximum values for the financial
benefits variable are 0 and 9 respectively. Poor working conditions takes a value 1 if the sum of the
adverse working conditions is higher than the sample median, 0 otherwise. Firms are defined as being
formal if they have an Enterprise Code Number (ECN) or if they have a Business Registration
Certificate (BRC) and a tax code.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Survey for 2011–15.
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10.4 Results
10.4.1 Regression Analyses
In Table 10.3, we present results from an OLS regression wherein the outcome
variable is the log of real hourly wages. In Column 1, we only include worker
characteristics such as gender, marital status, educational attainment dummies,
experience, and tenure and their respective quadratic terms, occupation, province,
and survey year dummies. In line with existing literature, we find that female
employees earn 10 per cent less than male employees, and this result is robust to
alternative specifications in columns 2 and 3. In accordance with previous studies
that have estimated wage returns to education in Vietnam (Liu 2006; Pham and
Reilly 2007; Nguyen et al. 2013; Oostendorp and Quang 2013), we find returns
to education to be increasing with the level of education attained. In column 2,
we proceed to adding the right-hand side variables measuring employment terms
and working conditions, and we add each as a separate variable. We find some
evidence that those reporting poor air quality earn higher wages, and those report-
ing poor lighting, earn lower wages (although both these coefficients are weakly
significant at the 10 per cent level). Note, however, that jointly these variables are
statistically significant (F-statistic = 1.82; p-value = 0.05). In column 3, we use the
dummy for poor working conditions instead of the separate variables, and from this
point on, this remains our preferred measure. We indeed believe that what would
matter the most in order to observe wage compensations for poor working condi-
tions (i.e., when the worker is able to bargain for such compensation) is the
cumulative nature of adverse job conditions, rather than one specific unfavourable
situation on the job. We find however that those facing poor working conditions
earn about 3.7 per cent lower hourly wages, indicating that compensating differ-
entials are not at work here. Finally, in column 4, we add the firm-fixed effects.
Upon adding these, we find that the association between wages and working
conditions is negative but ceases to be significant. This indicates the existence of
working condition-based sorting across firms such that poor working condition
jobs are mostly found in firms that tend to also offer low wages.
In Table 10.4, we estimate unconditional quantile regressions—with the full
specification of right-hand side variables as in column 4 of Table 10.3—at the
following points of the wage distribution: 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th. We find
that the number of financial benefits is positively correlated with wages at the
25th percentile of the wage distribution. On the other hand, those facing poor
working conditions earn lower wages at the median and higher points of the
distribution, but the coefficients are significant at the 75th and 90th percentiles
only. Furthermore, throughout the distribution, those with informal contracts
earn lower wages but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Our results on
financial benefits and poor working conditions seem to suggest that workers at the
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Table 10.3 Mean wage regressions (pooled sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.109*** 0.042*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
Married 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.028
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Secondary education 0.051 0.043 0.040 0.094*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.054)
High school education 0.094*** 0.078** 0.073** 0.111**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.049)
Vocational education 0.128*** 0.107** 0.100** 0.131**
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.062)
College education 0.239*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.208***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.057)
Prior experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Prior experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.010* 0.009* 0.009* 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Informal contract 0.015 0.016 0.024
(0.027) (0.027) (0.042)
Financial benefits 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
No OSH training 0.037
(0.024)
Problem: air quality 0.030*
(0.018)








Problem: waste disposal 0.008
(0.026)
Problem: water pollution 0.066
(0.042)
Poor working conditions 0.037* 0.033
(0.022) (0.033)
Observations 2847 2841 2841 2841
R² 0.237 0.247 0.242 0.600
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from an OLS regression on the pooled sample for 2011, 2013
and 2015. The dependent variable is log of real hourly wage. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the firm level. The sample is limited to employees who report earning a monthly wage. All regressions
include year and occupation dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Survey for 2011–15.
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bottom of the wage distribution are able to obtain some premium for unfavour-
able work conditions while for those at the higher wage percentiles, lower financial
benefits and poor working conditions are also detrimental to wages. In terms of
other controls included in the regression, we find that women are disadvantaged
across the wage distribution and the gender wage gap is larger at higher percent-
iles. This phenomenon, known as the ‘glass ceiling’ effect, is often obtained in
emerging and developing countries, including using matched worker-firm data
(Chi and Li 2008; Nordman and Wolff 2009; Cardoso et al. 2016). There are
generally positive and significant returns to college education, except at the 10th
and 90th percentiles, while the reverse is observed for high school education that is
positively and significantly valued from the 10th to the median percentiles.
Table 10.4 Unconditional quantile regressions (with firm fixed effects)
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Female 0.009 0.044** 0.043** 0.073*** 0.130***
(0.035) (0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.038)
Married 0.122** 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.048
(0.051) (0.024) (0.022) (0.029) (0.038)
Secondary education 0.121 0.065 0.083* 0.002 0.008
(0.131) (0.055) (0.046) (0.061) (0.072)
High school education 0.144 0.088 0.101** 0.010 0.028
(0.134) (0.056) (0.047) (0.060) (0.071)
Vocational education 0.111 0.106* 0.122** 0.065 0.060
(0.146) (0.063) (0.054) (0.071) (0.092)
College education 0.131 0.123** 0.207*** 0.147** 0.131
(0.143) (0.061) (0.055) (0.071) (0.092)
Prior experience 0.000 0.004 0.007** 0.010* 0.005
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Prior experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.019** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.010* 0.009
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Tenure squared 0.001** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Informal contract 0.085 0.044 0.028 0.045 0.010
(0.064) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.063)
Financial benefits 0.013 0.010* 0.008 0.002 0.009
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Poor working conditions 0.011 0.017 0.003 0.092*** 0.077*
(0.044) (0.022) (0.021) (0.032) (0.042)
Observations 2841 2841 2841 2841 2841
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from unconditional quantile regressions. Dependent variable
is log of real hourly wage. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The sample is limited to employees who report earning
a monthly wage. All regressions include firm fixed effects, year dummies and occupation dummies.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Survey for 2011–15.
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In Table 10.5, we explore the avenue of the channel through which the worker
was hired, with the idea that the hiring channel may differentially affect the
relationship between working conditions and wages. We do this by creating two
variables. The first is whether the employee was hired through formal channels: a
variable formal hire takes a value 1 if the job was obtained through an employment
agency, door to door visits, responding to job advertisements, and 0 otherwise.
The second is whether the worker got the job through a connection to the owner/
Table 10.5 Mean wage regressions, by hiring channels
(1) (2)
Informal contract 0.018 0.164**
(0.047) (0.064)
Financial benefits 0.008 0.007
(0.008) (0.011)




Formal hire*Informal contract 0.181**
(0.073)
Formal hire*Financial benefits 0.014
(0.010)






Manager tie*Informal contract 0.164**
(0.080)
Manager tie*Financial benefits 0.019
(0.012)
Manager tie*Poor working conditions 0.060
(0.059)
Worker tie*Informal contract 0.192**
(0.078)
Worker tie*Financial benefits 0.012
(0.010)




Notes: This table reports marginal effects fromOLS regressions. Dependent variable is log of real hourly
wage. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
sample is limited to employees who report earning a monthly wage. All regressions include worker
characteristics (gender, marital status, education dummies, experience and tenure), firm fixed effects,
year dummies and occupation dummies.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Survey for 2011–15.
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manager or another worker within the firm. Using the formulation of Larsen et al.
(2011), we create a variable calledmanager tie that takes a value 1 if the worker got
a job through the owner/manager whom they are related to or friends with, and 0
otherwise. Similarly, we create worker tie that takes a value 1 if the worker got a job
through a relative, friend, or acquaintance who was also an employee at the firm,
and 0 otherwise. Pooling data from the three survey rounds, we find that 27 per
cent of employees found the job through a manager tie and 45 per cent through a
worker tie.
In Column 1 of Table 10.5, we interact formal hire with the vector of employ-
ment terms and poor working conditions. We find that formally hired employees
with an informal contract earn less than informally hired employees. In column 2,
we interact manager tie and worker tie with working conditions variables. Upon
doing so, we find that those employed based on their connection to the manager as
well to a worker earn more on an informal contract than those without such ties.
This is consistent with column 1 wherein formally hired workers fared worse with
an informal contract. This is in contrast to the findings of Larsen et al. (2011) who
find that the manager tie is more important than the worker tie in wage deter-
mination. Here, we observe that both worker and manager ties are able to possibly
provide workers with some additional wage bargaining power when they are
informally hired.
10.4.2 Decomposition Analyses
Up till now, we relied on the potentially restrictive assumption that the returns to
covariates are the same in ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ working conditions jobs since we
estimated wage equations on samples of workers working in both types of jobs.
We now relax this assumption and observe the determinants of wages across jobs
defined by the dummy for poor working conditions. Using a wage decomposition
allows us to discern how much of the mean ‘working conditions wage gap’may be
due to differences in workers’ characteristics across jobs, and how much of it is
due to the price the market pays for workers’ attributes in these different jobs. We
use the decomposition proposed by Neumark (1988). The decompositions are
performed on the pooled years’ sample, and also on year-wise samples. We rely on
nominal wages instead of real wages when we turn to the three specific years.
Before discussing the decompositions, we describe the distribution of workers
across the two types of jobs. In the four panels of Figure 10.1, we present kernel
density graphs of log hourly wages across workers facing ‘poor’ or ‘non-poor’
working conditions (WC) for the pooled sample, and then for each year separ-
ately. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of distributions cannot reject the
null for the 2011 sample (p-value = 0.8) but for the pooled sample and for years
2013 and 2015, the density functions are not equal (Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests
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with p-values = 0.003, 0.093, and 0.002, in the pooled sample, 2013 and 2015
respectively). This justifies looking at yearly decompositions.
The results of the decompositions for 2013 and 2015 are reported in Table 10.6.
The raw wage differential is negligible in the pooled sample, and insignificantly
different from zero in 2011. There is then virtually nothing to be decomposed in
these two samples. The raw differentials are in contrast somewhat sizable and
significant in 2013 and 2015, respectively 6.1 and 7.6 per cent, in favour of non-
poor WC job workers. For these two years, we then proceed with decomposing the
raw gaps using as explanatory variables the employees’ characteristics and terms
of employment, and then we add the firm-fixed effects.
Interestingly, while the explained share of the gap (the differences in workers’
characteristics and terms of employment) is dominant in 2013 (65 per cent), this
explained share is much smaller in 2015 (40 per cent). We then conclude that
most (if not all) of the increase in the WC wage gap between 2013 and 2015 (from
6.1 to 7.6 per cent) might be attributed to unobserved characteristics of the
workers and/or of their jobs. Adding the firm-fixed effects to the decompositions
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Figure 10.1 Density of log hourly wages across workers facing ‘poor’ or ‘non-poor’
working conditions
Notes: Poor working conditions takes a value 1 if the sum of the adverse working conditions is higher
than the pooled or yearly sample median, 0 otherwise. For year-specific graphs, we use log of nominal
hourly wages and for the pooled years graph, we use the log of real hourly wages.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Survey for 2011–15.
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60 per cent to 16.6 per cent, leading us to explain over 80 per cent of the WC wage
gap. By contrast, adding firm-fixed effects does not increase the explained com-
ponent of the gap in 2013, in fact it leads to a marginal drop in the explained share.
This further reveals that most of the heterogeneity that was potentially increasing
the WC gap between 2013 and 2015 was that of the firms, and much less that of
the workers, perhaps reflecting changing firm wage policies between the two years.
10.5 Concluding Comments
In this chapter, our objective was to examine the existence of compensating wage
differentials for workers in vulnerable jobs and those facing undesirable working
conditions in SMEs in Vietnam. Descriptive statistics first show that there is some
heterogeneity in terms of the prevalence of vulnerable and unfavourable working
conditions across the survey years. We find a decline over time in the share of
employees with an informal contract, and an increase in the number of financial
benefits offered by employers. There is also significant increase in the share of
Table 10.6 Neumark decompositions of log hourly wage gaps by working conditions
(WC) (difference between ‘poor’ WC and ‘non-poor’ WC)













0.021 0.040 34.4 65.6
Adding firm fixed
effects





0.046 0.031 59.8 40.2
Adding firm-fixed
effects
0.013 0.064 16.6 83.4
Notes: Year-wise Neumark decompositions stem from log hourly nominal wage equations shown in
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 but without the poor working condition dummy. The sample is limited to
employees who report earning a monthly wage. All regressions include employee characteristics
(gender, marital status, education level, experience and tenure), year dummies, and occupation
dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Survey for 2011–15.
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employees reporting overall poor working conditions. Looking at the formality
divide at the firm level, an interesting finding is that adverse work environments
seem to be largely widespread in both formal and informal enterprises.
Wage regressions show that there are no clear compensating mechanisms for
poor working conditions in terms of wages in these Vietnamese SMEs, thus
rejecting the compensating differentials theory. In fact, evidence from quantile
regressions shows that employees above median wage levels are not compensated
for unfavourable working conditions and even suffer a wage penalty. This result of
varying effects across the wage distribution appears puzzling at first sight. Indeed,
one may expect to observe the reverse pattern assuming that workers at the upper
tail of the wage distribution are usually better positioned than their low-wage
counterparts to negotiate for higher wages when their work environment is
unfavourable. But the firm’s ability to compensate the worker for bearing poor
working conditions also depends on the degree of competition in the market for
labour (Fernández and Nordman 2009). If labour supply outstrips demand, which
might only be the case in some parts of the pay ladder, the employer may not need
to pay a premium for exposure to bad working conditions. This is one of the
interpretations we could make here: highly qualified workers willing to enter the
labour market may in fact be largely queuing for a formal sector job, perhaps
creating a mismatch between qualifications and offered jobs if labour demand is
weak and decreasing reservation wages of high ability workers. In such cases, poor
working conditions jobs at the higher ends of the formal sector would largely
correspond to poorly paid jobs, all else being equal. Finally, another interpretation
of the absence of penalty at the bottom of the wage distribution relies on the
existence of some wage rigidity in the lower formal labour market segment. There,
subsistence wages would prevent employers from paying poorly even in unfavour-
able work environment compared to jobs without such attributes. The new Labour
Code and Trade Union law of 2012–13, being part of the ongoing efforts in
Vietnam to modernize labour market governance in line with international
standards, may have provided a better environment for workers to negotiate
their own terms and conditions of employment through collective bargaining
(ILO 2015).
Upon estimating mean decompositions of wage gaps based on working condi-
tions, we find that the explained share of the gap is dominant in 2013 (65 per cent)
and is much weaker in 2015 (40 per cent). Once firm-fixed effects are added in
these decompositions, due to the matched worker-firm structure of the data, the
working conditions wage gap is almost entirely explained by the conjunction of
worker, job and firm characteristics in 2015 (83 per cent), in contrast to the
previous survey year of 2013 where the explained share remained almost constant
upon adding firm controls (63 per cent). Hence, we conclude that most of the
increase in the working conditions wage gap between 2013 and 2015 is on account
of increased unobserved firm heterogeneity in 2015. This then opens the door for
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additional interpretations, possibly changes over time in firm wage policies,
perhaps due to the implementation of the new Labour Code in 2013. This chapter
does not consider these aspects, but this is an avenue for further research.
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In developed economies, trade unions are generally associated with a positive
work environment, including higher wages, increased benefits, reduced wage
negotiation costs, and lower wage inequality and worker turnover (Freeman
1980; Standing 1992). In developing and transition countries characterized by
different employment structures, including the presence of large informal and
unorganized sectors, evidence remains more scarce.¹ However, precisely in such
contexts of low wage levels, inadequate institutional support, and limited provi-
sion of public sector goods and services, trade unions represent a potentially
important collective ‘voice’ for the promotion of worker benefits and welfare.
In the case of Vietnam, the transition to a market economy has, along with a
growing private sector and the parallel equitization of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), led to the formation of new employment relationships and bases for the
establishment of local trade unions. Moreover, in recent years, several changes
have been made to the regulatory framework, including the Labour Code and the
Trade Union Law, which together provide the impetus for formalizing and
strengthening the role of unions. Yet the effectiveness of workplace trade unions
remains questionable due partly to their marginal independence, employer dom-
inance, and the generally low incidence of collective agreements.
It is within this context that the current chapter analyses whether trade unions
are associated with higher wage outcomes, using firm-level survey data on small
and medium-sized (non-state) manufacturing firms in Vietnam over 2013–15
(Rand et al. 2014). The firm panel has been matched with employee data from a
subsample of workers in each year. The survey covers micro-, small, and medium-
sized firms, and I use the World Bank’s classification in terms of the number of
employees. One key advantage of using matched employer–employee data is that
¹ See Eaton et al. (2017) and Schurman and Eaton (2012) for reviews of the growing literature on
trade unions and worker organizing in the informal economy.
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it allows for disentangling worker from firm heterogeneity by controlling for firm
and worker characteristics which could affect both union status and wage out-
comes. Second, in being able to construct a balanced panel of workers some of
whom change union status over time, I am able to control for determining factors
and selected observed time-varying factors that may simultaneously influence the
decision to unionize and subsequent wage outcomes. Third, the availability of
numerous firm-level variables allows for identifying valid instruments so as to
capture time-varying unobserved characteristics which, if left unaccounted for,
could bias the results. In line with similar studies, the analysis shows a union
member wage premium of around 9–22 per cent, depending on the econometric
approach. An earlier version of this study undertakes some further robustness
checks revealing considerable variation along the conditional wage distribution,
with the union wage differential being substantially higher for the top quantiles
(Torm 2018). This in turn calls into question the ability of unions to promote the
rights and interests of all workers and their accountability for doing so. Moreover,
Torm (2018) shows that the union-related wage gain is individual, arising directly
from being a union member, rather than a spill-over effect from the presence of
unions.
In Section 11.2 I provide a selective overview of the existing literature and
theoretical background. Section 11.3 discusses the Vietnamese context, while
Section 11.4 describes the data, the methodology and the variables included in
the empirical analysis. Section 11.5 presents the main results and Section 11.6
concludes.
11.2 Literature and Theory
Unions provide workers with a mechanism through which to shape their employ-
ment relationship and working environment, by, for instance, improving work-
place communication, increasing wages and benefits, and reducing labour
turnover (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Thus, through serving as an agent for a
firm’s employees, a union can take on many different roles and be associated with
numerous outcomes, as evidenced by the vast number of trade union studies,
covering mostly the US, the UK, and other OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development) countries.² The literature generally portrays
unions as operating along at least three dimensions: their wage-making practices;
their participatory role in terms of negotiating and administering labour rules
related to hiring, training, promoting, and laying off workers; and their activities
as a pressure group on government (Pencavel 2005). Rather than attempting to
² See Betcherman (2012) for a review of the literature on labour market institutions in general.
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cover the enormous trade union literature as a whole, in this section I address the
wage dimension, which is the focus of this chapter, by providing a brief theoretical
discussion followed by a concise summary of the most relevant studies.
11.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
From a theoretical perspective, the trade union wage gap arises from trade unions
introducing a wedge between the reservation wage of the worker and the value of a
job, or in other words between labour supply and demand.³ The ability of the
union to achieve a wage rate that is higher than the non-union level depends on
various factors, including the power of the union to act as a monopolist in the
supply of labour, and the existence of economic rent or surplus in the product
market. In a bargaining model where all union members have the same prefer-
ences, wages will be higher the stronger the bargaining power of unions, and the
lower the responsiveness of labour demand (and profits) to wages. These relations
in turn depend on the competitiveness of the product market. In a perfectly
competitive market the union-imposed wedge is reduced, since a firm facing an
infinite elasticity of demand is unable to pass any union wage differential on to
prices. Thus, unions might be able to capture quasi-rents from capital in the short
run, but in the long run the firm would leave the market in search of a higher
return on capital, or be forced out by non-union firms with lower costs. In
addition to the economic factors, the extent of the union wage gap also depends
on the degree of coordination and centralization of wage determination activities
and the competitiveness of the labour market (Boeri and van Ours 2008).
In addition to the direct individual union wage premium, spill-over effects to
non-union members may occur in the presence of industry-level collective agree-
ments, and in most OECD countries union coverage (the share of workers covered
by a collective agreement) exceeds union density (union members as a percentage
of the workforce). Since collective agreements ensure that non-members, whether
firms or workers, are covered by the union-negotiated wage rate, union coverage is
often considered a more accurate measure of the bargaining power of unions than
density. The latter has been declining in many OECD countries since the 1980s,
and the option to free-ride on union-provided services and benefits is cited as one
of the reasons for this (Booth and Chatterji 1995; Boeri and van Ours 2008). In
the absence of extension rules, the wages of non-union workers are still likely to be
affected by the presence of unions—for instance through the ‘threat effect’ of
unionism, whereby non-union employers will pay wages that are comparable to
³ Booth and Chatterji (1995) and Boeri and van Ours (2008) provide comprehensive reviews of
trade union theory. See Lewis (1963, 1986) for earlier work on the union-related wage effect.
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those of unionized workers (Pencavel 2005). Alternatively, in the absence of such a
threat effect (but in the presence of unions), workers disemployed from union
firms due to a wage push will seek employment in non-union firms, shifting the
labour supply right and reducing wages in this sector below what they would be in
the absence of unions. Therefore, whether a threat effect exists or not, wage levels
are likely to be affected by the presence of unions.
11.2.2 Recent Empirical Evidence
Empirical work on the union–wage relationship has been based mostly on either
firm-level or individual data, yet since the 1990s a growing number of studies
using matched employer–employee data have emerged.⁴ For instance, Lalonde
et al. (1996) use American firm data to examine the effects of newly formed unions
on total output, employment, material purchases, wage rates, and productivity.
They find reductions in the first three, yet firms do not experience higher wage
rates. By contrast, in the UK, Hildreth and Pudney (1997) find higher wages
among unionized firms, and especially for individuals covered by a collective
agreement but who are not necessarily union members. Using matched
employer–employee data from Spain, Card and De La Rica (2006) find that
firm-level contracting is associated with a 5–10 per cent individual wage premium.
Moreover, the wage gain is larger for more highly paid workers, which is in
contrast to UK and US studies—where unions have tended to ‘flatten’ wages
across skill groups (Lewis 1986). This difference could, however, be related to
the fact that in the UK and US the comparison group is the non-union sector,
whereas in Spain it is the prevailing sectoral agreement.
As mentioned earlier, union studies covering the Global South are more
limited, and the findings are also more varied. For instance, Rama (2000)
states that in developing countries, unionized workers usually earn between
5 and 30 per cent more than non-unionized workers. In the same study, which
summarizes findings from Senegal and Cameroon, Rama (2000) shows union
membership to be associated with wages that are 8–12 per cent lower. This
atypical finding is attributed partly to the ‘subordinate’ nature of the labour
movement in these countries and the distortive labour market policies of the
1980s. This work then points to the importance of the nature of the links with the
government and political parties when it comes to how labour movements affect
wages. In the case of South Africa, Schultz and Mwabu (1998) show that the union
wage gap is as high as 145 per cent at the bottom decile of the wage distribution,
⁴ See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for a review of methods and results using matched employer–
employee data. In their comprehensive review of studies on developed countries, Aidt and Tzannatos
(2002) find the union wage effect to be between 5% and 15%.
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whereas at the top decile there is flattening so that the difference is 11 per cent.
This study, however, is unable to account for important firm attributes, such as
size, which are likely to explain much of the union wage gap.
Among the few studies on the union wage premium in Asia, Korean estimates
suggest very small positive impacts in the 5–6 per cent range (Fields and Yoo 2000;
Park 1991). In a case study of ten Vietnamese firms, Clarke et al. (2007) document
that trade unions are able to negotiate wages that are 5 per cent higher than those
in non-union firms. Moreover, Edwards and Phan (2008) argue that since trade
unions in Vietnam are involved in the central wage decision-making processes,
wages would be lower were it not for their presence and influence. However, the
study provides no evidence of this.
Methodologically, the above studies are based on either qualitative assessments
or cross-sections of individual worker data, and are thus unable to account for
workplace characteristics or time-invariant factors. Seeking to fill this gap, an
earlier study based on matched firm–worker data from 2007 and 2009 (Torm
2014) found that union membership in Vietnamese small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) was associated with higher wages and the provision of social
benefits. The current study builds upon and extends this earlier work by con-
structing a balanced worker panel, allowing for a more comprehensive analysis.
Moreover, since 2014 a number of regulatory changes, as examined below, have
been implemented which could influence the results. To set the scene, the next
section provides an overview of Vietnamese trade unions and the context in which
they operate.
11.3 Trade Unions in the Vietnamese Context
Under central planning, trade unions functioned mostly as a ‘transmission belt’
for the ruling Communist Party, as described in Zhu and Fahey (2000). With
Vietnam’s transition to a market economy, a rights-based system for the regula-
tion of industrial relations has been established, allocating a more prominent role
to trade unions. As for most developing countries, data on union coverage and
membership is generally limited. The Vietnam General Confederation of Labour
(VGCL) provides the most reliable and recent statistics, as summarized in Torm
(2018). According to these figures, in 2011 the total number of unions in Vietnam
was just under 110,000, the majority of which were located in the state sector.
In the non-state sector, unions were found mostly within domestic enterprises
(77 per cent), whereas union incidence among foreign direct investment (FDI)
enterprises remains relatively low (13 per cent). In terms of union density, this
was 26 per cent across the enterprise sector as a whole in 2011, compared with
16 per cent at the national level (including public servants and armed forces).
Total union membership was 7.3 million in 2011, with a slightly higher share in
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the state sector, yet considering that this sector accounts for two-thirds of unions,
the membership ratio appears to be higher in the private sector, as also evidenced
by the density figures. More recent figures from 2014 estimate total union
membership to be 8.6 million (not reported), thus, assuming a stable wage-
earner population, this indicates an increase in union membership over time.⁵
Regarding collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), as indicated in Torm (2018),
national coverage in 2011 was 28 per cent, and was highest in the state sector,
at 71 per cent, followed by foreign firms at 54 per cent and domestic firms at
31 per cent. Among unionized establishments the rate was around 67 per cent.⁶
11.3.1 The Legal Framework
The Amended Labor Code (ALC) and the new Union Law (NUL) both became
effective in early 2013.⁷ In the ALC chapter XIII, on trade unions, the purpose of
firm-based unions is clearly stated as follows: ‘trade unions serve to represent and
protect the lawful and legitimate rights and interests of trade union members and
workers; participate in negotiating, signing, and monitoring the implementation
of CBAs, wage scales and wage tables, work norms, wage payment regulations, and
bonus regulations among others’. The ALC further stipulates that labour contracts
are deemed invalid if, among other circumstances, ‘the contract contains an
agreement that prohibits or obstructs the employee from forming or joining
a trade union’. In addition to protecting the rights and interests of their members,
trade union representatives are involved in compliance procedures as stipulated
in the NUL, including the implementation of regimes and policies for the
employees, such as compliance with minimum wage provisions. The NUL does
not, however, set out specific requirements for wages to be above the minimum or
average wage in a particular industry, and thus the wage level depends on the
bargaining power of the involved parties. However, the employer must consult
the executive committee of the enterprise trade union on the formulation of wage
scales and labour rates.
The NUL also outlines the functions, tasks, and participation of trade unions in
inspecting, supervising, and monitoring the activities of agencies, organizations,
and enterprises, and confirms the rights of employees to establish and join trade
unions and to participate in trade union activities. Although enterprise trade
⁵ The VGCL had set a target of recruiting around 600,000 new union members every year between
2013 and 2018 (VGCL 2015).
⁶ To the extent that the figures are comparable this indicates an increase over time, as Clarke et al.
(2007) estimated only 20% of unionised private sector firms to have collective agreements (although in
Ho Chi Minh City the figure is around 65%).
⁷ See Decree No. 10/2012/QH13, and No. 12/2012/QH13, for details on the ALC and the NUL
respectively.
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unions are free to independently represent workers’ rights and interests, all trade
unions in Vietnam are required to affiliate with the VGCL—the higher-level trade
union which is the only legal trade union for Vietnamese workers. The VGCL
collaborates closely with the local labour department under the supervision of the
relevant (Communist) Party body, and this subordination of the trade union to
the Party means that workplace trade unions have limited independence and
ability to act as a pressure group on government. Moreover, given that trade
unions are generally headed by management rather than senior staff members,
they are characterized also by weak representational capacity in that dimension.
Compared with the earlier Trade Union Law (1994), the NUL incorporates
some major changes, including the requirement for all companies, whether
foreign-invested or local, to pay a mandatory union fee of 2 per cent of the total
payroll as a social insurance contribution, even if the enterprise has no trade
union. The 2 per cent levy is to be used for activities at all levels of trade unions,
including the upper-level trade union, which will collect the payment and subse-
quently distribute part of the fund to the enterprise trade union. Thus, this points
to an increased centralization of the ownership of all trade union assets under the
VGCL. Another new dimension of the NUL, as also outlined in the ALC, is that
the immediate upper-level trade union (usually at the district level) has the right
and obligation to represent and protect the legitimate and lawful rights and
interests of workers in situations where a grassroots (local) trade union has not
been established. Previously, this was only based on employees’ requests, with no
automatic default protection for workers in non-union firms. In fact, the ALC lays
out a number of provisions, including six months’ maternity leave, a two-year
work permit, and revised working and rest times, which appear to strengthen the
position of employees and decrease management flexibility. The impacts of these
amendments on employers and the economy as a whole remain to be seen.
11.3.2 Collective Bargaining
The ALC has sought to strengthen collective bargaining by extending the right of
workers in non-unionized enterprises to be covered by a relevant collective
agreement. The negotiation and monitoring of collective agreements provides
an important ‘test’ of the effectiveness of firm trade unions in representing the
interests of their members, and collective agreements should in principle include
agreed wage and bonus scales.⁸ Aside from the fact that one-third of unionized
⁸ Note that on 5 July 2019, Vietnam deposited the instrument of ratification of the Right to Organise
and Collective Bargaining Convention, set out by the International Labour Organization (ILO), but has
not yet ratified the international convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise.
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firms do not have such agreements (Torm 2018), the actual substance of collective
agreements is questionable, since they offer few benefits for covered workers
beyond conditions provided for by law. For example, a 2009 joint review between
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and trade unions found that most
agreements in Vietnam were initiated by employers to fulfil corporate social
responsibility requirements rather than as a consequence of genuine labour–
management negotiations (Grimshaw and de Bustillo 2016), demonstrating
employers’ unwillingness to bargain effectively. Furthermore, collective bargain-
ing rules purposely exclude many categories of workers, such as public sector
workers, foreign enterprise workers, subcontracted workers, etc., which is not very
conducive to achieving labour market inclusion.
The combination of weaknesses in collective bargaining mechanisms and
enterprise unions’ weak representation capacity as discussed above have meant
that workers have resorted to ‘collective bargaining by riots’. Such wildcat strikes,
in which workers—without the leadership of union officials—have demanded
wages higher than the minimum levels and better working conditions, peaked in
2008 and again in 2011, years during which inflation levels were also high and
therefore real wages low. In fact, over 70 per cent of around 5,000 strikes which
happened between 1995 and 2011 were on the basis of interests rather than
rights only (Chi and Torm 2015). The garment industry, characterized by a
combination of low wages and poor working conditions, is the most strike-prone
sector in Vietnam, accounting for 34 per cent of all nationwide strikes recorded
during 1995–2014 (VGCL 2015). However, since 2010, when the first sectoral
agreement for the garment industry was signed, efforts have been underway to
construct the foundations for more effective and resilient sector-level bargaining.
There are no official statistics on CBA coverage in the garment industry, yet the
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs estimates the CBA coverage to be
50 per cent of unionized companies in 2012 (Chi and Torm 2015). This is below
the average coverage rate of 67 per cent among unionized establishments, as
shown in Torm (2018).
The pressure of labour activism has made a growing number of employers
adjust their authoritarian approach to wage fixing by allowing for more partici-
pation of rank-and-file workers, and their representatives, in de facto wage
negotiations. Nevertheless, as long as the representation capacity of enterprise
unions remains weak, such models of de facto wage negotiations do not provide a
realistic alternative to collective bargaining. Given this combination of weak union
leadership, absence of specific requirements on wage levels, and ineffective col-
lective bargaining, the extent to which unions are associated with higher wages
becomes an empirical question. Against this background, I now turn to analysing
the union wage premium among Vietnamese SMEs.
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11.4 Data and Econometric Approach
11.4.1 Data
The chapter is based on matched employer–employee data from two SME surveys,
carried out during 2013–15 (Rand et al. 2014). In both years, the surveys included
a separate employee module consisting of randomly sampled employees from a
random subsample of firms stratified by location. Between one and seven workers
were interviewed in each firm, representing different categories. In Vietnam,
household firms are not officially registered by the central authorities under the
different enterprise laws (although they are listed by local officials), and as such
are not covered by the Trade Union Law.⁹ In other words establishing a trade
union is only mandatory for firms with more than ten workers and therefore not
for household firms. This is evidenced in the data, where only non-household
firms report having established firm-level unions and there are no union mem-
bers observed among household firms. For these reasons, I exclude household
firms, and focus solely on firms categorized as private enterprises, cooperatives/
collectives/partnerships (CCPs), and limited liability and joint stock companies.
After applying this selection criterion and undertaking a thorough data cleaning,
including checking the consistency of time-invariant variables between the two
survey rounds, I was left with an unbalanced panel of 1,594 permanent workers:
885 in 2013, and 709 in 2015, corresponding to 301 firms. Through identifying
repeatedly surveyed employees, I construct a balanced employee panel consist-
ing of 758 individual observations (379 in each year), corresponding to 152
repeated firms.¹⁰
11.4.2 Econometric Approach
In order to analyse the union–wage relationship, I estimate an equation where
individual wages depend on both worker attributes and the characteristics of the
firm where the worker is employed. Building on the basic model of Abowd and
Kramarz (1999), the specification takes the following for
lnYijt ¼ αþ Xijtβþ Zjtγþ Uijtδþ εijt: ð11:1Þ
Where the log of (real) individual wages for worker i in firm j at time t depends on
a set of individual worker characteristics ðXijtÞ and a vector of firm-level covariates
for the firm where worker i is employed ðZjtÞ. Our main variable of interest ðUijtÞ
⁹ For more detail on coverage see NUL No. 12/2012/QH13, article 3.
¹⁰ The reason for restricting the analysis to two survey rounds is to be able to construct a balanced
panel of workers. Since the employee module was not intended to capture repeat workers, adding an
additional year would reduce the balanced panel substantially, or even make it impossible to
construct one.
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is an indicator for whether the individual is a member of a firm-level trade union.
Finally, there is the worker-specific error term ðεijtÞ.
In estimating Equation (11.1), several potential biases are taken into account.
First, in order to address the possibility of autocorrelation arising from repeated
observations over time, the standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This allows for intragroup (within-firm) correlation over time and between
workers, while maintaining the assumption that the observations are independent
across firms. Second, bias may arise from the presence of unobserved individual
heterogeneity, such as worker ability, which influences both wages and union
membership. For example, an observed wage differential between unionized and
non-unionized workers may arise simply because the workers who are most likely
to become union members are also the ones with the highest unobserved abilities.
In order to account for such worker fixed effects (FE), e.g. ability, in the wage
specification, we estimate Equation (11.1) using the balanced panel. Third, bias
may arise if changes in union-related policies (for instance as result of the newTrade
Union Law which came into effect 1 January 2013) that influence membership are
also correlated with changes in wages. To overcome these potential sources of
endogeneity bias, I use standard matching techniques to control for determining
factors and selected observed time-varying factors that may simultaneously influ-
ence the decision to unionize and subsequent wage outcomes. More specifically,
I compare differences in wages between workers who unionized in the period
2013–15 and similar workers who remained non-unionized in the 2015 survey.
Finally, I use IV (instrumental variable) identification in order to control for
time-varying unobserved characteristics, e.g. if the decision to unionize is a
function of the perceived wage increase, beyond what is captured by unobserved
fixed effects (ability) or observed changes in firm/worker attributes. To instrument
for union membership (the endogenous variable), I use the share of firms that
have unions, by district and four-digit sector. In order to be able to assess the
validity of the instrument (test for overidentifying restrictions), I use a second
instrument—the share of firms reporting having good knowledge of the Labour
Code, again by district and four-digit sector. The key assumptions of this identi-
fication strategy are that (a) the IVs are strongly correlated with the individual
union membership, and (b) after adding the full set of worker and firm controls,
the selected instruments have no independent influence on individual wage
outcomes. If the IV assumptions hold, any observed relationship between union
status and wages has a causal interpretation for workers whose union membership
status is affected by the instrument (Angrist et al. 1996).
11.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 11.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the unbalanced panel. First, the
main variable of interest is union membership, taking the value 1 if the worker is a
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member of a union and 0 otherwise. Union membership averages 29 per cent and
increased from 27 per cent to 32 per cent over 2013–15. Next, the outcome
variable is the logged monthly real basic wage, which in nominal terms increased
from 3.7 to 4.6 million Vietnamese dong (VND) over 2013–15. The increase in the
real wage is less steep, from 3.2 to 3.7 VND million over 2013–15.¹¹
In terms of worker attributes, I control for gender, age, and education and
training of the worker, as well as job function, hiring method, and reasons for
choosing current job. The justifications for the selection of these covariates and
their summary statistics are as follows. First, previous studies on Vietnam (Bjerge
et al. 2016; Torm 2014) have shown substantial gender wage gaps, which are also
commonly found in other developing country studies (Jones 2001). Thus,
I incorporate a gender dummy and Table 11.1 shows that 55 per cent of the
sample are male workers. Second, I control for the age of the worker as a proxy for
experience—a key variable in the standard human capital earnings function
(Mincer 1974)—and include age squared to allow for a diminishing marginal
effect. The average worker age is 36 years. Third, I include a series of education
indicator variables, since educational attainment explains a large share of the
variation in earnings across individuals (Mincer 1974; Spence 1973). Moreover,
this also removes some of the bias arising from the possibility that unionized
firms may hire better-quality workers. Around 64 per cent of the sample have
finished secondary education, while the share of workers with a higher education
is 34 per cent, and this has risen over time. Fourth, the different job functions
are included as dummy variables on the basis that both wages and union mem-
bership are likely to vary substantially across occupation categories, beyond
what is accounted for by education. The largest share is production workers, at
48 per cent—a share that has increased over time, whereas managers and profes-
sional and service workers have seen declining shares over 2013–15. Fifth,
I include a dummy variable for whether the worker found their job through an
informal contact (knowing the owner or someone who works in the firm) as
opposed to via a formal contact (advertisement, employment agency, etc.), as this
has been shown to be associated with higher individual wages (Larsen et al. 2011).
Informal hiring remains the most common recruitment mechanism, at 67 per cent
of workers, yet with a slight decrease over time—an indication of increased
formalization of the Vietnamese labour market. Sixth, training incidence is
added since this has been shown to have an impact on workers’ wages in Vietnam
(Bjerge et al. 2016). In addition, theoretical models have predicted that union
workers receive more training and higher returns to training than non-union
workers.¹² Seventh, based on the reasoning that job choice preferences may be
related to both union status and wages, two indicator variables are included
¹¹ Real wages are deflated using province-level deflators, where the base is Hanoi, year 2010.
¹² See for instance, Booth and Chatterji (1995).
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Table 11.1 Summary statistics
2013 2015 All
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Member of a trade union 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45
Nominal monthly wage
VND1,000
3,733.50 1,306.09 4,643.70 2,213.03 4,138.35 1,824.29
Real monthly wage
VND1,000
3,178.79 1,073.89 3,652.00 1,758.40 3,389.27 1,438.58
Gender (male = 1) 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50
Worker age 34.14 9.35 38.65 9.32 36.15 9.60
None 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.07
Primary school 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12
Secondary school 0.66 0.47 0.62 0.49 0.64 0.48
College and higher 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47
Manager 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.31
Professional worker 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35
Office worker 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34
Sales worker 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
Service worker 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22
Production worker 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50
Informally hired 0.69 0.46 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47
Training 0.18 0.38 0.27 0.45 0.22 0.41
Job choice conditions 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
Job choice salary 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44
Firm size 34.22 39.73 41.64 48.66 37.52 44.07
Private 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40
Collective 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Limited liability 0.57 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49
Joint stock 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35
Urban 0.57 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.58 0.49
Sector low value added 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45
Sector medium value added 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
Sector high value added 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Wage negotiations 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47
Owner is male 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50
Owner has higher education 0.95 0.22 0.97 0.17 0.96 0.20
Share of women in labour
force
0.41 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.41 0.22
Share of professionals 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Share of casual workers 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.15
Observations 885 709 1,594
Note: Summary statistics are for the unbalanced panel. Real wages are deflated using province-level
deflators. VND20,500 is around US$1.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
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representing whether the worker chose their current job due to working condi-
tions or for salary reasons. Table 11.1 shows that 23 per cent indicate having
selected their job due to better working conditions and 26 per cent due to a higher
salary—both have risen over time, indicating that workers are having more
influence on the kinds of jobs they attain.
Turning to firm characteristics, I include firm size, legal status, location, sector,
wage determination method, owners’ gender and education, and the share of
professional workers, casual workers, and women. First, firm size (logged) is to
account for the commonly found firm-size wage premium (Oi and Idson 1999;
Söderbom et al. 2005), and the possibility that larger firms may be more likely to
be unionized. The average firm has 38 workers, and this has increased over time.
Second, due to the substantial variation in wages and unionization across firm
ownership types, I incorporate dummies for the different legal categories. In fact,
ownership form has been shown to be a critical factor influencing human resource
practices, including in relation to trade unions (Zhu et al. 2008). Limited liability
companies comprise the largest category at 60 per cent, followed by private firms
at 20 per cent, joint stock companies at 14 per cent, and finally CCPs at 6 per cent.
The share of limited liability companies has increased over time, while the share of
private firms has fallen, in line also with the overall rise in firm size. Third, I also
control for firm location, as wages and human resource initiatives differ across
provinces (Zhu et al. 2008), possibly due to the relative autonomy of provinces in
the implementation of centrally planned initiatives (Nguyen et al. 2007).
Table 11.1 shows that 58 per cent of firms are located in urban areas (Ho Chi
Minh City, Hanoi, and Hai Phong). Fourth, wage returns and human resource
practices may vary across sectors of production (Zhu et al. 2008), and thus
I control for the different sectors. The majority of firms fall into the medium-
value-added category, and this is increasing over time. Fifth, around 33 per cent of
firms respond that individual wage negotiation, which is likely to be associated
with both individual wages and union membership, was the most important
determinant of wages.
Sixth, the gender of the owner has been shown to be important in terms of
compensation, with female owners being more generous in the provision of non-
wage benefits (Rand and Tarp 2011). Between 2013 and 2015, female-owned firms
became more dominant, as indicated by the fall in male-owned firms from 50 to
44 per cent. Seventh, as well-educated managers are more likely to hire well-
educated workers (Rosenbaum et al. 1999), I include a dummy indicating whether
the owner has at least high school education. The share is very high, at 96 per cent,
and increasing over time. Eighth, the share of female workers is included because
this is likely to be correlated with lower overall wage outcomes, given the gender
wage gap (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Ninth, the share of professional workers acts
as a proxy for the general skills level of the workforce, which could be (positively)
correlated with unobserved worker-specific ability. Moreover, if, as a result of
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unionization, firms choose to hire better-quality workers such that productivity
increases are commensurate with the union-imposed higher wage (Lewis 1986),
average worker quality would eliminates the bias that might arise from a positive
correlation between union status and worker quality. Professionals make up
around 9 per cent of the workforce, and the share is stable over time. Tenth, the
casual workforce share (measured as the average number of casual workers
relative to the average number of full-time regular workers in a year) is included
as a measure of the stability of employment contracts, as this could be related to
both union and wage outcomes. Given that the sample considers only formal
firms, it is not surprising to see a relatively low share of casual workers, at around
6 per cent.
The appendix in Torm (2018) shows differences in firm and worker character-
istics by union membership status. As expected, (raw) wages are higher for union
members, and women are more likely to be union members. Union members are
slightly older than non-union members, but this is not significant. Union mem-
bers are well educated and are significantly more likely to have a college education
compared with non-union workers, who are more likely to have stopped studying
after secondary school. In line with the education figures, managers, office work-
ers, sales workers, and service workers are significantly more likely to be union
members (professionals also, but not significantly), whereas among production
workers non-unionization is more common. Union members are less likely to
have been hired informally, and training incidence is substantially higher among
unionized workers—as would be expected given that unions have a longer time
horizon and promote the value of training, and as also predicted by theory (Booth
and Chatterji 1995). The incidence of workers who chose their current job due to
the salary is lower among union members, indicating that higher wages are not a
driver of unionization. As expected, union members tend to work in larger limited
liability companies (and CCP firms), located in Ho Chi Minh City and Quang
Nam, whereas private, more rurally based firms have a higher share of non-union
members. Moreover, union workers are found in firms with highly educated
female owners, and a higher share of professional workers. Finally, in terms of
sectors, the ratio of union members is significantly higher in wood, chemical
products, and fabricated metal products.
11.5 Results
Table 11.2 shows the relation between union membership and individual wages.
In column 1, when employee attributes only are included, the union wage gap is
13 per cent, yet when the first set of firm-level characteristics (size, legal status,
sector, and location) are added in column 2, the wage premium falls to 10 per cent,
although this is still highly significant. In column 3, the second set of firm-level
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characteristics are added (owner gender and education, workforce shares, and
wage determinant), and the union coefficient remains just over 10 per cent. In
order to account for the possibility that unobserved worker heterogeneity is
driving the results, I use the balanced panel of workers to control for worker
fixed effects (i.e. ability or motivation). Column 4 shows that the union wage gap
Table 11.2 Wages and union membership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS FE bal.
Member of a trade union 0.133*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.091*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.055)
Gender (male = 1) 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.097***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Worker age 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Age squared 0.306*** 0.266*** 0.261***
(0.078) (0.066) (0.066)
Manager 0.308*** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.191**
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.082)
Professional worker 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.101
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.071)
Office worker 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.007
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.055)
Sales worker 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.067
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.073)
Service worker 0.042 0.054** 0.062** 0.067
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.080)
Informally hired 0.023 0.007 0.007 0.038
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.037)
Training 0.016 0.005 0.004 0.008
(0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.051)
Job choice conditions 0.000 0.015 0.020 0.027
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.041)
Job choice salary 0.058*** 0.042** 0.032 0.013
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.040)
Firm size and education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal ownership, sector and location
controls
No Yes Yes Yes
Owner gender and education No No Yes Yes
Workforce shares and wage
determinant
No No Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.21
Number of groups 379
Observations 1,594 1,594 1,594 758
Notes: OLS are based on the unbalanced panel. Year dummy included in all specifications. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
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remains when worker fixed effects are accounted for, yet the size of the coefficient
drops slightly, to 9 per cent, indicating that unobserved heterogeneity is positively
correlated with union membership. This suggests that higher-ability workers are
more likely to be unionized. This is in line with Torm (2018), which showed that
among union members the education category that comprises the highest union
member share is college education, whereas among non-union workers the share
falls as education levels rise. Also as shown in Torm (2018), non-production
workers are more likely to be in unions than production workers. The small
difference in the OLS and FE union coefficient is reassuring and indicates that
the numerous controls account for a large share of ability/other unobserved
heterogeneity. Assuming that the union membership contribution, which
amounts to 2 per cent of wages (and which, as outlined earlier, is now a mandatory
fee imposed on the employer), has not been deducted in the reported wage, the
real wage gain would be slightly lower. The results are in accordance with Clarke
et al. (2007) and Torm (2014).¹³
As for the individual worker attributes, these generally conform to human
capital theory. First, there is a substantial gender wage gap, with male earnings
being around 10 per cent higher than those of women, depending on the exact
specification. This is in line with similar studies (Bjerge et al. 2016) and appears to
have fallen slightly over time (Liu 2004; Torm 2014). Second, the age of the worker
is also highly significant and has the expected concave effect, with a maximum at
around 40 years of age. Third, the different occupation categories indicate a
substantial wage premium compared with production workers, especially for
managers, who earn around 30 per cent more—although this falls to 19 per cent
when ability is accounted for in the fixed effects specification. Fourth, as expected,
wages are higher if the worker has chosen their job based on the salary. With
regard to education (not reported), the results show positive and increasing
returns, with a college graduate having a wage that is 19 per cent higher than
that of a worker with no education. Yet when the firm-level control variables are
added the significance disappears.
For presentational purposes, firm-level variables are not reported, yet larger
firms pay significantly higher wages (Söderbom et al. 2005) and individuals
working in a CCP have significantly lower wages compared with private-firm
employees. Education and gender of the firm owner are not well determined, yet
the share of women in the workforce is significantly negative and indicates that
shifting from a 0 to a 100 per cent female worker share is associated with
approximately a 13 per cent lower wage bill, which is in line with similar studies
(Card and De La Rica 2006). Both the temporary worker and professional
¹³ Similarly, in the case of Spain, Card and De La Rica (2006) showed that unions were associated
with a 5–10% individual wage premium.
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worker shares are insignificant, the latter possibly due to being accounted for by
the individual education variables. The location controls (not reported) show
that workers in urban areas (Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi) earn more than
those based in rural areas. This is most likely because firms in urban areas pay
an efficiency wage in order to attract more productive workers. This is in line
with the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index (Malesky 2009), according
to which Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City ranked no. 1 and no. 4 respectively in
the 2014 labour policy sub-index, which among other components includes a
measure of labour quality (PCI 2015). High-value-added sectors (especially
transport equipment and furniture) generally pay higher wages than low-
value-added sectors, yet medium-value-added sectors (in particular rubber and
refined petroleum) generally pay lower wages than low-value-added sectors.
Further, the year dummy shows an increase in real wages of about 6 per cent
over 2013–15.
In Table 11.3 I zoom in on those workers who became union members between
2013–15 and compare the difference in their wages to that of similar workers who
remained non-unionized in 2015. This matching approach is applied to take
account of determining factors and selected observed time-varying factors that
may simultaneously influence the decision to unionize and subsequent wage
outcomes. In terms of control variables, column 1 corresponds to the first column
of Table 11.2, column 2 to the second, and column 3 to the third. In column 1,
when only employee characteristics (all lagged) are included, the union coefficient
is just below 15 per cent, which is reasonably in line with Table 11.2. However,
once firm controls are added, becoming a union member increases wages by
between 22–28 per cent, depending on the number and type of firm-level controls.
Table 11.3 Impact of union membership on wages, matching estimates
(1) (2) (3)
ATET ATET ATET
Becoming union member 0.147** 0.277** 0.222**
(0.066) (0.119) (0.103)
Treated 38 38 38
Observations 275 275 275
Notes: Average treatment effect of the treated (ATET) using bias-corrected nearest-neighbour match-
ing (four matches per observation). Estimations done using the ‘teffects nnmatch’ command in Stata
(Abadie and Imbens 2006, 2011). Matching is based on initial 2013 observed characteristics as
documented in the corresponding columns in Table 11.5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
independent and identically distributed (iid). Matched difference-in-difference (DD) estimates
are comparable, yet the coefficients are slightly smaller in magnitude (results available upon request).
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
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The matched results, however, do not consider the endogeneity bias arising from
the possibility of workers self-selecting into unions due to unobserved time-
varying factors that also simultaneously influence individual wages.¹⁴
Thus, in order to deal with potential unobserved time-varying factors, in
Table 11.4 I present the instrumental variables estimation (2SLS), using the
instruments as described earlier, and the results confirm the positive effect of
union membership on wages of workers. Columns 1a and 1b are based on the
unbalanced panel, showing a union wage gap of 12 per cent—which, reassuringly,
is in line with the earlier results in Tables 10.2 and 10.3. As seen in the first-stage
estimation in column 1b, the chosen instruments are significantly related to union
membership. In column 2b, based on the balanced panel, the union coefficient is
higher (21 per cent) than the FE in Table 11.2, but comparable to the matching
estimate in Table 11.3. As reported in the bottom rows of Table 11.4, the joint test
of significance (F-stat) indicates that the instruments are jointly statistically
significant at the 1 per cent level. Moreover, the validity of the instruments is
confirmed by the Sargan and Basmann tests of overidentifying restrictions (OID),
whereby I am unable to reject that the instruments are valid. All in all, this suggest
that the chosen instruments influence wages only through their effect on union
membership.
The preceding results are all based on the mean distribution of wages, yet in
Torm (2018) the possibility that the effects of union membership vary over
different parts of the conditional wage distribution is analysed using a set of
(semi-parametric) quantile regressions. Interestingly, the results reveal that the
union membership gain increases considerably as we move up the wage distribu-
tion. Thus, unions in Vietnam do not seem to be bargaining as effectively on
behalf of those at the lower end of the wage distribution, and this bias towards the
more skilled segment of the workforce is in part related to the management
structure and political subordination of unions, as discussed earlier. This differs
from previous similar studies. For instance, Schultz and Mwabu (1998) find that
in South Africa there are large union effects at the lower part of the wage
distribution and that these decrease towards the top. In the case of Ghana,
Blunch and Verner (2004) show a union membership premium which is signifi-
cant only for the tenth quantile. Similarly, in the US, Chamberlain (1994) dem-
onstrates that union membership has a larger effect on the lower quantiles than on
the higher quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages, and in the case of the
UK public sector, Manquilef-Bächler et al. (2009) find a higher union wage return
at the bottom of the distribution among males, while for females the premium is
constant across the wage distribution.
¹⁴ In addition to nearest-neighbour matching I also use double-difference matching, and the results
are qualitatively the same, yet the coefficients are smaller in magnitude in all columns (result available
upon request).
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The current analysis compares the wages between union members (in union-
ized firms) and non-union members (in union and non-union firms). However,
these two groups may not be directly comparable, because the latter have not been
faced with the choice of becoming union members, unless they purposely chose to
work in a non-unionized firm. Thus, the observed wage difference may simply
reflect the differential between being employed in a unionized versus a non-
unionized firm, rather than the individual wage gain associated with union
membership. In Torm (2018) the fact that that about 20 per cent of workers
in unionized firms are not union members, is exploited to test the wage gap within
unionized firms only. The results show that within unionized firms, the wage gain
from being a union member remains significant, and close to the estimates
presented in Table 11.2. Thus, what is observed throughout the current analysis
is the direct union membership premium—rather than spill-over effects from
there being a union at the firm, allowing non-union members to free-ride on
union members. This finding is not surprising given the low prevalence of
collective agreements and lack of effective bargaining in general.
11.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the union wage premium among Vietnamese manu-
facturing SMEs using matched employer–employee survey data over 2013–15. In
contrast to the situation in many developed countries, union membership is on
the rise in Vietnam, and recent regulatory changes are said to have strengthened
Table 11.4 Wages and union membership, IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
First stage Wages First stage Wages
Member of a trade union 0.116*** 0.211***
(0.035) (0.044)
Trade union—share of firms 0.706*** 0.756***
(0.033) (0.045)















Note: 2SLS estimations on the unbalanced sample (columns 1a and 1b) and the balanced panel
(columns 2a and 2b). Control variables are the same as in Table 11.5, column 3. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
248     ?
the position of employees vis-à-vis management. At the same time, however, the
NUL contains elements which imply increased centralization of trade union
assets, in turn adding to already limited union autonomy and representative
power. These aspects, coupled with the transitional environment in which unions
operate, make Vietnam an interesting case study.
Methodologically, the main contribution of the chapter, compared with similar
studies, is that the data set allows for the construction of a balanced worker panel,
making it possible to account for observed and unobserved time-varying factors
which may influence both union status and wage outcomes. The results show that
union membership is associated with higher individual earnings when both firm
and employee characteristics are controlled for, and that this effect holds when
using an IV approach to take account of unobserved time-varying factors.
Depending on the analytical approaches adopted, the union wage premium ranges
from 9 to 21 per cent.
The variation in the union-wage gap arises from the fact that union member-
ship gains are particularly high for workers in higher-level positions, in turn
implying a widening of the wage-skill differential, which is somewhat concerning.
Potentially, this could be countered by local trade unions more adequately repre-
senting all workers’ rights equally, as well as playing an imperative role in ensuring
that compliance with labour regulations is upheld. The fact that the incidence of
firm-based trade unions is on the rise is positive, yet their ability to act in the
interests of their members depends to a large extent on the existence and exten-
sion of collective agreements based on effective and inclusive bargaining. In this
area, Vietnam still has work to do.
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Conclusion
John Rand and Finn Tarp
Structural change has been a significant contributor to Vietnam’s impressive
growth experience over the past three decades. Labour has moved rapidly from
agriculture into manufacturing, with important improvements in livelihoods as
the result. The private sector has played a key role in this success story, and
especially SMEs have shown the necessary dynamism to adapt to an economic
policy and institutional reform design, characterized as decentralized experimen-
talism. This dynamism of private SMEs has played a crucial role for the pace of
diffusion of experimental successes—upstream and downstream along the value
chain. Whether this success will carry into the future when innovation of new
technologies (instead of diffusion of existing technologies) and TFP/productivity
growth (instead of structural change) will have to become core drivers of
Vietnam’s growth prospects (as argued by Dang et al. 2019) stands out as a
major challenge for future success.
In this book volume, we addressed this challenge striving to develop a better
understanding of what drives SME growth and progress, as well as uncovering
insights into the underlying behaviour of SME owners, managers, and employees.
Coming to grips with these issues, is essential for both the development profession
and policy-making community in figuring out how to address the task of pro-
moting continued and sustainable private sector development. The roots of this
volume grew from a time when the first Danida supported SME survey of
Vietnamese non-state manufacturing enterprises covering more than 2,500
firms (formal and informal) in ten provinces began in 2005.¹ The success of the
2005 SME survey became an inspiration. It led the Central Institute of Economic
Management (CIEM) of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) in
Hanoi, the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the Ministry
of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), the Development Economics
Research Group (DERG) of the University of Copenhagen and UNU-WIDER,
together with Danida to plan and carry out an ambitious series of SME panel
surveys. Since 2005, we have together implemented the survey of these enterprises
every two years. It is on this extraordinary foundation the present volume builds.
¹ The original survey drew inspiration from the work in 1991 by Ronnås (1992).
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Importantly, since the surveys tracked the same SMEs during a decade
characterized by significant economic and institutional changes and transform-
ation, the SME panel data is a very strong tool for gaining detailed and
policy-relevant information about private sector firm dynamics and enterprise
development in Vietnam from 2005 to 2015. Moreover, all chapters in this volume
cover owners, managers, and employees in these SMEs. They lived through and
experienced a critical period in Vietnam’s economic development process while
managing their daily private and productive lives. How firms coped and ended up
performing (or not performing) in a highly dynamic business environment under
a complex set of constraints is key in what the chapters of this volume tried to
uncover. In general, understanding the circumstances under which SMEs operate
and the constraints and opportunities they face is an indispensable input into
sound evidence-based policy-making for the future of the SMEs, the overall
economy, and the welfare of the Vietnamese people in both urban and rural areas.
The SME data are exceptionally informative regarding particular themes and
mechanisms influencing SME performance and development. This is why this
volume was organized in three component parts, including: (i) credit access and
management practices; (ii) political connections, institutional quality, and innov-
ation; and (iii) certification, working conditions, and union membership.
Throughout, the authors were determined to bring out the underlying dynamics
and on identifying associated policy challenges.
What did we learn from following the same Vietnamese SMEs over a decade?
A general, crosscutting, and telling insight from the chapters in this volume is that
around 10 per cent of SMEs close their business every year. Given the steady
increase in the population of SMEs recorded during the period 2005–2015
together with increasing average performance and productivity among survivors
and new entrants, this suggests that a process of positive creative destruction
forms part of the Vietnamese success story. On the other hand, we also found
coherent evidence supporting that there is significant heterogeneity among smal-
ler firms. One group, ‘the necessity entrepreneurs’, stays informal with low
productivity and lacks better opportunities, while ‘opportunity entrepreneurs’
often seek formality and perform better in terms of both employment growth
and productivity in the longer run. Accordingly, a key lesson here is that many of
the informal micro firms stay in operation out of ‘necessity’, not because of
‘opportunity’. The policy implication is that entrepreneurs, driven by respectively
necessity and opportunity, need different policies to prosper. A one-size-fits-all
approach does not work. This is a conclusion that emerges in different ways as
well in the more specific findings of the chapters in this volume. They include nine
more specific sets of conclusions.
First, resource misallocation reduces aggregate productivity and growth signifi-
cantly. Several of the chapters in this volume directly or indirectly address this
theme. One key result is that SMEs with higher marginal returns to capital are on
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average less likely to get access to financing, confirming that misallocation of
capital is indeed a concern with real economic implications. Moreover, and
importantly, rejected credit applications constraining investment activity are
especially limiting at the upper end of the investment efficiency distribution.
This leads to clear inefficiencies that future reforms of policy must surely address.
Second, one reason for economic inefficiencies is that the capital structure of
Vietnamese firms reflects that firms balance between the ‘trade-off’ and the
‘pecking order’ theory. Accessing formal debt is extremely difficult for well-
performing young (new entrants) and non-state firms. They bootstrap themselves
out of financial constraints by stretching and making the most of their internal
resources and assets. In contrast, established incumbents with access to formal
loans use their influence, and exploit tax benefits in response to financial distress.
Another key finding in this context is that informal debt markets are very
important for high profitability entrepreneurs, and while human capital encour-
ages entrepreneurs to obtain formal loans, its interaction with institutional quality
deters debt financing, and favours other financial sources. We reiterate that this
leads to in-optimal loan allocations that policy must address as a key priority.
Third, managerial capabilities are an important determinant for the growth
path of SMEs in Vietnam. Utilizing a multidimensional measure of managerial
capital, which combines both practices and attitudes of entrepreneurs, we see a
clear positive association between managerial capital and productivity. We also
see how changes in management practices support firms in becoming more
efficient over time. Importantly, ‘entrepreneurial attitudes’ are more important
for success than learning elementary business skills. This result has critical policy
implications for the design of entrepreneurial training programmes for SMEs.
Furthermore, effects are very heterogeneous across firm size, with improvements
in managerial capabilities having significantly more impact on smaller inexperi-
enced SMEs than on larger incumbents. Key insights for effective policy design
flow from these observations.
Fourth, having close ties to government officials may not only be beneficial for
smaller businesses wanting to stay ‘under the radar’. It may also be of importance
for SMEs operating at a larger more formal scale. Our data reveal that is very
important for formal SMEs to have political connections when it comes to both
the access to and the cost-of-credit obtained from formal financial institutions.
Having close ties through membership of the Communist Party of Vietnam
decreases the likelihood of being credit-constrained by 4 percentage points.
Moreover, politically connected SMEs accessing credit face lower cost-of-capital
than non-connected SMEs not excluded from formal financial markets. Finally,
the data shows that the impact of political connections is most valuable during
periods of financial distress, and less prevalent during business cycle upswings.
These findings are important. They reinforce the above finding that credit-
allocation is not optimal and that policy change would lead to greater economic
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
     255
efficiency. It also suggests that it is wise policy to consider expanding credit in
periods of distress as Vietnam did in 2007–08.²
Fifth, we have already observed that differential impacts across firm size matter.
So do different degrees of formality. Taking into account previous experience with
the Vietnamese licencing system, the most productive informal household busi-
nesses are not always those that ‘switch’ into formality. Many of these highly
productive informal SMEs do not perceive the potential positive effects of for-
malization as relevant for their business going forward. Tellingly, they state that
the reason for staying informal is that they expect the net costs from increased tax
payments to surpass the net benefits from formalization, also in the longer run.
We stress though that the data also give rise to an alternative explanation.³
Government ‘push’ initiatives towards increased formalization are heterogeneous
across informal household businesses, with the upper tier informal entrepreneurs
most likely to ‘escape’ civil servant demands for improved business licensing.
Combined with information from bribe incidence data, this raises the possibility
and critical policy concern of collusion between upper tier informal SMEs and
public officials. This highlights that no single policy can ensure proper balance
between the need for generating public revenue and the critical importance of
furthering firm efficiency.
Sixth, differences in institutional capacity/quality across the ten provinces
covered by the SME survey matter for the innovative capacity of SMEs. The
same goes for the interaction with human and financial capital scarcity
in these locations. This volume therefore zoomed in on the relationship between
the innovative capacity of SMEs and the relative abundance of resources avail-
able (slack resources) to the SMEs across different locations. This reveals that in
locations with a more favourable business environment the impact (on innov-
ation rates) of relative human resource abundance is lesspronounced than the
impact (on innovation rates) of relative abundance of capital. In terms of policy,
this calls attention once more to the need for pursuing an effective balance
between the allocation of scarce capital and human capital policy—and associ-
ated institutions.
Seventh, a promising policy-tool to protect especially mid-sized businesses
from downside shocks and minimize risk is the development of internationally
recognized quality control systems (i.e., certification). Interpreting business risk as
variability in revenue, variability in customer base, a practice of making informal
payments, and temporary firm closure, our data document that certified firms
experience lower levels of business risk. We once again find significant hetero-
geneity across provinces with firms located in rural areas and in the northern
² See Thurlow et al. (2011). ³ See also see Rand and Tarp (2012).
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provinces of Vietnam as those most likely to benefit from such internationally
recognized certifications. The policy implication is that further expansion of such
systems is highly recommended both with a view to expanding exports and from
the perspective of minimizing business risk in a challenging environment.
Eight, a particular strength of the SME panel data is its employer-employee
component. This made it possible in this book volume to add value to the
literature on the effect of different labour market conditions on individual
earnings. In the absence of adequate institutional mechanisms, trade unions
can help promote equity and social justice for workers through higher wages
and other worker benefits. The results show that the wages of unionized workers
are 9–22 per cent higher than the wages of non-union workers, controlling for
both firm and worker characteristics. This point to a potentially important role
for trade unions that could bring future advantages if further developed in
Vietnam.
Ninth and finally, the employer–employee data makes it possible for analysts
to establish whether workers obtain compensation through higher wages for
working in vulnerable jobs and in unfavourable working conditions. The results
indicate that there are no clear compensating mechanisms for working in poor
conditions, for having an informal contract, and for having few financial bene-
fits. In addition, workers in the upper tail of the wage distribution are more likely
to suffer due to working in adverse working conditions. Finally, employees
recruited through official hiring channels with an informal contract earn less
compared to employees, relying on a social network hiring channel. Such
differences are clearly a concern and they suggest that decisive policy action is
required to address them.
In sum, the need to develop the private sector and the importance of ensuring
that the motoring capacity of private initiative and entrepreneurial spirit is
mobilized to the maximum in support of sustainable development took a central
place in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved by the UN General
Assembly in September 2015. While the development community across a wide
spectrum recognizes the need for private sector dynamism, we know much less
about how to ensure this happens in practice, and what is required in concrete
terms when it comes to policy action. We put forward the present volume with the
ambition to help fill this gap with a series of insights from a dynamic East Asian
country that has managed to combine aggregate growth, structural transform-
ation, and poverty reduction. We hope this will help inspire action elsewhere as we
believe researchers and policy makers can learn a great deal from this experience.
We also hope that our findings and recommendations will help inform Vietnam-
ese policy-making in the continued search of how to promote private sector driven
development in the years to come and how to achieve the SDG aspirational goal of
leaving no one behind.
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